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Abstract 
This collection of work totalling over 85,000 words published over the 
period 2013 – 2018 addresses two separate but closely inter-related 
questions. ‘(1) What role can the European Court of Human Rights 
(‘ECtHR’) and the European Union (‘EU’) play in claims for the recognition 
of same-sex marriage? (2) What further impact do pan-European courts’ 
approaches to same-sex marriage cases have internationally?’  The 
publications have been produced at a time of rapid social and legal change 
worldwide concerning the recognition of same-sex relationships. When this 
work was begun in 2012 only six countries in Europe recognised same-sex 
marriage. At the time of writing (October 2019) this has increased to 16 
countries. However, many jurisdictions within Europe continue to refuse to 
recognise same-sex marriage. The last couple of years has seen leading 
judgments from the ECtHR, the European Court of Justice (CJEU) and the 
Inter-American court. As yet the ECtHR does not require contracting states 
to legalise same-sex marriage. In an era of Brexit, together with discussions 
by certain political factions regarding leaving the Council of Europe, there 
are increasing difficulties for pan-European organisations to act. This is 
particularly the case in relation to the topic of same-sex marriage, which 
often incites social, moral and religious controversy. The pieces in this work 
document the challenges raised by same-sex marriage claimants, the 
judicial and legal responses and the reforms that have or may still take 
place. Unlike many prominent works in this area which are highly influenced 
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by feminist or queer theories, this PhD focuses on doctrinal and 
comparative law methodology.  
These works make a novel and significant contribution to the prior 
knowledge base in a number of ways. (1) Originality is demonstrated by 
novel critiques of the Margin of Appreciation (‘MoA’) doctrine and by 
evaluating the strength of different legal arguments for proponents of same-
sex marriage before the ECtHR. The detailed critical analysis in the 
publications highlights the importance of interpreting the non-discrimination 
rights (article 14 ECHR) together with a dynamic approach to the right to 
marriage (article 12) and further development of the family law aspect to 
article 8 ECHR. (2) Lack of consensus between contracting states is cited 
by the ECtHR as a reason for not requiring legalisation of same-sex 
marriage. A novel critique is set out concerning the lack of certainty over 
how consensus should be quantified or measured. (3) Other publications 
demonstrate originality by predicting the potential for EU involvement for 
same-sex couples, in relation to both expansion of free movement 
protections for non-EU national same-sex spouses and in the area of 
private international law. (4) A new choice of law theory is recommended 
for use in essential validity cases concerning same-sex couples. (5) 
Originality can also be seen by the published work providing an immediate 
and fresh insight into the possible impact of Brexit on same-sex couples. 
(6) The final section utilises comparative law methodology to recommend 
the use of the incrementalist theory in a strategic manner. The central 
conclusion reached, is that proponents of same-sex marriage should take 
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a new more holistic approach, taking into account all relevant factors. This 
should include consideration of the role of the ECtHR in advancing human 
rights and the ever expanding role of the EU and international comparative 
law to set out incremental steps for proponents of same-sex marriage. 
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Written Commentary on the Cited Published 
Outputs 
 
Introduction 
 
England and Wales and Scotland legalised same-sex marriage in 2013 and 
2014 respectively. In July 2019 the House of Commons voted to amend 
Northern Irish law, resulting in automatic legalisation of same-sex marriage 
on 21st October 2019, unless the Northern Ireland Parliament is no longer 
suspended.1 Other countries have yet to take this step. Sixteen European 
states have legalised same-sex marriage.2 Others provide civil partnership. 
The latter concept takes different forms, with the result that there are a 
varying degree of rights protected.3 Certain Central and Eastern Europe 
states constitutionally define marriage as between a man and a woman 
only.4 Russia (a Council of Europe state) continues to maintain gay 
propaganda laws in force.5 Globally there have been far-reaching 
                                                          
1 Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Act 2019. 
 
2 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.  
 
3 See Waaldijk, K., ‘Great Diversity and Some Equality: Non-Marital Legal Family Formats 
for Same-Sex Couples in Europe’ in Waaldijk, K., Van Den Brink, M., Burri S. and 
Goldshmidt, J., ‘Equality and Human Rights: Nothing But Trouble – Liber Amicorum Titial 
Loenen’ (Netherlands Institute of Human Rights, 2016 Sim Special 38).  
 
4 Marriage is defined as a union solely between a man and a woman in the constitutions 
of Armenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Serbia, 
Slovakia and Ukraine.  
 
5 See Fenwick, H., ‘Same Sex Unions and the Strasbourg Court in a Divided Europe: 
Driving Forward Reform or Protecting the Court’s Authority Via Consensus Analysis’ 
(2016) 3 EHRLR 248 at 270. See also Johnson, P., ‘Homosexual Propaganda in the 
Russian Federation: Are They in Violation of the European Convention on Human Rights?’ 
(2015) 3(2) Russ. LJ 37. 
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judgments in favour of same-sex marriage in recent years.6 However, over 
70 countries worldwide continue to criminalise same-sex sexual relations.7 
The publications collected together for this PhD consider what further 
action can be taken at a pan-European level by both the European Court 
of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) and the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(‘CJEU’). Although the ECtHR continues to emphasise the need for a 
consensus before it will require contracting states to legalise same-sex 
marriage,8 it seems likely that at some stage the ECtHR will move forward 
on this issue.9 The ECtHR has made recent statements observing the rapid 
introduction of same-sex marriage across contracting states.10 The CJEU 
has also recently issued more favourable judgments to same-sex 
couples.11  This includes allowing non-EU national same-sex spouses of 
EU citizens free movement and residency rights, even where the couple 
                                                          
6 This can be seen from the United States Supreme Court judgment in Obergefell v 
Hodges 576 US (2015) from August 2015 which legalised same-sex marriage across the 
US and from the Inter-American Court Obligaciones Estatales en Relacion Con El Cambio 
De Nombre, La Identidad de Genero, Y Los Derechos Derivados De Un Vinculo Entre 
Parejas Del Mismo Sexo, Judgment of the Inter-American Court, 9 January 2018 which 
recognised same-sex marriage across South America. This ruling is binding on 19 other 
countries that are signatories to the American Convention on Human Rights, which at the 
time of the judgment did not allow same-sex couples to marry (several countries already 
did so, including Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay).  
 
7 See ILGA Sexual Orientation Laws https://ilga.org/maps-sexual-orientation-laws. 
 
8 Schalk and Kopf v Austria, App No 30141/04 (ECtHR, 24 June 2010) at para 57, 
Hämäläinen v Finland, no.37359/09   00)24/01/16 at para 39 and Chapin v France (App. 
No.40183/07), 09/06/2016. 
 
9 See Oliari v Italy Application Nos 18766/11 and 36030/11, 21 July 2015. 
 
10 See Oliari v Italy (n9) by the ECtHR at para 163. 
 
11    Relu Adrian Coman and Others v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări and Others C-
673/16 and MB v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions Case C-451/16 [2018] Pens. 
L.R. 17.  
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are relocating to a jurisdiction which does not recognise same-sex 
marriage.12 This collection, published over a six-year period, critically 
considers from the perspective of proponents of same-sex marriage the 
advancement of this concept in three distinct areas of law. Part one 
analyses European human rights law. Part two critiques the position of EU 
law concentrating on the impact of EU citizenship, EU free movement 
provisions and EU possible involvement in conflicts of law treatment of 
same-sex couples. The third part explores the wider international 
implications of pan-European approaches utilising a comparative 
methodology.  
 
Influence on Teaching, Engagement and Potential Impact 
 
 
The published work in this PhD has influenced my teaching. I introduced 
the Gender Sexuality and the Law module on to Northumbria University’s 
MLAW and LLB degrees and re-modified the Foundation Degree Law and 
Society course.13 Many of these outputs have been assessed following 
anonymous peer review as internationally excellent in preparation for the 
Research Excellence Framework (REF 2021). My work has also been cited 
                                                          
12 See Coman (n11).  
 
13 External examiners have commented on the Gender Sexuality and the Law course that 
it : ‘…provides students with the ability to develop independent research and analysis 
skills’’ and that ‘[t]here was evidence of innovation relating to learning and assessment in 
the Gender Sexuality and Law module, through an oral presentation counting for a 
percentage of the final module mark. I was nominated for the Northumbria Student Led 
Teaching Awards in 2019 for the content of lectures and speaking clearly in an 
understandable manner for students.  
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in international literature including as far afield as the US, the National 
Chung Hsing University, Taiwan and Estonia.14 Some of these pieces have 
been downloaded multiple times15 Other pieces have been requested 
internationally.16 Many of these publications are also the subject of 
conference papers given to many different international audiences 
including in Italy, Spain, US, Canada as well as across the UK.17 Following 
invitation I have now agreed to act as a Visiting Professor at Pisa University 
in March – April 2020.18 
Paths towards engagement include organising guest speakers at 
Northumbria University, as co-convenor of the Gender Sexuality and the 
Law Research Interest Group.19 I have co-organised two conferences on 
this theme, one with a domestic reach and one with an international 
                                                          
14 See Appendix 1 for a full list of citations. 
 
15 See Appendix 1 for example download information. 
 
16 Including requests from countries such as Spain, South Africa, Germany, Belgium, 
Poland, Ireland and Australia) through Northumbria University Library. A full list of citations 
and download information is available in Appendix 1. 
17  I have a record of speaking at international conferences on the subject of same-sex 
marriage and these include presentations at the ‘Rights on the Move Conference’ Trento, 
Italy, October 2014, with Lauren Clayton-Helm, ‘Recognition vs Non-Recognition: The 
Perils of Crossing Lines for Same-Sex Couples’ (2015) UACES 45th Annual Conference, 
Bilbao 7-9 September 2015, the Law and Society Conference, Toronto (Canada) (2017),  
the Law and Society Conference, Washington DC, USA (2019), the EPATH 2019 Inside 
Matters call in Rome, Italy in April the SLSA conferences in University of West of England 
(2010), Warwick (2013), York, (2015)  and Newcastle (2017) and internal presentations at 
Northumbria 2010 ,2016 and 2019.  
18 It is proposed that I will be delivering research seminars on their International 
Comparative Law PhD programme and teach students Gender, Sexuality and the Law at 
Pisa University, Italy, March – April 2020. 
 
19 See Appendix 2.  
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reach.20 As lead editor I have a book contract with  Routledge under the 
working title of ‘Same-Sex Relationships, Law and Society’21 which will see 
publication of 14 international outputs22 from Law and Sociology experts, 
from 5 different jurisdictions.23 This collection explores the necessity for 
both legal and social change with regard to the regulation of same-sex 
relationships and rainbow families, the status of civil partnership as a 
concept and the lived reality of equality for LGBTQ+ persons. As set out 
further in my conclusion, I am working with multi-university partners,24  to 
develop an impact case study which will include creating a free to access 
worldwide hub of LGBTQ+ legal rights specifically targeted at LGBTQ+ 
individuals connected with the STEM sector.25   
  
                                                          
20 See Appendix 2. 
 
21 Dr Guido Noto La Diega, Northumbria University is co-editor. 
 
22 Many of these were originally presented at the 10th September 2018 conference entitled 
‘Same-Sex Relationships, A New Revolutionary Era and the Influence of Legal and Social 
Change’. 
  
23 Authors are from the UK, Italy, the Republic of Ireland, Australia and Canada.  
 
24 These include Dr Antonio Portas, Northumbria University (Engineering); Dr Eugenie 
Hunsicker, Senior Lecturer in Mathematics and Director of Equality, Diversity at the School 
of Sciences, Loughborough University; Emma Nichols, Public Engagement Manger in 
Physics and Astronomy, University of Manchester; Henry Li, Queen Mary University; 
Sarah Cosgriff, Gender Balance Officer at the Institute of Physics; Clara Barker, 
Department of Materials, Oxford University and Alfredo Carpineti, Co-Founder of Pride in 
STEM. 
 
25 It is anticipated that this would be hosted on the charity, Pride in STEM’s webpage and 
would aim to change practice as to how LGBTQ+ individuals connected with the STEM 
sector access legal information. 
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Methodology 
 
In recent years, much literature concerning same-sex relationships has 
concentrated on queer and feminist analysis.26 In contrast the pieces in this 
PhD represent a doctrinal and comparative based approach to support 
proponents of same-sex marriage.27 Some queer and feminist theorists 
have questioned the very need and appropriateness of same-sex marriage. 
In their view same-sex marriage is not a goal to be aspired to.28 Marriage, 
an institution in which participation has been declining29 is not seen as 
‘worthy of imitation.’30 Feminist writers are reluctant to embrace marriage, 
due to its history of oppression of women. 31 On this view it is seen as 
‘inappropriate to the construction of egalitarian same-sex relationships.32 
Marriage was understood as ‘at best problematic for, and at worst deeply 
                                                          
26 Examples of leading feminist and queer theory scholars include Barker, N., ‘Not the 
Marrying Kind: A Feminist Critique of Same-Sex Marriage’ (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan), Duggan, L., ‘Beyond Same-Sex Marriage’ (2008) 9(2) Studies in Gender and 
Sexuality 155 and Auchmuty, R., (2004) ‘Same Sex Marriage Revived; Feminist Critique 
and Legal Strategy’ 14(1) Feminist and Psychology 101. 
 
27 Although not actively acknowledged throughout the publications, on reflection this 
represents a normative framework based on critical legal studies, as discussed further in 
text. 
 
28 Duggan (n26).  
 
29  Auchmuty (n26).  
 
30 Josephson, J., ‘Citizenship, Same-Sex Marriage and Feminist Criitques of Marriage’ 
(2005) 3(2) Perspectives on Politics 269, 273 referring to Weeks, J., Heaphy, B. 
and Donovan, C., Same-sex intimacies: Families of Choice and other Life Experiments 
(New York: Routledge, 2001). 
 
31  See for example Zylan, Y. ‘States of Passion, Identity and Social Construction of Desire’ 
(Oxford University Press, 2011) 204. 
 
32 Auchmuty (n26) 104. 
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oppressive to, women as a class’.33  Some queer theorists would also reject 
same-sex marriage as a goal because of concerns that it is seeking to 
incorporate the LGBTQ+ movement into the mainstream,34 which ‘conflicts 
with the goal of queer sexual liberation.’35 On this view LGBTQ+ people are 
considered ‘not [to be] the marrying kind’.36 Richardson for instance 
believes that same-sex marriage would lead to LGBTQ+ persons being 
domesticated and therefore de-sexualised.37 This ties in closely with a 
concern about a loss of the LGBTQ+ identity38 and a suspicion that same-
sex marriage means that the ‘dominative heteronormative assumptions’ 
are not questioned.39 Some queer theorists also believe there would be a 
danger that the advent of same-sex marriage would lead to this form of 
sexual relationship being ‘privileged … above all others..’40 In turn this 
would mean that different forms of sexuality could be excluded41 and would 
                                                          
33 Id.  
 
34 Richardson, D, (2005) ‘Desisting Sameness? The Rise of Neoliberal Politics of 
Normalisation’ 37 Antipodes 519. 
 
35 Josephson (n30)  273 referring to Warner, M. (1999), The Trouble With Normal: Sex, 
Politics, and the Ethics of Queer Life (New York, Free Press, 1999). 
36 Barker (n26). 
 
37 Richardson (n34).  
 
38 Duggan (n26). 
 
39 Duggan, L., ‘The New Homonormativity: The Sexual Politics of Neoliberalism’ in Nelson 
D. and Castronovo R. (Eds.) ‘Materializing Democracy: Toward a Revitalized Cultural 
Politics’ (Duke University Press. 2002) 175.  
 
40 Josephson (n 30) 274. 
 
41 Barker (n 26) at 12. 
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result in the creation of ‘sexual hierarchies.’42 Josephson concludes, on this 
view (in direct contrast to the pieces included in this collection) that same-
sex marriage would result in the citizenship of LGBTQ+ persons and 
women being hindered.43 Instead queer theorists prefer a more 
‘thoroughgoing resistance to regimes of the normal.’44 They reject labels 
and statuses such as same-sex marriage and civil partnership and argue 
that the multifarious ways in which LGBTQ+ persons have built their own 
relationships should be celebrated.45  
 
The proposal of ever advancing models of family life is attractive in tone, 
and queer and feminist approaches have done much to make sure that 
‘…entirely new ways of thinking about families and intimate life’46 should 
always be considered. Yet, whilst many feminist and queer theorists 
advocate wholesale change in society, such critique is often academic in 
nature and it is unclear what practical steps need to be made. Feminist and 
queer theorists in rejecting same-sex marriage never proceed to analyse 
the socio-legal issues underpinning decisions of the ECtHR and CJEU.  
The doctrinal approach taken in this work ensures these issues are 
                                                          
42 Heaphy, B.,  Smart, C., and Einarsdottir, A., (2013) Same Sex Marriages: New 
Generations, New Relationships (Palgrave MacMillan 2013) 132. 
 
43 Josephson (n30). 
 
44 Warner, M., ed. (1993) Fear of a Queer Planet: Queer politics and Social Theory. (1993, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press) 7.  
 
45 Duggan (n26). 
 
46 Josephson (n30) at 274. 
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thoroughly critiqued.47 This work does not proceed on the basis of legal 
analysis alone, but in a similar manner to that set out by critical legal studies 
advocates, considers that written laws must be seen in the context of 
politics and other societal issues.48  The idea that law is ‘neutral and 
unbiased’49 or that it yields ‘determinant and predictable results’50 is 
rejected. Instead the ultimate basis for a decision has to include a variety 
of factors. Throughout the work, I am concerned with legal analysis set in 
the context of a wider range of issues. Recurring themes include the 
influence of developing public opinion, what level of discretion international 
courts should award to contracting states and the debate surrounding the 
meaning of consensus. 
 
Critical legal studies advocate Unger considered that liberalism was in fact 
‘an ideological cover for decisions governed by power and the maintenance 
of inequality…’51 Critical legal scholars are motivated by a drive to ‘create 
                                                          
47 Williams, G., Learning the Law (2002, Sweet and Maxwell) at 206-207.  
 
48 Kairys, D., (1984) ‘Law and Politics’ 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 243. See also Hunt, A., 
(1986) ‘The Theory of Critical Legal Studies’ 6(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1, at 4- 
5.  
 
49 See generally Kairys, D, (1982) in ‘Legal Reasoning’ in Kairys, D., Ed., The Politics of 
Law, The Polemics of Law, a Progressive Critique (1987, Pantheon, New York) at 11-17. 
 
50 Hunt (n48) at 4.  
 
51 Unger, R.M., (1986) ‘The Critical Legal Studies Movement’  (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge) at 128. See also K Scheppele, K. L., (1994) 20 Anna Rev. Social 383 who at 
391 explains that ‘liberal legalism is exposed in CLS writings as a justification machine 
that serve primarily to reproduce social inequality…’ 
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a more humane, egalitarian and democratic society.’52  Applied to this work, 
the drive to favour proponents of same-sex marriage is influenced by 
greater recognition of same-sex marriage across Western Europe,53 
opinion polls,54 LGBTQ+ rights movements adopting a more positive view 
towards same-sex marriage55 and the result of the Irish referendum.56  For 
some proponents of same-sex marriage, this represents a symbolic ‘gold 
standard.’57 They see same-sex marriage as necessary for egalitarian 
treatment, the ultimate recognition of their same-sex partnership and a 
‘right central to citizenship.’58 This approach sees the legalisation of same-
sex marriage as allowing a choice for those who favour marriage. Marriage 
                                                          
52 Kennedy, D., and Klare, K. E., (1984) ‘ A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies’ 94 
Yale Law Journal 461. 
 
53 See n2. 
 
54 See the Pew Research Centre at http://www.pewforum.org/fact-sheet/changing-
attitudes-on-gay-marriage/ on ‘Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage’ who has surveyed 
public opinion on same-sex marriage since 2001 and documents increasing support.  
 
55 See Zylan (n31) 205 referring to Wolfson, E. ‘Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage 
Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men and the Intra-Community Critique’ (1994) 21 N.Y.U. 
Rev. of L. and Social Change 567, 611  and Aloni, E., ‘Incrementalism, Civil Unions and 
the Possibility of Predicting Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage’ (2010-2011) 18 
Duke J. Gender L. and Pol’y 105, 156.  
 
56 In a referendum held on 22nd May 2015, with a 60% turnout, 62% voted in favour of 
same-sex marriage and 38% voted against.  
 
57 See petitioner Sue Wilkinson’s witness statement in Wilkinson v Kitzinger [2006] EWHC 
2022 (Fam) para 18.  
 
58 See Bamforth, N., ‘Sexuality and Citizenship in Contemporary Constitutional Argument’ 
(2012) 10(2) Int’l J. Const. L. 477; Weeks, J.,  ‘The Sexual Citizen’ (1998) 15 Theory, 
Culture and Society 38 and Bradley, D.,  (2003) ‘Comparative Law, Family Law and 
Common Law’ (2003) 33(1) OJLS 127 and Kochenov, D., ‘On Options of Citizens and 
Moral choices of States: Gays and European Federalism’ (2009) 33(1) Fordham 
International Law Review 156.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
itself is also not a ‘fixed and immutable institution’59 and recent years have 
seen many changes in the nature of marriage, for example allowing inter-
racial couples to marry and allowing married women an independent legal 
status.60 If LGBTQ+ persons choose to enter a marriage, this means they 
have the opportunity to change the nature of marriage from within. The 
published work, especially publication 8, notes how the incrementalist 
theory allows change on a step by step basis.61  
 
This work also utilises comparative legal methodology in order to tackle the 
practical next step issues which are never addressed in theoretical, 
historical and cultural perspectives. This method involves comparing the 
law of one country to that of another.62  This can be broader to also 
encompass cultural comparisons. Writers comment on the difficulties of 
international comparisons in family law, because of important cultural, 
                                                          
59 Van Ness, G. ‘The Inevitability of Gay Marriage’ (2003-2004) 38 New Eng. L. Rev. 563 
at 564. See also Tobisman, C. ‘Marriage vs Domestic Partnership: Will We Ever Protect 
Lesbians’ Families? (1997) 12 Berkeley Women’s L. J. 112, 112 who explains that the 
‘institution of marriage is not monolithic and unchanging.’  
 
60 See for discussion Tobisman (n59). See also Loveland, I., ‘A Right to Engage in Same-
Sex Marriage in the United States’ (2014) 1 EHRLR 10 and Leckey, R., ‘Must Equal Mean 
Identical? Same-Sex Couples and Marriage’ (2014) 10(1) Int. J C  L.  5 at 11. 
 
61 This theory, also known as the theory of ‘small change’ was first advanced by Waaldijk, 
K., ‘Small Change: How the Road to Same-Sex Marriage Got Paved in the Netherlands’ 
in Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Partnerships: A Legal Recognition of Same-Sex 
Partnerships: A Study of National, European and International Law (Wintemute, R. and 
Andenaes, M (Eds) 437) (2001, Oxford) at 437 and subsequently developed by Eskridge, 
W. N., Jr. ‘Equality Practices, Civil Unions and the Future of Gay Rights’ (2002) and Merin, 
Y., ‘Equality for Same-Sex Couples: The Legal Recognition of Gay Partnerships in Europe 
and the United States’ (2002).  
 
62 See for discussion, Eberle, E. J., (2009) The Method and Role of Comparative Law, 8(3) 
Global Studies Law Review 451. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
moral and religious considerations in this area. 63  However proponents of 
same-sex marriage, acting in an era of globalisation64 are at the forefront 
of a fast developing area of law. Reviewing how other nations have 
grappled with similar claims concerning discrimination and equal 
protection, allows an evaluation of use of other legal responses.65  Foreign 
solutions are not adopted wholesale but rather that a ‘variety of solutions’ 
are studied.66  Appropriate strategies for same-sex marriage proponents 
can then be planned.  
 
Comparative law is most useful between legal systems which are similar 
when considering culture and demographics.67 The choice of comparison 
is therefore particularly pertinent.68 In this work, the main comparisons are 
between international courts such as the ECtHR and the EU. Comparison 
is also made with the Supreme Court of the USA, which allows comparison 
                                                          
63 Bradley (n58). Other writers also comment on the difficulties of international 
comparisons as regards family law. See Zweigert, K., and Kotz, H., An Introduction to 
Comparative Law (1998, Clarendon Press, Oxford) Clarendon Press and Diduck and 
Raday, 2012).  
 
64 For discussion see Picker, C. B., (2011) Comparative Law Methodology and  American 
Legal Culture: Obstacles and Opportunities 16 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 86 and Eberle 
(n62) 451.  
 
65 Josephson (n30) at 272 and Eskridge (n61). 
 
66 Hicks, S. C., ‘The Jurisprudence of Comparative Legal Systems’ (1983) 6 Loy. L.A. Int'l 
& Comp. L. Rev. 83 at 88. Zweigert, and Kotz (n63) at 15 explain  that ‘…comparative law 
can provide a much richer range of model solutions that a legal science devoted to a single 
nation, simply because the different systems of the world can offer a greater variety of 
solutions than could be thought up in a lifetime by eve the most imaginative jurist…’  
 
67 Eskridge (n61).  
 
68 See Eskridge (n61) at 41 who states that ‘…on the reverse side of the coin 
incomparables cannot be usefully compared …’ 
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to a federal system.69 The US Supreme Court has also had to grapple with 
issues of disagreement between states. Traditionally the US Supreme 
Court has been reluctant to interfere with family law at a federal level.70   
However the Supreme Court determined on 26th June 2015, that all US 
states were required to license marriage between two people of the same 
sex and to recognise marriage performed out of state,71 despite same-sex 
marriage being prohibited in twelve states at the time.72  Another reason 
why comparative methodology is useful is because it allows consideration 
for the ‘…international unification of law…’73 Although not all authors would 
consider EU involvement advisable,74 one of the conclusions reached in 
                                                          
69 Although differences between a federal system and parties to an international 
agreement have to be acknowledged.  See  Aloni (n55).  The US Supreme Court does 
refer to judgments of the ECtHR  See for example In Lawrence v Texas 539 U.S. 558 
where Chief Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion looked at constitutional precedents from 
abroad, referring to decisions from the ECtHR. For discussion see Eskridge, W. N. Jr. 
(2004) ‘Development – United States: Lawrence v Texas and the Imperative of 
Comparative Constitutionalism’ 2(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 555-560 
and Rehnquist, W. H. (1989) ‘Constitutional Courts – Comparative Remarks’ reprinted in 
Kirchhof P and Kornmers DP eds (1993) Germany and its Basic Law: Past, Present and 
Future – A German – American Symposium, (1993, Nomos).  
 
70 For discussion see Aloni (n55) at 141; Graham, K. T., ‘Same-Sex Unions and Conflicts 
of Law: When ‘I Do’ May be Interpreted as ‘No, You Didn’t’ (2004) 3 Whittier J. Child and 
Fam. Advoc. 23 and Rains, R. E., ‘A Minimalist Approach to Same-Sex Divorce: 
Respecting States that Permit Same-Sex Marriages and States that Refuse to Recognise 
Them’ (2012) Utah L. Rev. 393. 
71 Obergefell et al v Hodges, Director, Ohio Department of Health (n6). 
 
72 Prior to Obergefell (n6) the following states still banned same-sex marriage: Arkansas, 
Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas.  
 
73 Zweigert and Kotz (n63) at 24. 
 
74 There are legitimate concerns that a single European approach would result in 
unnecessary homogeneity and it is highly controversial as to whether it will be politically 
supported. For discussion, see Moir. G. and Beaumont, P., ‘Brussels Convention II: A New 
Private International Law Instrument in Family Matters for the European Union or the 
European Community’ (1995) 20(3) European Law Review 268 at 280 and Shuibhne, N. 
N., ‘Margins of Appreciation: National Values, Fundamental Rights and EC Free 
Movement Law’ (2009) 34(2) European Law Review 230 at 236 who remind us of the 
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this work is that the EU is one of the most important bodies to consider 
when reaching solutions regarding same-sex couples crossing borders.75 
This subsequently provokes further thought about the possible impact of 
Brexit on same-sex couples and is the subject of future publications.76  
 
Literature Review 
 
All eight pieces in this collection, together with this introduction and 
conclusion have extensive Bibliographies. Types of sources include both 
primary (legislation, EU legislation, international conventions, domestic 
case law, US case law, Canadian case law, EU and EctHR case law) and 
secondary materials. Often international peer reviewed articles have been 
my primary point of reference in igniting points of debate and development. 
These have been found on electronic databases subscribed to by 
Northumbria University where I have commonly used Nora pan-library 
searches.77 I have also utilised HeinOnLine, Westlaw, Lexis Nexis, together 
with EU and ECHR databases78 and the inter-library loan system. 
                                                          
importance of ‘constitutional differences’ referring to Weiler. J., ‘Fundamental rights and 
fundamental boundaries” in The Constitution of Europe (Cambridge University Press, 
1999).  
75 Zweigert and Kotz (n63) at 28 state that ‘[i]If barriers to trade within the European Union 
are to be overcome, legislation in the form of ratification of international treaties or 
Regulations or Directives is clearly indispensable in certain areas…’ 
 
76 This includes my personal chapter in the upcoming edited collection due to be 
published by Routledge.  
 
77 Nora is Northumbria University library cross-university search engine. 
 
78  The EU database to which I have primarily utilised is https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/homepage.html; and the European Convention on Human Rights utilised is 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng 
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Reference has also been made to Law Commission consultations and 
Hansard debates.79  Some key authors have been particularly influential.  
Barbara Stark’s article80 provided me with the initial drive about the 
relevance of globalisation as an issue in family law. I then applied this to 
same-sex relationships. Unlike other work I have taken a holistic approach 
across EU law, ECtHR law and conflicts of law.  
Part one of this PhD by publication contains a detailed critique of use of the 
Margin  of Appreciation (‘MoA’) by the ECtHR. In this context, I found work 
by Donoho, Sweeney, Benvenisti, and Brauch to be useful in setting out 
the framing of this debate.81 Donoho explains that a ‘balance’ has to be 
struck between universal rights on the one hand and ‘the competing values 
of self-governance, autonomy, and diversity’82 on the other.  Sweeney and 
Benvenisti both expressed doubts about the overuse of regionalism83 with 
                                                          
79 For example the Home Office, ‘Equal Civil Marriage Consultation’ (now closed) available 
at  https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/equal-marriage-consultation referred to 
in  Publication 1 and Jacqui Smith (then Deputy Minister for Women and Equality) who 
stated in the House of Commons that ‘I recognise that Hon. Members on both sides of the 
House understand and feel very strongly about specific religious connotations of marriage’ 
(See Hansard, HC, 12 October 2004, Col 177) referred to in Appendix 4 Additional 
Publication 1. 
 
80 Stark, B., ‘When Globalization Hits Home: International Family Law Comes of Age’ 
(2006) 36 V and J. Transnat’l 1551 
 
81 Donoho, D.L., ‘Autonomy, Self-Governance, and the Margin of Appreciation: Developing 
a Jurisprudence of Diversity Within Universal Human Rights’ (2001) 15 Emory Int’l L Rev 
391; Sweeney, J.A., ’Margin of Appreciation: Cultural Relativity and the European Court 
of Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era (2005) 54 Int’l and Comparative LQ 459; 
Benvenisti, E.,  ‘Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Standards (1998-99) 
31 NYUJ Int’L and Pol 843; and Brauch, J.,‘The Margin of Appreciation and the 
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights; Threat to the Rule of Law’ (2004-
2005) 15 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 391 
82 Donoho (n81) at 398. 
 
83 Sweeney (n81) at 461 he has commented on the view of some commentators about the 
‘rhetoric of cultural relativism [being] high jacked by political elites in order to repress their 
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Brauch considering that the ‘doctrine of [MoA] significantly threatens the 
rule of law.84 In publication one I applied these arguments in the context of 
the ECtHR consideration of same-sex marriage. Hodson’s article, 
published shortly after the Schalk and Kopf v Austria judgment,85 stated 
that it left the ECtHR ‘devoid of much to say about the nature of recent 
developments …’ 86 I developed this point in Publication one to argue that 
utilisation of the MOA by the ECtHR means that contracting states are free 
to determine their own domestic legislative provision, and could be relying 
on erroneous or discriminatory reasons in refusing to sanction same-sex 
marriage. Publication 3 further analysed how ECtHR use of consensus 
should be quantified or measured.  
Work in part one expanded pre-existing published material further to 
critique the ECtHR position regarding same-sex relationships. In this 
context articles written by Johnson have been particularly influential.87 
Johnson considered that the stress on privacy before the ECtHR limited 
                                                          
own population.’ Benvenisti  (n81) at 844 has discussed concerns about ‘inconsistent 
applications in seemingly similar cases due to different margins allowed by the court might 
raise concerns about judicial double standards…’ and concerns that emphasis on 
‘universal values… may lead national institutions to resist external review altogether…’   
 
84 Brauch (n81) at 115 . 
  
85 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (n8).  
 
86 Hodson, L., ‘A Marriage By Any Other Name? Schalk and Kopf v Austria’ (2011) 11(1) 
HRLR 170 at 173.  
 
87 Johnson, P.,  ‘An Essentially Private Manifestation of Human Personality: Constructions 
of Homosexuality in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2010) 10(1) HLR Rev 67; 
Johnson, P., ‘The Choice of Wording Must be Regarded as Deliberate: Same-Sex 
Marriage and Article 12 of the European Convention on Human Right’ (2016) 40(2) Eur. 
L. Rev. 207. 
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future development of case law,88 and in relation to its use of Article 12 
resulted in ‘historical presentism.’89 I have built on his work by suggesting 
a solution to these acknowledged problems. Publication 2 provides detailed 
analysis highlighting the importance of non-discrimination rights (article 14 
ECHR) together with further development of family law aspect to article 8 
ECHR and a dynamic approach to marriage (article 12 ECHR).   
Stalford’s writing was influential in relation to the advancement of same-
sex couples’ rights by the EU.90 Stalford’s article made a comparison 
between the EU the ECHR across a wider area of family law. I applied and 
adapted this methodology in publication 4 specifically focusing on same-
sex relationships. In contrast to Stalford I conclude in publication 4, that it 
is the EU concept of citizenship which had most to offer same-sex couples. 
This is borne out by recent case law, as discussed in publication 6.91  
Publication 5 considers private international law treatment of same-sex 
couples and the potential for EU involvement in that regard. Much of the 
background detail is drawn from Reed’s work92   where he advanced the 
                                                          
88 Johnson (2010) (n87) at 76.   
 
89 Johnson, P.,  ‘The Choice of Wording Must be Regarded as Deliberate: Same-Sex 
Marriage and Article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights (2015) 40(2) Eur L 
Rev 207. 
 
90 Stalford, H., ‘Concepts of Family Under EU Law – Lessons from the ECHR’ (2002) 16(3) 
Inter J of L Policy and the Fam 410.  
91  Recent CJEU case law in this context includes Coman (n11) and MB (n11).  
 
92 Reed, A., ‘Essential Validity of Marriage: The Application of Interest Analysis and 
Depecage to Anglo-American Choice of Law Rules’ (2000) 20 N Y School J of Inter and 
Comp Law 387. 
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concepts of interest analysis93 and dépeçage 94 in the wider context of 
essential validity of marriage.95 In publication 5 my co-author and I explain 
how interest analysis and dépeçage principles could be set out in the new 
context of same-sex relationships and recommend a new choice of law 
theory.96 We further advance the benefit of EU involvement in this area.  
Part three of this work considers the wider international implications of the 
work set out in parts 1 and 2. I have built upon Walldijk’s concept of 
incrementalist theory97 to suggest how this could be applied practically by 
proponents of same-sex marriage. I find his theory attractive as it accords 
with my methodology, considering that legal developments must be 
considered in a political and social context.98 Publication 8 considers that 
                                                          
93 Interest analysis is the idea that the most applicable law is the one that has the most 
interest in being applied after consideration of public policy reasons and was originally 
founded in the USA and applied on a case-by-case basis..  Interest analysis was founded 
by Brainerd Currie see Currie, B., Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (1963). 
 
94 The concept of dépeçage is a conflict of laws where different issues within a case may 
be governed by the laws of different states. 
 
95 Formal validity looks at the rules and requirements surrounding the actual ceremony, 
such as the requirement of witnesses and the vows that must be undertaken. This is 
usually uncontroversial and depends upon the lex loci celebratioinis. Essential validity on 
the other hand covers all aspects of a marriage which are not associated with formalities, 
the primary example being the capacity to marry. Reed (n92) at 388 sets out that the focus 
of his article was to consider in relation to the issue of validity of marriage how a ‘new two-
centred rationale, derived from interest analysis and depecage principles… ought to be 
applied to resolve difficulties when the laws of two or more interested jurisdictions present 
a conflict.’ Competing policy concerns are then set out. 
 
96 This is termed the continued recognised relationship theory. It is suggested that the 
choice of law rule should be that of the country where the couple intends to reside, or if 
their marriage has been subsisting for a reasonable period of time, it should be the law of 
the country where they previously lived. 
 
97 The incrementalist or step by step approach was first set out by Waaldijk (n61).   
98 See reference to critical legal theorists such as Kairys (n48) and Hunt (n48) , more fully 
considered in my methodology section.   
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legislative approaches are preferable to judicial approaches as they allow 
action by democratically elected representatives. Public opinion and 
enforcement of laws are interwoven99 and examples of correlation between 
public opinion and the enforcement of laws in the long term are cited.100  
Advancement of the Field of Study and Structure 
 
The published pieces of work in this PhD demonstrate that in an era of 
globalisation, proponents of same-sex marriage should take a new more 
holistic approach towards recognition of same-sex couples’ rights. This 
should consider all relevant factors  including legal and social rights, the 
role of the ECtHR in advancing human rights, the ever expanding role of 
the EU and the growing interplay between the two. In contrast to more 
recent theoretical literature, I have taken a doctrinal and comparative law 
approach. The social-legal issues underpinning decisions of the ECtHR 
and CJEU are thoroughly critiqued.101  Law is studied in the context of 
political and societal issues102 in support of proponents of same-sex 
marriage who consider that same-sex marriage is necessary for egalitarian 
treatment and a ‘right central to citizenship.’103 This work also utilises 
                                                          
99 See Gonzalez, K (2010) Gay Marriage and Gay Union Law in the Americas, 16 Law and 
Business Review America 285. 
100 A change in the law alone will not result in public acceptance of same-sex couples and 
publication 8 gives South Africa as an example in this context. See also Pew Research 
Centre, ‘Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage at http://www.pewforum.org/fact-
sheet/changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage/  
101 For discussion of doctrinal approaches see Williams (n47) at 206-207. 
 
102 See Kairys (n48) and Hunt (n48) at 4 –5.  
 
103 See n58. 
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comparative legal methodology in order to tackle the practical next step 
issues which are seldom addressed in theoretical perspectives.104  One of 
the main conclusions reached is the importance of EU action when 
considering solutions for same-sex couples crossing borders.105   
Each published piece has its own specific point of originality recognised 
through the process of peer review. The publications in part one critically 
consider the position of the ECtHR. They contain a critique of the ECtHR’s 
MoA doctrine and chart a way forward for the ECtHR utilising Article 14 
ECHR (right to equality) in connection with new revitalised arguments 
under the family law aspect of Article 8 ECHR and a dynamic interpretation 
of Article 12 ECHR (right to marry). In addition it is argued that if the ECtHR 
continues to stress consensus in this area it should at least consider further 
how consensus is to be quantified or measured. Part two then considers 
the recognition of same-sex couples’ rights before the EU. Although it is the 
ECtHR which has led the way in the protection of rights for LGBTQ+ 
persons and same-sex couples, publication 4 considered that it is the EU 
concept of citizenship together with a closer interplay with the ECtHR which 
offers greater support for those who favour same-sex marriage. As 
discussed in publication 6 this conclusion has been subsequently borne out 
                                                          
104 Comparative legal methodology is the act of comparing the law of one country to that 
of another.’ See Eberle (n62).  
 
105 Also see Zweigert and Kotz (n63) who comment at 28 on the need of international 
treaties or Regulations or Directives ‘(i)f barriers to trade within the European Union are to 
be overcome…’ 
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by further case law.106 Publication 5 sets out a novel choice of law theory 
to be applied to same-sex relationships which is termed the ‘continued 
recognised relationship theory.’107 Whilst the pieces in parts one and two 
consider the approaches of pan European courts including the ECtHR and 
the CJEU, part three utilises comparative legal methodology between 
different jurisdictions, to analyse the further potential impact of this work 
internationally for proponents of same-sex marriage.108  The symbolic 
status of same-sex marriage is stressed as is the close relationship 
between public opinion and the enforcement of laws.109 Incrementalism is 
applied in a strategic manner to argue that civil partnership can be seen as 
a ‘stepping stone’ on route to same-sex marriage and to advocate the 
legislative (as opposed to judicial) approach to legalisation of same-sex 
marriage.110 Change continues to occur, with recent developments 
including heterosexual civil partnerships.111 
                                                          
106 Most noticeably Coman (n11) and MB (n11).  
 
107 It is suggested that the choice of law rule should be that of the country where the couple 
intends to reside, or if their marriage has been subsisting for a reasonable period of time, 
it should be the law of the country where they previously lived.  
 
108 Brenda Cossman also favours comparative approaches. See Cossman, B., ‘Migrating 
Marriages and Comparative Constitutionalism, in Choudry S., (Ed.) ‘The Migration of 
Constitutional Ideas’ (Cambridge University Press 2006) at 209. 
 
109 Gonzalez (n99) 285 explains that ‘public opinion and enforcement of laws are 
‘interwoven… because the law has little meaning if it is not enforced.’ 
 
110 Richards, D.A.J. in a ‘Book Review [of] Stychin, C.F., ‘Governing Sexuality: the 
Changing Politics of Citizenship and Law Reform’ (Hart Publishing: Oxford and Portland, 
Oregon)’ (2004) 2(3) Int J Const L 727 at 733 argues that ‘recognition should happen 
democratically rather than judicially and argue for a democracy in which gay are mobilised 
a full citizens, demanding their rights…’ 
 
111 The Civil Partnerships, Marriages and Deaths (Registration etc) Act 2019 received royal 
assent on 26th March 2019, and came into force on 26th May 2019. 
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Commentary on cited Published Work contained in 
PART ONE: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE 
APPROACH OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
(1) Hamilton, F., ‘Why Margin of Appreciation is Not the Answer to the Gay 
Marriage Debate’ 1(2013) European Human Rights Law Review 47 -55.  
 
(2) Hamilton, F., ‘The Case for Same-Sex Marriage Before the European 
Court of Human Rights’ (2017) Journal of Homosexuality 1-25.  
 
(3) Hamilton, F., ‘Same-Sex Marriage, Consensus, Certainty and the 
European Court of Human Rights’ (2018) 1 European Human Rights 
Law Review 33 – 45. 
 
Publication one sets out the international context of this work which 
underpins all parts of this PhD. The demands of globalisation and the 
increasing numbers of international families can lead to difficulties when 
families relocate especially if their marital situation is not explicitly 
recognised.112 Publication one (published January 2013) was particularly 
                                                          
112 See Stark (n80).  
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timely in relation to domestic consideration of same-sex marriage. 
Following publication a Member of the House of Lords requested to read it 
(through their library) prior to the House of Lords’ debate on the Marriage 
(Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013. Publications one to three look in detail at 
ECtHR treatment of same-sex marriage proponents. The leading case of 
Schalk and Kopf v Austria, determined that ECtHR contracting states are 
not obliged to legislate for same-sex marriage.113 The ECtHR considers 
that a consensus between contracting states needs to develop first.114 
Recent cases confirm the position,115 although now contracting states are 
obliged to provide legal protection for same-sex couples.116 The 
publications in Part One consider a series of inter-linking themes, focusing 
on use of margin of appreciation (MoA), use of consensus analysis by the 
ECtHR and by considering new ways forward for the ECtHR.  
Publication one offers an original critique of the concept of MoA , as used 
by the ECtHR in the context of same-sex marriage. The MoA or ‘latitude of 
                                                          
113 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (n8).  
 
114 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (n8) para 94. 
 
115 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (n8); Hämäläinen v Finland (n8) and Chapin 
v France (n8). 
116 Following Oliari v Italy (n9) the ECtHR now obliges contracting states to provide some 
level of legal protection, although each individual contracting state can decide what legal 
rights to attach to this status. However, in its judgement the ECtHR concentrated upon the 
difference between the lack of legal protection and the social reality thereby arguably trying 
to confine it to the facts existing on the ground in Western democracies. See also Fenwick. 
H., and Hayward, A., ‘Rejecting Asymmetry of Access to Formal Relationship Statuses for 
Same and Different-Sex Couples at Strasbourg and Domestically’ [2017] EHRLR 544. 
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deference or error’117 is when ECtHR international supervision should give 
way to contracting states’ discretion. The MoA in relation to same-sex 
marriage is a wide one. The ECtHR utilises the MoA to balance the 
competing demands of universalism of human rights (one of the primary 
justifications of any human rights system)118 and the concept of relativism, 
which requires international courts to be aware of different cultural, 
sociological and religious differences between contracting states. 
Relativism is arguably more appropriate in areas of social and moral 
controversy such as same-sex marriage where large ‘blocs of … 
population(s) disagree.’119 These concerns were even more stark in 2013 
when only six countries in Europe recognised same-sex marriage. 
Publication one after reinforcing well-known criticisms of the MoA doctrine 
namely that it lacks clarity120 and that it is uncertain and vague,121 goes 
further in arguing that utilisation of the MoA by the ECtHR means that the 
ECtHR does not examine the conduct of contracting states, leaving them 
                                                          
117 Butler, P., ‘Margin of Appreciation – A Note Towards a Solution in the Pacific (2008-
2009) 39 VULWR 687 referring to Yourow, H.C., ‘Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the 
Dynamics of European Human Rights Jurisprudence’ (Leiden, Brill, 1996) at 13. 
 
118 For discussion see Donoho (n81). 
 
119 Shany, Y., ‘Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?’ 
(2005) 16(5) EJIL 907 – 940. 
 
120 For comment see Lord Lester, "The European Convention in the New Architecture of 
Europe" (1996) PL 6. 
 
121 See Brauch (n81) 113 referring to Lavender, N., ‘The Problem of the Margin of 
Appreciation’, (1997) 4 EHRLR 380; Letsas, G., ‘Two Concepts of the Margin of 
Appreciation’, (2006) 26(4) OJLS 705; Shany (n120) and Hutchinson, M., ‘The Margin of 
Appreciation Doctrine in the European Court of Human Rights’, (1999) 48 ICLQ 638. 
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free to determine their own domestic legislative provisions. Publication one 
then makes the novel point that consequently use of the MoA means that 
contracting states could be relying on erroneous or discriminatory reasons 
in refusing to sanction same-sex marriage. There are numerous examples 
of erroneous reasons which could maintain influence in contracting states, 
but which have been discredited. Erroneous arguments include the 
‘slippery slope’ argument, the definitional argument and the procreation 
argument. The slippery slope argument, that same-sex marriage would 
inevitably lead to polygamy or even bestiality has been discredited by the 
complete lack of public support for the latter concepts. Similarly the 
definitional argument122 meaning that courts are bound by definitions set 
out years ago, contrasts to the ECtHR view in other cases that their role 
should be ‘dynamic and evolutive.’123  The procreation argument, that 
marriage should be about producing children has been widely discredited 
in leading international case law by the very fact that this would also bar 
the sick or elderly from marrying, as they also do not have the ability to 
procreate.124  
                                                          
122 The definitional argument has been explained by Carpenter, D., ‘Bad Arguments 
Against Gay Marriage’ (2005-2006) 7 Fla. Coastal L. Rev 181.to mean that a homosexual 
couple can never marry as by definition they are not man and woman.  
 
123 See for example the ECtHR position in relation to trans-persons in the case of Goodwin 
v UK (App No.28957/95) (1996) 22 EHRR 123 at paragraph 74. 
 
124 For example see Justice Scalia in Lawrence v Texas (n70); Minister of Home Affairs 
and Another v Fourie and Another (CCT 60/40)[2005] ZACC 19; 2006 (3) BCLR 355 (CC); 
2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) (1 December 2005) per Sachs J and Ghaidan v Godin –Mendoza 
[2004] UKHL 30, [2004] 2 AC 557, [2004] 3 All 411, [2004] 3 WLR 113 per Baroness Hale 
of Richmond. 
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Even more worryingly, use of the MoA doctrine means that contracting 
states could be acting on the basis of discriminatory reasons.125 Publication 
one demonstrates that the ECtHR is well aware of the possibility of 
discrimination against LGBTQ+ persons, as shown by a series of cases 
where the ECtHR condemned homophobic practices of contracting 
states.126 In other case law the ECtHR has found that discrimination against 
LGBTQ+ persons requires particularly strong justification.127 Yet the use of 
the MoA in same-sex marriage cases, means that the ECtHR never 
investigates the reasons behind a contracting states’ course of action. This 
means that discriminatory reasons could be influential.128  Having identified 
difficulties with the current approach taken by the ECtHR in relation to 
same-sex marriage, publication two concentrates on identifying appropriate 
steps forward for proponents of same-sex marriage before the ECtHR.   
                                                          
125 It should be noted that Article 14 Prohibition of discrimination is a conditional right. 
Article 14 provides that ‘[t]he enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, 
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association 
with a national minority, property, birth or other status…’ A claim can only be brought under 
Article 14, providing another alleged breach of the European Convention is put forward.  
 
126 See for example Dudgeon v United Kingdom (App. No. 7525/76) (1982) 4 EHRR 149; 
Norris v Ireland (App. No.10581/83) (1988) 13 EHRR 186; ADT v UK (App. No.35765/97) 
(2001) 31 EHRR 33; L and V v Austria (App. No.s39392/98 and 39829/98) (2003) 36 
EHRR 1022; SL v Austria (App. No.45330/99)  (2003) 37 EHRR 799; Laskey, Jaggard 
and Brown v United Kingdom (App. Nos.21627/93, 21628/93, 21974/93) (1997) 24  EHRR 
39; Smith and Grady v United Kingdom (App. Nos.33985/96 and 33986/96) (2000) 29 
EHRR 493 and Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v Portugal (App. No 33290/96). 
 
127 For example see Karner v Austria, Application No 40016/98, Judgment of 24 July 2003. 
 
128 See minority judge Rozakis, Spielmann and Jebens in Schalk and Kopf v Austria (n8) 
who in their joint dissenting opinion comment that having identified a ‘relevantly similar 
situation’ and emphasised that ‘differences based on sexual orientation require particularly 
serious reasons by way of justification’ that there should have been a violation of Article 
14 found in conjunction with Article 8.  
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Publication 2 (November 2017) is published in the leading international 
inter-disciplinary Journal of Homosexuality.129 By that date, thirteen Council 
of Europe members had legalised same-sex marriage.130  Publication 2 is 
drafted for proponents of same-sex marriage and sets out the best strategy 
for success before the ECtHR. Whilst the ECtHR has played a major role 
in the advancement of LGBTQ+ rights,131 traditionally, proponents in these 
cases have relied upon privacy arguments (under article 8 ECHR).132 
Privacy based claims are unhelpful when it comes to same-sex marriage 
claims. Lord Penzance stated in the leading case of Hyde v Hyde in 1866 
                                                          
129 The Journal of Homosexuality is described on ResearchGate as being ‘highly 
acclaimed [being] devloted to scholarly research on homosexuality, including sexual 
practices and gender roles and their cultural, hitorica, interpersonal and modern social 
contexts..’ See https://www.researchgate.net/journal/0091-
8369_Journal_of_Homosexuality   last accessed August 2019.  
 
130 As at November 2017 the following ECtHR contracting state had enacted same-sex 
marriage laws: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom (apart from Northern 
Ireland).   
 
131 In practice the ECtHR has adopted a gradually increasing level of protections for 
LGBTQ+ persons and same-sex couples. This began with the decriminalisation of sodomy 
laws in Dudgeon v United Kingdom (n126) before moving on to equality in employment 
Smith and Grady v UK (n126) and Lustig-Prean and Beckett v UK (Apps 31417/96 and 
32377/96) and tenancy conditions Karner v Austria (n127).  EB v France (Application No. 
43546/ 02 Judgement of 22nd January 2008) concerned adoption rights and Vallianotos v 
Greece, Application Nos 29381/09 and 32684/09, Judgment of 7 November 2013 
concerned civil partnership rights where these have already been introduced for 
heterosexuals. In Oliari v Italy (n9) the ECtHR determined that same-sex couples in 
contracting states had the right to some form of civil union or registered partnership. In 
Orlandi v Italy (Application no. 26431/12), Judgement of 14 December 2017, the ECtHR 
held that a failure to recognise a same-sex marriage conducted abroad contravened the 
European Convention.  
 
132 Other authors who also argue this point include Johnson, P., ‘An Essentially Private 
Manifestation of Human Personality’: Constructions of Homosexuality in the European 
Court of Human Rights’ (n87); Stark (n80) and Danisi, C.,  ‘How far can the European 
Court of Human Rights go in the Fight Against Discrimination? Defining New Standards in 
its Non-Discrimination Jurisprudence’ (2011) 9(4) Inter J of Const. L 793. This is reflected 
by case law before the ECtHR including for example Dudgeon v UK (n126) ; Sutherland v 
UK, Application No 25186/94, Judgment of 21 May 1996; Smith and Grady v UK (n126) 
and Lustig-Prean and Beckett v UK (n131). 
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that marriage is ‘…more than a contract’133  as it is an institution and 
‘confers a status.’134  It is a concept very much on the public stage. The 
stress on privacy before the ECtHR has resulted in a ‘significant limitation… 
in respect of the ‘evolution’ of LGBTQ+ rights.’135 In many cases the ECtHR 
stated that it did not need ‘to rule on the merits’ of Article 14 as the same 
complaint had already been examined under Article 8.’136 However, 
publication 2 goes on to explain that in relation to same-sex marriage use 
of equality arguments is necessary. Marriage is seen by many as a key 
component of equal citizenship.137 On this view denial of same-sex 
marriage to the LGBTQ+ community has been referred to as a ‘domestic 
apartheid’138 and a denial of ‘full political standing’139  for LGBTQ+ persons. 
                                                          
133 Per Lord Penzance in Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee (1866) LR 1 P&D 130. 
 
134 Lord Penzance's statement in Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee (n133). 
 
135 Johnson, P,, ‘An Essentially Private Manifestation of Human Personality’: 
Constructions of Homosexuality in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2010) (n87) at 
76. For further criticism see also Sedgewick, E., Epistemology of the Closet 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990) at 71 and Grigolo, M., ’Sexualities and the ECHR: 
Introducing the University Sexual Legal Subject’ (2003) 14(5) EJIL 14(5) 1023 at 1040. 
 
136 See for example Dudgeon v United Kingdom (n126) at paragraph 69.  Grigolo (n135) 
reports at 1030 that in this case the ‘[c]ourt did not find it necessary to examine the case 
under Article 14.’ See also  ADT v UK (n126) at paragraph 40, Lustig-Prean and Beckett 
v UK (n131) at paragraphs 107-109 and Smith and Grady v UK  (n126) at paragraphs 114 
– 116. 
 
137 See for discussion Harris, A., ‘Loving Before and After the Law’ (2007-2008) 76 
Fordham Inter L R 2821; Bamforth (n58); Cott, N., ‘Public Vows: A History of Marriage and 
the Nation (Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2000); Cossman, B.,  Sexual 
Citizens: The Legal and Cultural Regulation of Sex and Belonging, (California: Stanford 
University Press, 2007); Kochenov (n58) and Richardson, D., ‘Sexuality and Citizenship’ 
(1998) 32 Sociology 83. 
 
138 Dunlap, M., ‘The Lesbian and Gay Marriage Debate: A Microcosm of Our Hopes and 
Troubles in the Nineties’ (1991) Law and Sexuality Review Lesbian and Gay Legal Issues, 
1 at 63. 
139 Kornbluh, F., ‘Queer Legal History: A Field Grows Up and Comes Out’ (2011) 36(2) 
Law and Social Inquiry 537. 
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Publication 2 therefore makes an important link to part two, which engages 
with the impact of citizenship in the context of the EU. Publication 2 also 
sets out the symbolic advantages of equality arguments (a theme taken up 
again by publication 7 in part three) and the record of success that the 
equality argument has had in same-sex marriage cases internationally.140  
Publication two explains difficulties in the use of equality arguments. Firstly, 
Article 14 ECHR is a conditional right which can only be asserted where 
another alleged violation of the ECtHR is made simultaneously.141 
Secondly, in relation to equality claims made by proponents of same-sex 
marriage, a wide MoA is set because of a lack of consensus.142  This 
contrasts to cases concerning privacy (Article 8) where a narrow MoA is 
seen as essential due to the importance of privacy concerns and the 
consideration of privacy to be a universally understood concept.143  In 
                                                          
 
140 For example in Fourie (n124) per Sachs J the South African Constitutional Court 
criticised privacy as a ‘negative liberty’ (para 46) contrasted to the strength of the equality 
argument which meant ‘equal concern and respect across differences’ (para 60). Equality 
arguments were also essential in Canada’s recognition of same-sex marriage. For 
discussion see Wintemute, R., (2003-2004). ‘Sexual Orientation and the Charter: The 
Achievement of Formal Legal Equality (1985-2000) and Its Limits’ (2003-2004) 49 McGill 
L. J.(2003-2004) 1143. US courts have also relied heavily on the equality argument. For 
which see Barrett, S.J., ‘For the Sake of the Children:  A New Approach to Securing Same-
Sex Marriage Rights’ (2006-2008) 73 Brooklyn L Rev 695. The recent Supreme Court 
judgment of Obergefell v Hodges (n6) now requires all US states to issue marriage 
licences to same-sex couples and to recognise same-sex marriages validly performed in 
other jurisdictions. The main justification of the right to marry was ‘derived from the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection’ (at para 10).  
 
141 See for further explanation Letsas (n121) at 708. 
 
142 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (n8) at paragraph 105. 
 
143 See Dudgeon v United Kingdom (n126) at paragraph 52, Lustig-Prean and Beckett v 
UK (n131) at paragraph 82 and in Smith and Grady (n127) at paragraph 89 where the 
ECtHR discussed the fact that since these cases concerned ‘a most intimate part of an 
individual’s private life’, there must exist ‘particularly serious reasons’ before such 
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moving from the universally understood right of privacy as the main focus 
of LGBTQ+ rights to the more amorphous right of equality argument,144 the 
ECtHR has potentially weakened protection for LGBTQ+ persons. Thirdly 
the equality argument is critiqued, because by its very nature this requires 
comparison between different groups. This in itself presupposes 
categorisation of individuals into certain specific boxes of sexual interest. 
This may not be desirable either because of the strengthening of any 
perceived heteronormative approach145  or because of the difficulties of 
individuals in identifying with certain set categories.146  
Publication 2 then explains that the weaknesses identified in the equality 
argument need to be strengthened by other new revitalised arguments. The 
family life aspect of Article 8 ECHR should play increasing importance in 
same-sex marriage claims. Historically, the ECtHR refused to recognise 
same-sex partners as having a ‘family life’,147 considering such 
relationships as being generative of private life considerations only.148 
                                                          
interferences can satisfy the requirements of Article 8 paragraph 2 of the Convention.’ See 
also ADT v UK (n126) at paragraph 38. 
 
144 See also Donoho (n81) at 416-417. 
 
145 See Grigolo (n135) on this practice. 
 
146 Queer theorists challenge the categorisation of relationships into homosexual and 
heterosexual and argue that categories should not be seen ‘fixed and given.’ See Kornbluh 
(n139). 
 
147 X and Y v UK (App. No. 21830/93, 22 April 1997), Simpson v UK (App. No. 11716/85, 
14 May 1986), Kerkhoven and Hinke v The Netherlands (App. No. 15666/89, 19 May 1992) 
and Mata Estevez v Spain (App. No. 56501/00, 10 May 2001.  
 
148 Cabellero, S.S., ‘Unmarried Cohabiting Couples Before the European Court of Human 
Rights: Parity with Marriage? (2004-2005) 11 Columbia J of Eur L 151 at 152.  
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Although both aspects of Article 8, reliance on the privacy aspect attracted 
criticism that the ECHR was favouring the nuclear married heterosexual 
ideal.149 As set out above reliance on privacy based claims also resulted in 
limitations on the expansion of LGBTQ+ rights before the ECtHR.150 A 
breakthrough development151 came when the ECtHR found that same-sex 
relationships are included within family life protections under Article 8.152 
Publication 2 argues that the family law aspect of Article 8 ECHR should 
have increasing importance going forwards. Lastly publication 2 calls for a 
new interpretation of Article 12 (right to marry).153 Redundant historical text 
driven approaches154 should be abandoned in favour of a dynamic 
interpretation of Article 12 to include same-sex couples. In setting out a 
strategy for success for proponents of same-sex marriage before the 
ECtHR, publication 2 therefore argues that the equality argument under 
                                                          
149 Stalford (n90) at 411. 
 
150 Johnson, P,. ‘An Essentially Private Manifestation of Human Personality’: 
Constructions of Homosexuality in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2010) (n88) at 
76. For further criticism see also Sedgewick (n130) at 1040. 
 
151 Danisi (n132) 804; O’Mahoney, C., ‘Irreconcilable Differences? Article 8 ECHR and 
Irish Law on Non-Traditional Families’ (2012) 26(1) Inter J of L Policy and the Fam 31 at 
38 and Sutherland, E. , ‘A Step Closer to Same-Sex Marriage Throughout Europe (2011) 
15 Edin L Rev 97. 
 
152 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (n8).  
 
153 Article 12 provides that ‘[m]en and women of marriageable age have the right to marry 
and to found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right’. 
 
154 Such as that favoured by the ECtHR in Schalk and Kopf v Austria (n8) where the ECtHR 
noted that Article 12 only granted the right to marry to men and women’ and where the 
reference to ‘everyone’ or ‘no one and the ‘historical context’ were deemed as significant. 
The grammatical reading by the ECtHR also reflects the approach taken by the HRC in 
Joslin v New Zealand Communication No. 902/1999 U.N. DOC A/57/40 at 21.  
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Article 14 ECHR, can be strengthened by a continued evolution of right to 
a family life under Article 8 and a dynamic interpretation of Article 12 (right 
to marry).  Publication 4 (in Part 2) has another useful conclusion  in this 
regard, recommending that the free standing equality clause in the shape 
of Protocol 12, should be ratified by all contracting states (including the UK). 
This is in direct contrast to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) which does provide a free-standing equality clause.155  
 
Ultimately, the ECtHR stresses a lack of consensus between contracting 
states as a reason for the lack of movement on this issue.156 Publication 2 
concludes that the success of any future case law depends upon the 
ECtHR recognising a consensus. Analysis of the consensus standard, then 
forms the subject matter of publication 3 which was published in January 
2018 in the leading peer-reviewed European Human Rights Law Review.157 
The ECtHR has to be conscious of social, economic and cultural 
differences, at a time when states are considering leaving the Council of 
Europe.158  The ECtHR is under increased pressure to recognise relativist 
                                                          
155 ICCPR, art.26. 
 
156 See Schalk and Kopf v Austria (n8) para 57, Hamalaninen v Finland (n8) para 39 and 
Chapin and Charpentier v France (n8). 
 
157 This is described on Research Gate as providing ‘.. unrivalled coverage of key issues 
in human rights law…’ see https://www.researchgate.net/journal/1361-
1526_European_human_rights_law_review (last accessed August 2019).  
 
158 Bribosia, E., Rorive, I. and Van den Eynde, L., ‘Same-sex Marriage: Building an 
Argument before the European Court of Human Rights in Light of the U.S. Experience. 
(2014) 32 Berkeley Journal of International Law 1. 
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concerns. The primary duty of guarding human rights is awarded to 
contracting states.159 By 2018, a series of factors pointed towards a 
developing consensus in favour of recognition of same-sex marriage. 
Sixteen countries in Europe now recognise same-sex marriage.160 The 
ECtHR has also made favourable statements about the ‘rapidly developing 
European consensus.’161 The Oliari v Italy case resulted in the ECtHR 
recognising a right to legal protection for same-sex couples.162  
 
Publication 3 builds on some of publication 1’s earlier critiques of the MoA 
doctrine and its primary factor of influence in these cases, namely 
consensus.163 Publication 3 then offers a novel solution to the issues 
                                                          
159 The doctrine of subsidiarity has recently been re-emphasised as can be seen from 
the Council of Europe, ‘Brighton Declaration High Legal Conference on the Future of the 
ECtHR; 
http:www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2012_Brighton_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf (2012) B12 
[Accessed 22 January 2018]. 
 
160 See n2.  
 
161 Oliari v Italy (n9) para 163.  
 
162 See Oliari v Italy (n9). This could be subject to conditions being socially accepting of 
same-sex couples on the ground. See Fenwick and Hayward (n116).  
 
163 Publication 4 discusses the lack of consensus being utilised as a justification for a wide 
MoA. Reference is made to common criticisms of the consensus argument in that it ignores 
the interests of minority groups, and that reliance on consensus leads to a lack of legal 
analysis and no high level of scrutiny. See Fenwick (n5) and Dzehtsiarou, K., ‘Does 
Consensus Matter? Legitimacy of European Consensus in the Case Law of the European 
Court of Human Rights’ [2011] PL 534; Hodson (n86); Sweeney (n81); Lord Lester, ‘The 
European Convention in the New Architecture of Europe’ (n120); and Benvenisti (n81). 
See also Lewis, T., ‘What Not to Wear: Religious Rights, the European Court and the 
Margin of Appreciation’ (2007) 56 ICLQ 395 at 414 who comments that the MoA should 
not be used as an ‘intellectually lazy option of running for cover’ and Hutchinson (n121) 
and Brauch (n81). Reference is made to publication one’s argument that reliance on 
consensus means that Member State could be relying on erroneous or discriminatory 
reasons in refusing to sanction same-sex marriage, reasons which are not investigated by 
the court. 
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suggesting that if the ECtHR continues to stress the need for consensus in 
future judgments regarding same-sex marriage, it should at least outline 
how many domestic legislatures need to legislate in favour of same-sex 
marriage, before it will determine that a consensus exists. On reflection this 
concern with a number needs further consideration, and the strength of this 
article resides on its critique as to the lack of certainty as to how a 
consensus is to be quantified or measured. Certainty is important. 
Publication 3 explains that as there are ‘manifold constitutional, legal and 
symbolical implications of marriage, it is essential for a couple to know if 
their marriage will be legally recognised.’164 The need for certainty 
regarding marriage recognition is also stressed by international case law165 
and international human rights covenants.166 This links to publication 5 
which deals with the same theme in the context of private international law. 
In summary part one has critiqued the position of the ECtHR in relying on 
MoA and a lack of consensus between contracting states in relation to 
same-sex marriage claims. Part one has then offered a way forward for the 
ECtHR. However, the ECtHR is only one actor at a European level and Part 
2 moves on to consider the position before the EU.  
                                                          
164 In Estin v Estin 334 US 541, 553 (1948) Robert Jackson J commented that ‘one thing 
that people are entitled to know from the law is whether they are formally married.’ See 
also Stark (n80), and McClain, L., ‘Deliberative Democracy, Overlapping Consensus and 
Same-Sex Marriage’ (1997–1998) Fordham L R 1241. 
 
165 See, e.g. Goodridge v Department of Public Health 798 NE 2d 941 (Mass., 2003); 
Loving v Virginia 388 US 1 (1967) and Obergefell v Hodges  (n6). 
 
166 E.g. art.12 Right to Marry European Convention on Human Rights. 
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*E.H.R.L.R. 47 Abstract 
This article offers an argument as to why the margin of appreciation is not an answer to 
the gay marriage debate. This is both of domestic importance due to upcoming legislative 
proposals on the issue as well of European and international importance given the 
demands of globalisation and the growing number of international families. In the leading 
case of Schalk and Kopf v Austria the European Court of Human Rights relied on the 
concept of the margin of appreciation in refusing to find any violation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights where Austria had not provided for same-sex marriage. 
However, reliance on this concept is unhelpful as it lacks clarity, meaning that the 
European Court of Human Rights has not investigated the reasons behind States Parties’ 
decisions on the issue of gay marriage. This article demonstrates by way of case analysis 
that this could mean that States Parties are acting both in relation to their legislation and 
their judicial supervision of statutes on the basis of erroneous or even discriminatory 
reasons. 
Introduction 
The European Court of Human Rights is aware of the possibilities of discrimination against 
homosexuals in States Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),1 
with homophobia being well documented.2 Yet despite this, on the topic of gay marriage, 
the judgment of Schalk and Kopf v Austria has allowed ECHR contracting states a wide 
margin of appreciation in relation to both their legislation and judicial supervision of 
statutes on the basis that "there is no European consensus regarding same-sex 
marriage".3 The margin of appreciation has been defined as the "latitude of deference or 
error … at which international supervision should give way to a ECHR contracting states 
party’s discretion in enacting or enforcing its laws".4 
Arguably allowing a wide margin of appreciation could lead to homosexuals being 
dangerously exposed to discriminatory legislation and judicial supervision, as the 
European Court of Human Rights, by using the doctrine of the margin of appreciation, 
does not examine the reasons behind why States have refused to sanction gay marriage. 
On the topic of gay marriage, all that is certain internationally is that there are *E.H.R.L.R. 
48 many different family law structures, from "traditionalist" to "modernist".5   Eleven 
countries recognise gay marriage, of which seven of these are within the Council of 
Europe, whilst internationally a further 23 recognise some form of same-sex partnership. 
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The issue is topical in the United Kingdom following a consultation that revealed 
widespread support for gay marriage.6 David Cameron promised that gay marriage,7 in 
addition to civil partnership (which was introduced by the Civil Partnership Act 2004),8 will 
be shortly introduced on to the statute books (following similar plans in Scotland).9 
Writers have doubted the usefulness of international comparisons in family law,10 which 
would suggest that the European Court of Human Rights as a transnational court should 
remain uninvolved, with the margin of appreciation being an appropriate line to follow. 
However, a further reason why the issue of same-sex marriage remains important is 
because it involves a "relationship not simply between two people but also with 
government".11 Internationally the demands of globalisation and increasing numbers of 
international families can lead to difficulties when families relocate especially if their marital 
situation is not explicitly recognised.12 Without legal recognition of same-sex relationships, 
this could deter couples relocating internationally. This can be demonstrated by the 
treatment of gay couples who relocate within the European Union and the United States. 
Michele Grigolo states that in an EU context the treatment of married persons differs from 
other relationships.13 Whilst spouses have a right to join citizens, unmarried partners have 
to rely upon proving a "duly attested relationship".14 Cases from the United States 
demonstrate the difficulties which globalisation can create from a same-sex union. Some 
states within the United States recognise same-sex unions and others do not.15 
The situation is acute within the federal United States where s.2 of the Defense of Marriage 
Act 1996 provides that no state within the United States need recognise a marriage 
considered legal in another state, and s.3 of the Defense of Marriage Act provides that 
"marriage" means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and 
wife, and the word "spouse" refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband 
or a wife.16 The Defense of Marriage Act 1996 remains controversial and is subject to 
ongoing litigation with appeals pending to the US Supreme Court.17 The situation is 
complex and contrary to dicta *E.H.R.L.R. 49 from judges in cases such as Estin v Estin, 
where Robert Jackson J. commented that "one thing that people are entitled to know from 
the law is whether they are formally married".18 
The issue is also symbolically important. Zvi Triger argues that marriage is used as a 
weapon against homosexuals and makes reference to anti-miscegenation laws in the 
United States and the Nazi-Nuremberg laws.19 The Equality Network argues that "civil 
partnership was invented specifically to deny same-sex couples access to marriage, and 
is seen by many same-sex couples as a second-class status".20 The developing doctrine 
of "comparative constitutionalism" is relevant as many landmark cases show that leading 
international courts have influence worldwide.21 
This article does not rehearse arguments for and against gay marriage but demonstrates 
that despite other recent judgments from the European Court of Human Rights insisting 
on a wide margin of appreciation in other contexts, relying on the margin of appreciation 
lacks clarity and could be detrimental in that it allows States to rely on erroneous or 
discriminatory reasons in refusing to sanction gay marriage. 
Other recent cases granting a wide margin of appreciation 
In the recent case of Lautsi v Italy, which concerned the compulsory displaying of crucifixes 
in Italian state school classrooms, the European Court of Human Rights granted Italy a 
wide margin of appreciation in the context of Protocol 1 to art.2 of the ECHR (the right to 
educate children in accordance with one’s religious and philosophical convictions).22 The 
lack of European consensus on the presence of religious symbols was seen as decisive. 
Similarly, in A v Ireland, which considered Irish anti-abortion laws, the Court deferred to a 
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wide margin of appreciation in finding no right to abortion, in which case was considered 
in the context of art.8 of the ECHR (the right to a private and family life).23 Interestingly, in 
ABC v Ireland however, there was a strong consensus among European States in favour 
of allowing abortions, so instead emphasis was placed upon the "relative importance of 
the interest at stake".24 Paolo Ronchi has criticised this lack of consistency from the Court 
which he argues is "ready to abandon the notion of consensus where the issue is too 
political to be decided by Strasbourg".25 
The Brighton Declaration 2012 also gave particular emphasis to the importance of the 
margin of appreciation, encouraging the prominence of the principles of subsidiarity and 
the margin of appreciation.26 
 
The margin of appreciation lacks clarity 
Despite use of the margin of appreciation in recent cases by the European Court, one of 
the risks of the margin of appreciation doctrine is that it leads to a lack of certainty. Lord 
Lester has commented that the margin of appreciation "has become as slippery and 
elusive as an eel".27 This is particularly dangerous with reference to marriage as individuals 
need to know their marital status. 
A particular issue with cases concerning homosexuality is that it  is "an essentially 
private manifestation of human personality".28 This also leads to increased difficulties for 
international courts in trying to reconcile both universalist and relativist approaches. 
Douglas Lee Donoho describes this task by asking; *E.H.R.L.R. 50 "[h]ow can human 
rights be sufficiently universal to make them appropriate subjects for meaningful 
international regulation and yet consistent with, and appropriate to, the world’s diversity?"29 
Whilst universalism is attractive with its promise of universal standards for everyone,30 it 
runs into criticism that it can lead to an "undesirable homogenisation of people and 
cultures" especially on such a central matter as protection of human rights.31 However, 
many authors regard relativism as a necessity if the Convention "is not to become 
progressively ineffective with time"32 and where large "blocs of the population disagree".33 
A common criticism of the margin of appreciation is that it is vague.34 Ultimately, Paul 
Mahoney states that the "European Court of Human Rights’ ability to protect human rights 
is seriously threatened … by the doctrine of margin of appreciation".35 Judges have stated 
that the doctrine should be abandoned.36 Perhaps as Douglas Lee Donoho suggests, the 
margin of appreciation is used as a concept to allow the judiciary to ignore "the issues 
posed by diversity" or is used where courts prefer to obscure the basis on which their 
decision is made.37 
In the context of gay marriage, the vagueness of margin of appreciation means that ECHR 
contracting states are free to introduce their own legislation (for example our own domestic 
legislative proposals)38 and decide on judicial supervision of such legislation, without the 
reasons behind their decisions having to be examined by the Court. This means that 
litigation will also continue before the Court as the Equal Love Campaign demonstrates. 
In the Equal Love Campaign case the applicants allege that the current prohibition by UK 
legislation of same-sex civil marriage and opposite-sex civil partnership is a violation of 
the ECHR.39 
Vagueness leads to further danger. ECHR contracting states could be relying on 
erroneous or discriminatory reasons in their refusal to sanction to gay marriage, which the 
Court does not investigate. The following sections provide examples of courts relying on 
erroneous and discriminatory reasons. *E.H.R.L.R. 51 
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Are states legislating on the basis of erroneous reasons? 
Erroneous arguments include the definitional argument, the "slippery slope" argument, the 
procreation argument and discriminatory arguments against homosexuals. The term 
"erroneous" is used to describe arguments against gay marriage which have been proven 
to be redundant in their reasoning. 
The definitional argument has been explained by Dale Carpenter to mean that a 
homosexual couple cannot marry as by definition they are not man and woman.40 The lack 
of reasoning is seen as a fatal flaw to this argument as "traditions change [and] 
[d]ictionaries are not the law".41 
Despite the widespread dismissal of the definitional argument as valid, the use of the 
margin of appreciation by the European Court of Human Rights means that the definitional 
argument continues to be widely used, as ECHR contracting states are not obliged to 
provide reasons for decisions reached. Indeed, in Schalk and Kopf v Austria, the Court 
relied upon the definitional argument, noting that art.12 only granted the right to marry to 
"men and women" and contrasted that article to others which referred to "everyone" or "no 
one" and cited the "historical context" as being important.42 In the leading domestic case 
of Wilkinson v Kritzinger, Potter J. also followed a definitional approach by referring to the 
definition stated at s.11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and noted the lack of 
intervention from the Court "where there is a wide variety of national and cultural traditions 
at play".43 Similarly in the leading Irish case of Zappone and Gilligan v Revenue 
Commissioners, Dunne J. essentially relied upon the definitional argument.44 At present, 
although the definitional argument can be seen to be redundant in its reasoning and 
therefore erroneous, this represents a perfectly legitimate approach for the purposes of 
the margin of appreciation because the European Court of Human Rights does not 
investigate the reasons for conclusions reached. 
Indeed, countries such as South Africa that have adopted a progressive approach to gay 
marriage have specifically acknowledged that "ideas of justice and equity evolve, so do 
conceptions of rights take on new texture and meaning".45 In similar style, when the 
European Court of Human Rights has departed from previous case-law it has done so on 
the basis that human rights should be rendered "dynamic and evolutive".46 
Reliance on the margin of appreciation could allow other erroneous arguments to be 
applied. Authors have argued that if gay marriage were permitted this could lead to a 
slippery slope allowing other relationships being sanctioned, including polygamy and 
bestiality.47 There is clearly a lack of political and public support for such policies. The result 
is the likelihood of such legislative change is virtually non-existent.48 However, if the 
European Court of Human Rights does not examine the reasons why States are refusing 
to sanction gay marriage, this could mean that such arguments remain influential at State 
level. 
Another erroneous position is the procreation argument. This approach proceeds on the 
basis that marriage should only be between a man and a woman as only they have the 
ability to procreate. This was *E.H.R.L.R. 52 the argument made by the state of 
Massachusetts to justify its ban on gay marriage.49 Many high profile courts have 
dismissed the procreation argument on the basis that if procreation were necessary to 
validate a marriage, this would mean that neither the sterile nor the elderly could marry.50 
However, by the application of the margin of appreciation, the European Court of Human 
Rights does not examine the reasons why gay marriage is not sanctioned, resulting in 
such arguments maintaining influence. Even more worryingly, ECHR contracting States 
could be acting on the basis of discriminatory reasons. 
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Are states acting on the basis of discriminatory reasons? 
Discrimination against homosexuals is well documented,51 and condemned as 
unacceptable by the European Court. Discrimination against homosexuals does not 
always take an overt form and on occasion is expressed by way of a heterosexual norm 
with homosexuals still seen as part of a minority group.52 
The difficulty with European Court of Human Rights case-law is that it allows a margin of 
appreciation in the area of gay marriage despite evidence that sexual orientation is an 
important ground of discrimination. Case-law provides that "differences in treatment 
require particularly serious reasons by way of justification".53  Relying on the margin of 
appreciation also fails to protect minorities, which is often seen as one of the main 
justifications for an international system.54 
The following case-law analysis demonstrates that the Court is aware that States could be 
acting on the basis of discriminatory reasons, yet confusingly continues to allow a wide 
margin of appreciation in gay marriage cases. 
The earlier cases from the Court on the issue of homosexuality show that States 
successfully argued that discriminatory laws served legitimate aims, even if ultimately the 
legislation was found to violate the ECHR. For example in Dudgeon v United Kingdom, 
which concerned anti-sodomy laws, the European Court found that the preservation of 
"public order and decency [and] to protect the citizen from what is offensive and injurious" 
were legitimate aims.55 The Court used the language of "an increased tolerance" of 
homosexuality which again reinforced the image of the heterosexual norm. Similarly in 
Norris v Ireland, after the Irish Supreme Court had upheld the anti-sodomy laws on the 
basis that "homosexuality was condemned in Christian teaching",56 the European Court of 
Human Rights determined that the "interference has a legitimate aim, namely the 
protection of morals."57 In ADT v United Kingdom which concerned the conviction of a man 
for gross indecency after he was involved in private consensual acts with up to four men, 
a legitimate aim was found in the "protection … of health or morals".58 Although in these 
cases a violation of the Convention was found, George Letsas critiques the fact that the 
moralistic preferences of the majority were seen as being synonymous with "public morals" 
and "thus constituting a legitimate aim".59 By recognising discriminatory laws as serving 
legitimate aims, even though ultimately finding *E.H.R.L.R. 53 violations of the ECHR, the 
European Court is perpetuating the image of the heterosexual norm and creating an image 
of tolerance rather than support for homosexuality. 
Other authors have commented that this led to the "minorisation of homosexuals",60 who 
had to assert their private law rights to be (let alone) leading to a negative appreciation of 
homosexual rights as something to hide from the general public. Nicole Moreham 
comments that "there can be no doubt that sexual orientation and activity concern an 
intimate aspect of private life".61 Such an approach leads to homosexuals being given 
limited space to develop protection of their rights. 
Other cases demonstrate an awareness of the Court of the perceived attitudes of the 
heterosexual majority. In the cases of L v Austria and SL v Austria the Court commented 
on the "predisposed bias on the part of a heterosexual majority against a homosexual 
minority".62 Michele Grigolo critiqued the case of Laskey v United Kingdom for "subtly 
establish[ing] a universal (hetero)sexual normativity as the premise for the whole of the 
Court’s reasoning".63 For example, earlier in the case history, whilst still in the English 
Court of Appeal, Lord Lowry C.J. commented on the corruption of a youth K., and the fact 
that in his opinion "it is some comfort at least to be told, … that K., is now it seems settled 
into a normal heterosexual relationship".64 
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Other cases go further and can arguably demonstrate that domestic courts are acting in a 
discriminatory fashion towards homosexuals, although homophobia is never given by the 
State as the justifying reason. In the conjoined cases of Smith v United Kingdom and 
Lustig-Prean v United Kingdom the European Court of Human Rights held that the 
arguments raised by the UK government in relation to discriminatory treatment were 
"founded solely upon the negative attitudes of heterosexual personnel towards those of 
homosexual orientation".65 In the case of Salgueiro Da Silva Mouta v Portugal, which 
concerned a custody dispute, there is an awareness by the Court of discrimination at a 
domestic level, although it is often disguised by euphemisms used by domestic courts.66 
In the judgment of the Court reference was made to the judgment of the Lisbon Court of 
Appeal, where it was stated that "given the dominant model in our society … [t]he child 
should live in a family environment, a traditional Portuguese family, which is certainly not 
the set-up her father has decided to enter into, since he is living with another man as if 
they were man and wife".67 
The European Court of Human Rights found that the difference in treatment was "based 
on the applicant’s sexual orientation".68 This latter case is a good example of domestic 
courts using language which is dismissive of homosexual family units. Despite their 
awareness of discrimination against homosexuals at a State level, in the area of gay 
marriage the Court continues to maintain a wide margin of appreciation. 
In Frette v France, which concerned adoption by a single openly gay parent, the Court 
stated that although the French authorities based their decisions on "lifestyle", the Court 
considered the "applicant’s homosexuality the decisive factor".69 Despite this direct finding 
the Court went on to find that due to lack of consensus the difference in treatment could 
be justified and there was no breach of the ECHR. This case demonstrates that where 
there is a wide margin of appreciation, national courts can continue to operate in a fashion 
which allows different treatment on the basis of the applicant’s homosexuality. The joint 
*E.H.R.L.R. 54 partly dissenting opinion was critical of the majority conclusion arguing that 
it "is at variance with the Court’s case law … and … liable to take the protection of 
fundamental rights backwards".70 Michele Grigolo comments that the court chose to ignore 
relevant facts and over-relied on the consensus argument.71 
EB v France also concerned adoption by a single openly gay parent. After examining the 
opinions of the psychologists, the Court came to an "inescapable conclusion … that sexual 
orientation was at the centre of the deliberations and omnipresent at every stage of 
administrative judicial proceedings".72 The conclusion in EB v France was diametrically 
opposite to that in Frette v France leading to a violation of the ECHR being found. Authors 
have criticised the lack of "legal clarity" of the EB v France decision and "diversion" of 
approach since Frette v France.73 The reasoning of the Court for justifying their difference 
in approach was put down to the importance of combating sexual orientation 
discrimination. The European Court of Human Rights stated,"[w]here sexual orientation is 
in issue, there is need for particularly convincing and weighty reasons to justify a difference 
in treatment regarding rights falling within Article 8".74 
The case is interesting not only because of the weight placed upon combating sexual 
orientation discrimination, but also because of the Court’s willingness to take a leading 
role internationally, which had not been seen since its volte face on the transgender case 
of Goodwin v United Kingdom.75 In that case, the European Court established a precedent 
for departing from previous case-law in order to "render its rights practical and effective, 
not theoretical and illusory" and "maintain a dynamic and evolutive approach".76 The Court 
in Goodwin was undeterred by a lack of consensus amongst the 43 contracting States. 
Despite the Court noting concerns about sexual orientation discrimination in Schalk, a wide 
margin of appreciation on the issue of gay marriage was upheld. The Court observed that 
"marriage has deep rooted social and cultural connotations which may differ largely from 
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one society to another. The court re-iterates that it must not rush to substitute its own 
judgment in the place of national authorities".77 
The Court again referred to the fact that there is an "emerging consensus towards the 
recognition of gay couples". After noting that this trend had accelerated over the past 
decade the Court concluded that "nevertheless not yet a majority of states provid[ed] for 
legal recognition of gay couples".78 
Interestingly the Court was far from unanimous on this issue with three out of seven judges 
dissenting. In their joint dissenting opinion, Judges Rozakis, Spielmann and Jebens 
commented that having identified a "relevantly similar situation" and emphasised that 
"difference based on sexual orientation require particularly serious reasons by way of 
justification", the Court should have found a violation of art.14 taken in conjunction with 
art.8 of the ECHR.79 
Loveday Hudson criticises Schalk and its deference to the ECHR contracting state’s 
margin of appreciation as leaving the *E.H.R.L.R. 55 "Court devoid of much to say about 
the nature of recent developments concerning that institution, thereby leaving same-sex 
couples out in the cold … and that this is clearly an unsatisfactory approach that leaves 
minorities vulnerable to majoritarian domination".80 
Leading judgments from the Canadian Supreme Court have also commented on the fact 
that "not recognising same-sex relationships perpetuates disadvantage suffered by 
individuals in same-sex relationships and contributes to the erasure of their existence".81 
Conclusion 
This article has sought to show that due to the forces of globalisation an international 
approach towards gay marriage is necessary. The demands of the increasing number of 
international families mean that when such families relocate the legal status of a gay 
marriage or civil partnership and the legal consequences flowing from it, including any 
additional difficulties created by a subsequent break-up of the relationship, need to be 
addressed. The issue is also of symbolic importance because of the developing doctrine 
of comparative constitutionalism. 
By relying upon the margin of appreciation in Schalk, the European Court of Human Rights 
has effectively abdicated its role in making a decision on gay marriage, allowing States 
free reign on this subject both in relation to their legislation and the judicial supervision of 
such legislation. This is despite the fact that ECHR contracting States "enjoy … a degree 
of homogeneity in cultural, political and religious orientations not shared by global human 
rights institutions".82 
Numerous authors have commented on the fact that the margin of appreciation is too 
vague and difficult to understand how it is going to be applied in practice.83 The reasoning 
behind States’ practices is not investigated by the European Court of Human Rights. The 
result is that States could be acting on the basis of erroneous or discriminatory reasons. 
Erroneous arguments such as the definitional argument, the "slippery slope" argument 
and the procreation argument which have been widely discredited as redundant in their 
reasoning, may continue to maintain influence over States’ legislation and judicial control. 
Even more worryingly, discriminatory practices can continue without interference, despite 
the European Court being aware of the existence of such practices.84 
The margin of appreciation is not the answer to the gay marriage debate and previous 
authorities such as Goodwin v UK and EB v France prove that the Court could reverse a 
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previously established policy where necessary.85 This article demonstrates that the use of 
the margin of appreciation in the context of gay marriage has left homosexuals vulnerable. 
Frances Hamilton 
Senior Law Lecturer 
Northumbria University 
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ABSTRACT 
For proponents of same-sex marriage, this essay sets forward a 
critical analysis of relevant arguments before the European Court 
of Human Rights. The privacy aspect of Article 8 European 
Convention of Human Rights will never be a successful argument 
with reference to marriage, which involves a public status. The 
equality argument (Article 14) is useful in addressing this issue 
with its close connections with citizenship, symbolic value, and 
proven record internationally. Difficulties remain with the equality 
argument; its conditional status, the width of the margin of 
appreciation allocated, and the need for an equality comparator. 
The equality argument needs reinforcement by use alongside a 
developing family law argument under Article 8 and a dynamically 
interpreted Article 12 (right to marry) argument. Ultimately, the 
success of any argument depends on convincingly influencing the 
European Court to consider that sufficient consensus has 
developed among Member States of the Council of Europe. 
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The European Convention of Human Rights was drafted 
following the atrocities of the Second World War (Foster, 
2011). The Council of Europe currently has 47 member 
states, and the European Court of Human Rights can be 
described as the premier human rights court within 
Europe. Yet at a European Court level there continues to 
be no right to same-sex marriage (Schalk and Kopf v. 
Austria, para. 94). As recently confirmed in Chapin and 
Charpentier v. France, this is because the European Court 
considers that a consensus in favor of same-sex marriage 
between member states needs to develop before such a 
right can be recognized. The 2015 case of Oliari v. Italy 
determined that same-sex couples now have the right to 
form a civil union or registered partnership, which is 
recognized as an important step forward (Zago, 2015). 
However, the battle for equality with regard to civil 
partnerships is not finished. The case of Ferguson v. UK 
before the European Court argued that a UK law 
preventing heterosexuals entering into civil partnership 
was unfair because it treated couples differently 
depending on their sexual orientation1 (see Barker, 2012). 
The case was dismissed by the European Court on the 
basis that it did not meet the admissibility criteria under 
Article 35 of the European Convention. Among other 
conditions, this requires applicants, first of all, to seek 
redress in their domestic courts by “exhaust[ing] domestic 
remedies.” A different couple, Charles Keidan and 
Rebecca Steinfeld, have reintroduced the case of 
heterosexual access to civil partnerships to the English 
courts. The Court of Appeal dismissed their case in 
February 2017 with the majority (of two to one) 
determining that the UK government be given time to 
review the existing legislation (Steinfeld v. Secretary of 
State for Education, 2017). They are now appealing their 
matter to the Supreme Court. 
 
As well as the fight for equality in relation to heterosexual 
couples and civil partnerships, there remains the ongoing 
battle for same-sex marriage at a European Court level, 
which is the focus of this piece. For many same-sex 
marriage campaigners, civil partnership will never be 
seen as sufficient recognition of their unions.2 At present, 
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only 15 member states out of 47 provide for same-sex 
marriage.3 Indeed, some member states constitutionally 
ban marriage between same-sex couples4 (see Fenwick, 
2016), and Russia, a member state, has certain 
homophobic policies (Fenwick, 2016; Johnson, 2015b).5 
The challenge remains to convince the European Court by 
persuasive arguments that sufficient consensus has been 
reached among the member states in relation to same-sex 
marriage. 
 
Over the course of many years, history demonstrates that 
the European Court has developed a leading role in the 
protection of rights for gays and lesbians in Europe 
(Bribosia, Rorive, & Van den Eynde, 2014; Cooper, 2011; 
Helfer & Voeten, 2014). This is despite the fact that, 
because the European Convention was drafted in the 
1950s, it contains no “general nondiscrimination clause” 
(Letsas, 2006, p. 708). Article 14 of the European 
Convention (right to nondiscrimination) is conditional 
only and depends on other human rights violations also 
being alleged simultaneously.6 Protocol 12 of the 
European Convention, which contains a general 
nondiscrimination clause, remains unratified by many 
members of the Council of Europe.7 As there are no 
specific protections preventing discrimination against 
gays, any arguments before the European Court have to 
rely on the “living instrument” doctrine. This allows the 
European Court to interpret the existing articles in the 
European Convention in a dynamic fashion to build on 
case law in order to accord with modern reality (see 
Tahmindjis, 2016). 
 
Article 8 of the European Convention provides a right to 
respect for private and family life.8 This is the article that 
has been of most use to gays and lesbians in expanding 
the protection of their rights under the European 
Convention. Utilizing a dynamic interpretation, violations 
of the European Convention Article 8 have been found in 
relation to laws that criminalized same-sex sexual activity 
(Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 1981), required unequal 
ages for the age of consent for heterosexual and 
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homosexual couples (Sutherland v. UK, 1977), did not 
allow same-sex couples to inherit tenancy rights 
(Simpson v. UK, 1986; Karner v. Austria, 2003), 
prevented the employment of gays in the military (Lustig-
Prean and Beckett v. UK, 1999; Smith and Grady v. UK, 
1999), excluded same-sex couples from the definition of 
family (Kerkhoven and Hinke v. Netherlands, 1992; JRM 
v. The Netherlands, 2003; Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 
2010; X and Y v. UK, 1997), prevented gays from 
adopting (EB v. France, 2008; Frette v. France, 2002), 
and, most recently, prevented gays from entering into the 
right to form a civil partnership (Oliari v. Italy, 2015). In 
fact, the right to marry under Article 129 as applied to 
same-sex couples was first properly discussed by the 
European Court only in 2010 in the case of Schalk and 
Kopf v. Austria (2010). Under international law, 
decisions of the European Court are binding on member 
states who have accepted the jurisdiction of the European 
Court by signing the European Convention (see Foster, 
2011, p. 56).10 If a member state is found to have violated 
the European Convention, it is required to change its laws 
and practices and pay any just satisfaction damages to the 
victims concerned where these have been awarded by the 
European Court. 
 
The argument can be made that, given the European 
Convention’s Preamble’s promise to “protect and enforce 
human rights… it is perplexing to see the [European] 
[C]ourt refrain from legalising same-sex marriage” 
(Poppelwell-Scevak, 2016, p. 1). Some commentators 
have argued that the European Court should have a 
leading, standard-setting, aspirational role (Bribosia et al., 
2014; Dzehtsiarou, 2011). However, one of the central 
challenges for any international court, including the 
European Court, is to uphold the universal standard of 
human rights, while respecting regional differences. This 
is especially true in an area that is as politically, morally, 
and religiously sensitive as same-sex marriage 
(Teutonico, 2016–2017). Nicola Barker reminded us that 
it “would be understandable if [the European Court] were 
reluctant to impose same-sex marriage on all [member] 
  
67 
 
states, some of which have only relatively recently 
decriminalized sex between men” (Barker, 2012, pp. 548–
549). 
 
Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the European Court is 
very much bound by the competing interests of its 
member states (Teutonico, 2016–2017). Under the 
European Convention, “primary responsibility” 
(McGoldrick, 2016, p. 32) is given to member states to 
secure human rights (Hutchinson, 1999). The role of the 
European Court is, in fact, secondary. Although the 
European Court’s judgments are binding in international 
law, there is no enforcement mechanism, and the 
European Court depends on member states to change their 
legislation and practices (Wintemute, 2010). If the 
European Court were to force their views on all 47 
countries, this could lead to a political backlash and could 
mean some governments threatening to leave the Council 
of Europe (Wintemute, 2010). The Margin of 
Appreciation (MoA) is one of the important tools used by 
the European Court to respect regional differences 
(Donoho, 2001, p. 451). The MoA can be described as the 
area of discretion awarded to member states (Butler, 
2008–2009; Yourow, 1996). The European Court varies 
the width of the MoA depending on the strength of the 
right in question, the strength of the member states’ 
defense(s) and also depending on the level of consensus 
found by the European Court to exist between member 
states. In areas concerning morals, a wide MoA is often 
found by the European Court, as in the case of same-sex 
marriage (Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010. MoA has 
recently been re-emphasized (Council of Europe, 2012). 
The role of the MoA and developing consensus remains a 
“vital force” (Bribosia et al., 2014, p. 19) in relation to 
same-sex marriage cases before the European Court. 
However, there is reason to consider that the European 
Court will rule in favor of same-sex marriage at some 
stage. The European Court refers to an “emerging 
consensus in favor of the legal recognition of same-sex 
marriage” (Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010, para. 105).11 
This article reviews thoroughly which arguments will 
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operate with the most force in order for the European 
Court to reconsider that a consensus has been reached. A 
critical analysis of Article 8 (right to a private and family 
life) now follows. The usefulness of Article 14 (freedom 
from discrimination) and Article 12 (right to marry) in 
relation to same-sex marriage is then considered. 
 
The dominant influence of the privacy argument before 
the European Court in cases developing gay rights 
The right to privacy has traditionally been defined as 
containing a focus on a right to be left alone. It is 
described by Mill as “a circle around every individual 
human being which no government … ought to be 
permitted to overstep” (Mill, 1936, p. 943). Arguments 
based on privacy result in basic protections for gays, and 
arguably not same-sex marriage. However, traditionally, 
the right to respect for private life under Article 8 was 
dominant in relation to the expansion and development of 
gay rights. Several authors have stated that the large 
majority of the successful cases concerning the 
development of the European Court’s protection of gays 
from discrimination have resulted from the use of Article 
8 right to privacy (Cabellero, 2004–2005; Danisi, 2011; 
Johnson, 2010; Stark, 2006; Walker, 2001). The 
traditional focus on privacy can be seen from the earliest 
European Court cases, including Dudgeon v. UK (1981), 
whereby the UK was obliged to decriminalize sodomy in 
Northern Ireland. Although the case was ground breaking 
at the time for finding a violation of Article 8 (see Walker, 
2001, p. 125), the European Court emphasized the fact 
that these concerned “private” acts (Dudgeon v. UK, 
1981, para. 39; ADT v. UK, 2000; see also, Lustig-Prean 
and Beckett v. UK, 1999, para. 82; Smith and Grady v. 
UK, 1999; Sutherland v. UK, 1997). The traditional focus 
on privacy before the European Court is also reflected in 
UK domestic legislation that referred to privacy as the 
main reason for protecting gay rights (see Bradley, 2003, 
p. 142 on the Wolfenden Report, which was adopted in 
the Sexual Offences Act 1967). 
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Although these European Court cases and domestic 
legislation were significant achievements for gay rights 
campaigners at the time, commentators have argued that 
this has placed a limitation on the evolution of gay rights 
in Europe (Johnson, 2010; Sedgewick, 1990). As a result 
of the perceived nexus made by the European Court 
between private functions and homosexuality, there has 
been less chance to develop wider rights beyond that of 
sexual privacy. Grigolo also commented on the limits of 
the privacy argument, stating that this is just the start and 
not the end of sexual orientation rights (Grigolo, 2003). If 
cases concerning sexual orientation are going to continue 
to stress the private nature of such matters, it will not be 
as easy to bring forward arguments in relation to same-
sex marriage. Marriage is a concept on the public stage. 
Marriage is celebrated in public in front of witnesses and 
has to comply with formal rules regarding state 
registration. Marriage has significant external legal 
consequences, although these do vary between countries 
(Waaldijk, 2005). In many jurisdictions this includes tax 
advantages, inheritance rights, protections in property 
law, post-divorce rights, right to name change, and the 
right to bring a wrongful death action. Children born 
during a marriage are presumed to be the children of the 
husband. Privacy arguments will never be successful in 
this context. It is argued next that Article 14 (equality) 
arguments are advantageous in addressing these issues. 
The advantages of equality-based arguments for 
proponents of same-sex marriage 
 
There is far more scope for “evolution” of an equality 
right. While privacy is a right to be left alone, in contrast 
equality is associated with citizenship and its public 
status. Marriage is seen by many as a key component of 
citizenship. (Bamforth, 2012; Cossman, 2007; Cott, 2000; 
Harris, 2007–2008; Kochenov, 2009; Richardson, 1998). 
Exclusion of gays from the status of marriage has been 
referred to as “domestic apartheid” (Dunlap, 1991, p. 63) 
and denial of “full political standing” for gays (Bamforth, 
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2012; Kornbluh, 2011, p. 537; Marshall, 1992, p. 18). 
Citizenship allows full participation in society. For those 
countries that are part of the EU, it also allows EU citizens 
and their family to relocate with associated employment 
rights around the EU territory (Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union, 2016, Article 23, Article 20[2]). 
Engagement of equality arguments in relation to same-sex 
marriage is therefore advantageous in achieving the 
associated benefits of citizenship. This is something that 
is never going to be achieved from a privacy argument 
alone. 
 
Equality arguments also have symbolic value, which is a 
key attraction of marriage as opposed to civil partnership 
(Aloni, 2010–2011; Dorf, 2011; Isaak, 2008). Writers 
have referred to marriage as “fundamental” and “deeply 
rooted in our society” (Lombino, 2003) and as a “public 
tradition” (Dent, 1999). Others have described marriage 
as the “privileged and preferred legal status in Europe and 
the United States” (Aloni, 2010–2011, p. 110; Equality 
Network, 2011). Even after achieving civil partnership, 
which often involves similar legal rights to marriage, 
proponents of same-sex marriage continued striving for 
marriage as a goal due to its symbolic status (Dunlap, 
1991). Other jurisdictions have also stressed the 
importance of equality arguments in relation to their 
judgments on same-sex marriage. In Minister of Home 
Affairs and Another v. Fourie the South African 
Constitutional Court criticized privacy as a “negative 
liberty” (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2005, para. 
46) in contrast to the strength of the equality argument, 
which meant “equal concern and respect across 
differences” (Constitutional Court of South Africa, para. 
60). Equality arguments were also essential in Canada’s 
recognition of same-sex marriage (Wintemute, 2003–
2004). U.S. courts have also relied heavily on the equality 
argument (see Barrett, 2006–2008, p. 695 for 
discussion).12 The recent Supreme Court judgment of 
Obergefell et al. v. Hodges, Director, Ohio Department of 
Health now requires all U.S. states to issue marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples and to recognize same-sex 
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marriages validly performed in other jurisdictions 
(Obergefell et al. v. Hodges, Director, Ohio Department 
of Health, 2015). The main justification of the right to 
marry was “derived from the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
guarantee of equal protection” (Obergefell et al. v. 
Hodges, Director, Ohio Department of Health, 2015, p. 
10). These examples demonstrate that, internationally, 
equality has been the most successful argument for those 
courts finding in favor of same-sex marriage. It is argued 
that it is advantageous for the European Court to engage 
with this argument in order to recognize same-sex 
marriage. At present, equality is given a subsidiary role in 
cases concerning gays before the European Court. 
European court engagement with Article 14 (equality) 
 
Throughout its earlier judgments, the European Court did 
not find it necessary to consider the arguments brought 
forward on the basis of Article 14. In Dudgeon v. UK, the 
European Court found that “there is no call to rule on the 
merits” of Article 14, as the same complaint had already 
been examined under Article 8 (Dudgeon v. United 
Kingdom, 1981, para. 69; see also Grigolo, 2003, p. 
1030).13 This set a trend for further cases that did not 
consider Article 14 (see ADT v. UK, 2000, para. 40; 
Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. UK, 1999, paras. 107–109; 
Smith and Grady v. UK, 1999, paras. 114–116). The 
traditional focus by the European Court on Article 8 
privacy therefore remained. Grigolo asserted that, in 
relation to Dudgeon v. UK, a conclusion based on Article 
14 would have “strengthened the (political) ‘status’ of 
homosexuality to an excessive extent” (Grigolo, 2003, p. 
1030). Perhaps this was a concern about not proceeding 
too quickly with the development of gay rights at the time 
for fear of a backlash of public opinion, causing 
unnecessary polarization (Marshall, 2010; Reinhardt, 
2005). However, since that date gay rights have advanced 
significantly. Step-by-step or incremental development 
has allowed recognition of gay rights and public 
acceptance of same-sex couples. More recently, the 
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European Court has been “increasingly sensitive to issues 
of non-discrimination” (Cartabia, 2011, p. 808; see also 
Waaldijk, 2016, p. 242). Significant case law 
emphasizing equality includes Karner v. Austria, where it 
was stated that “weighty reasons were needed to justify a 
difference in treatment” (Karner v. Austria, 2003, para. 
37).14 This dicta was used to great effect in later case law. 
For example, when Greece attempted to reserve civil 
partnerships to heterosexual couples only, this was found 
to violate Article 14 (right to equality) in conjunction with 
Article 8 (family law aspect) (Vallianatos v. Greece, 
2013). Reliance on nondiscrimination principles under 
Article 14 was also successful in relation to same-sex 
couples’ right to adopt (X and Others v. Austria, 2013). 
 
Yet in Oliari v. Italy (2015) there was a reversal to this 
developing trend. The European Court determined that it 
was not necessary to consider the argument on the basis 
of Article 14. Instead, the right to civil partnership was 
deemed to be successful under Article 8, creating a 
positive obligation on member states to provide such a 
status to same-sex couples (Oliari v. Italy, 2015). Fenwick 
considered that approach “significant” (Fenwick, 2016, p. 
263). If the case had been considered under Article 14, the 
European Court would have had to consider whether Italy 
was able to provide “weighty reasons” for its difference in 
treatment of same-sex couples. It is unlikely that Italy 
would have been able to do this successfully. The 
European Court therefore avoided having to consider 
whether the reasons given by Italy were discriminatory 
(see Hayward, 2016, p. 29). Such a precedent would have 
undoubtedly strengthened the case for same-sex marriage. 
Indeed, if the “weighty reasons” dicta were followed to its 
logical extent, this could result in the argument that there 
should be a right to same-sex marriage (Karner v. Austria, 
2003). The dissenting judges in Schalk and Kopf v. 
Austria commented that having identified a “relevantly 
similar situation” that required “particularly serious 
reasons by way of justification” the European Court 
should have found a violation of Article 14 taken in 
conjunction with Article 8 (Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 
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2003, para. 8). Arguably, it is only the concerns about lack 
of consensus between member states that have prevented 
the European Court utilizing equality arguments to their 
full extent. This situation is changing, and a consensus is 
slowly emerging in favor of the recognition of same-sex 
marriage (Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2003, para. 105). 
 
An opportunity to have arguments based on Article 14 
(equality) considered by the European Court in Ferguson 
v. UK (concerning heterosexual access to civil 
partnership in the UK) never materialized because the 
European Court did not have to engage with the merits of 
the claim (Ferguson v. UK, 2011). The case was 
dismissed on the basis of non-admissibility. Claimants are 
obliged to exhaust domestic remedies before taking a case 
to the European Court (Article 35 European Convention). 
Arguments on the basis of “total equality” are now being 
pursued through the UK courts in Steinfeld v. Secretary 
of State for Education (2017, para. 5). At the Court of 
Appeal level, these arguments gained ground, but, 
ultimately, the Court of Appeal determined that the matter 
should at present be left in the hands of the legislature 
(2017, para. 164). If the matter is not resolved, it is 
understood that the litigants in Steinfeld v. Secretary of 
State for Education will pursue the matter to the Supreme 
Court (Guardian, 2017). 
 
A difficulty in the utilization of Article 14 by the 
European Court relates to concerns about trampling on 
legislative ground in the area of same-sex marriage, a 
view that is echoed by the UK Court of Appeal in 
Steinfeld v. Secretary of State for Education (2017, para. 
164). As well as these political concerns, a further 
difficulty in the use of Article 14 by the European 
Convention is that it is a conditional right that can be 
asserted only where another alleged violation of the 
European Convention is made simultaneously (Letsas, 
2006, p. 708). For member states such as the UK that have 
not ratified the freestanding Protocol 12 equality 
provisions, this means that Article 14 (equality) points 
have to be made in tandem with another alleged breach of 
the European Convention. Although it does remain 
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possible for the European Court in judgment to find a 
violation of Article 14 alone, this is provided that the 
applicant framed their case under the alleged breach of 
another treaty right (for discussion, see Letsas, 2006, p. 
720). Wintemute (2004) argued that for member states 
that have not ratified Protocol 12, this results in a “gap” in 
protection. He argued that the position would be improved 
if more states ratified Protocol 12. The international 
examples drawn from South Africa and the United States 
demonstrate the strong influence of equality provisions in 
those constitutions (see Constitutional Court of South 
Africa, 2005; Obergefell et al. v. Hodges, Director, Ohio 
Department of Health, 2015). In contrast, Article 14 of 
European Convention in the 1950s only offers 
handicapped protection for equality, not as a free standing 
provision. As stated above, it is a conditional right that 
can be asserted only where another alleged violation of 
the European Convention is made simultaneously. 
 
An important point to draw from this is that although this 
article advocates the greater use of the equality argument 
under Article 14, at present for those member states that 
have not ratified the freestanding Protocol 12, this has to 
be done by expanding the ambit of other articles. As 
explained above, cases made under Article 14 in tandem 
with the privacy branch of Article 8 would not be 
successful in relation to same-sex marriage. In this 
respect, attention is drawn to the developing notion of 
“family life” for same-sex couples under Article 8 and a 
recommended further development of Article 12 (right to 
marry). Both of these points are addressed in the final 
sections of this piece. Further difficulties for the European 
Court in seeking to engage with equality arguments are 
considered next. First, equality arguments have been 
allocated a wide MoA by the European Court, leading to 
a vaguer protection of rights. Second, an equality 
argument by its nature requires a categorization of groups 
into sexual interests to allow a comparison, thereby 
resulting in a re-emphasis of the heterosexual norm. 
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Differing widths of margin of appreciation 
As stated in the introductory section, the MoA is the 
“amount of discretion… [Member States are offered] … in 
fulfilling their obligations under the [European 
Convention]” (Butler, 2008–2009, p. 695; Yourow, 1996, 
p. 13). The purpose behind this concept is to 
accommodate diversity between nations “while enforcing 
effective implementation” of the European Convention 
(Donoho, 2001, p. 451). One of the central questions 
surrounding the MoA concerns the width of the discretion 
offered to the member states. As mentioned earlier, the 
MoA is itself variable and depends on a number of factors. 
These include the “the importance of the national interest 
at stake ought to be balanced against the nature of the 
individual’s rights” (Shany, 2005, p. 927) and the degree 
of consensus. Debate rages around the importance of each 
of these factors. Some commentators have considered 
consensus to be the most prominent (Donoho, 2001, p. 
452; Letsas, 2006; Wada, 2004). Butler also identified this 
as a factor in determining when national authorities were 
best placed to make a decision (Butler, 2008–2009, p. 
701). There are also other important considerations that 
are relevant when it comes to determining the width of the 
MoA. These include the effect that the member state’s 
conduct has had on an individual (Donoho, 2001, p. 452) 
and the aim of the interference (Hutchinson, 1999). 
 
How the factors are to be weighed when determining the 
width of the MoA is unclear. Authors criticize the 
vagueness and lack of transparency of the MoA concept 
and its connecting ideas (Brauch, 2004–2005; Butler, 
2008–2009; Hutchinson, 1999; Wada, 2004). Hutchinson 
argued that the “doctrine as it stands is not a great deal of 
help to the [European Court] in its decision-making 
processes” (Hutchinson, 1999, p. 649). There is also a 
separate criticism that the MoA opens the door to 
discrimination against minorities (Hamilton, 2013; 
Hodson, 2011; Lester, 1998; Letsas, 2006; Sweeney, 
2005). The specific criticism made here relates to the 
varying widths given to the MoA in respect of different 
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human rights. It is worth examining how the width of the 
MoA is determined in relevant cases that have been 
brought before the European Court. In certain 
circumstances there is a recognized narrow MoA. This is 
exemplified where matters of personal autonomy and 
privacy are at stake (e.g., Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 
1981). In contrast in relation to equality cases the situation 
is less clear, and it is more likely that the European Court 
will determine there is a wider MoA. 
 
The European Court spelled out in Dudgeon v. UK that in 
relation to privacy there is a narrow MoA as it concerned 
a “most intimate aspect of private life” (Dudgeon v. 
United Kingdom, 1981, para. 52). Subsequent cases 
brought under the privacy branch of Article 8 were also 
treated in the same way (L and V v. Austria, 2003; Lustig-
Prean and Beckett v. UK, 1999; Smith and Grady v. UK, 
1999). This was because of the high level of effect that 
such laws could have on the life of the individual 
applicants (Grigolo, 2003) and the fact that private 
conduct is less likely to cause harm than that done in 
public (Lewis, 2007; Mill, 1859). There was also seen to 
be a consensus in many member states, meaning that 
“such limitations were not necessary in a democratic 
society” (Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 1981, para. 49; 
Hutchinson, 1999, p. 648). The certainty about the 
narrowness of the MoA in relation to the privacy aspect 
of Article 8 is not replicated in relation to cases brought 
under Article 14 equality. The width of the MoA that the 
European Court determines to exist in relation to equality 
cases is often variable. In Karner v. Austria the European 
Court stated that in cases of sexual orientation 
discrimination, the member states in question have to 
offer particularly convincing and weighty reasons to 
justify their conduct (See, e.g., Karner v. Austria, 2003; 
Kozak v. Poland, 2010). Although this would seem to 
point to a narrow MoA, this has not assisted in the area of 
same-sex marriage. The European Court continues to be 
influenced by the lack of consensus among member states 
(Chapin and Charpentier v. France, 2016; Hämäläinen v. 
Finland, 2014; Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010). Areas 
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with lack of international consensus are likely to have a 
wider MoA (Hutchinson, 1999; Lewis, 2007; Nigro, 
2010; Shuibhe, 2009; Wada, 2004), a point reiterated by 
the European Court on important cases on same-sex 
marriage referring to the wide MoA enjoyed (Chapin and 
Charpentier v. France, 2016; Hämäläinen v. Finland, 
2014, para. 75; Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010, para. 
45). No clear ruling on the width of MoA in relation to 
equality cases can be deduced, and this remains highly 
circumstance dependent. Such a wide-ranging vague 
MoA has the danger of rendering any equality right 
“meaningless” (Cartabia, 2011, p. 814). However, the 
European Court is likely to move forward when a lack of 
consensus either can be explained or starts to emerge. 
This is why it is so essential to put forward the most 
convincing arguments before the European Court. 
 
In reaching the limits of protection for gays that the right 
to privacy can offer, the argument has turned to equality 
as offering more scope for the evolution of rights. One of 
the disadvantages of the equality argument is that in 
contrast to privacy, the width of the MoA is much more 
variable and can be wider. In having a varying MoA for 
different types of rights, Donoho and other commentators 
have stated that, in essence, the European Court has 
created a “hierarchy among rights protected” by the 
European Convention (Butler, 2008–2009, p. 703; 
Donoho, 2001, p. 59). By moving from privacy to 
equality, the argument in favor of expansion of gay rights 
to include samesex marriage has moved down the 
hierarchy of protected rights, meaning less protection is 
offered to gays. This is another reason to utilize any 
equality right arguments alongside an expanded family 
law argument under Article 8 and a revitalized right to 
marry under Article 12 argument. The next section 
considers a further difficulty with the use of the equality 
argument by the European Court. 
 
 
  
78 
 
The equality argument requires categorization of 
individuals into classes of sexual orientation 
Throughout its case law the European Court refers to gays 
as “homosexuals,” creating a clear categorization of 
sexual interests. Evidence of the heteronormative model 
can be traced to the earliest cases concerning gays. In 
Dudgeon v. UK the applicant in question categorized 
himself as a “homosexual” at the outset of the case by 
stating that “on his own evidence, [he had] been 
consciously homosexual from the age of 14” (Dudgeon v. 
United Kingdom, 1981, para. 32). A similar approach was 
also taken in Sutherland v. UK (1997, para. 2). Grigolo 
argued that the European Court traditionally proceeded on 
the basis of toleration (Grigolo, 2003), stating in Dudgeon 
v. UK that “‘[d]ecriminalisation’ does not imply approval” 
(Grigolo, 2003, p. 1030). Interestingly, the typecasting of 
homosexuals as a group outside of normal society can also 
be seen from UK policy. Earlier in the judgment of 
Dudgeon v. UK the European Court quoted the 
Wolfenden report as demonstrating the need to protect 
society at large from “corruption” by such individuals 
(Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 1981, para. 17). The 
European Court has also commonly given credence to 
arguments made by defendant governments that they were 
pursuing legitimate aims in seeking to regulate the sexual 
activities of gays (Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. UK, 1999, 
para. 67; Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 1999, 
para. 30; Smith and Grady v. UK, 1999, para. 74). More 
recent European Court case law concerning the “family 
life of same-sex couples” arguably continues to be 
“inherently shaped by heteronormative standards” 
(Ammaturo, 2014, p. 178). The very fact that same-sex 
couples, although now recognized as having a “family 
life” but not entitled to access the married state,66 arguably 
demonstrates a certain “privileging of marital families” 
(O’Mahoney, 2012, p. 34; Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 
2010; see also Ammaturo, 2014). 
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The categorization of individuals into classes of sexual 
orientation appears to have been the common practice of 
the European Court. Yet when the equality argument is 
deployed, it becomes a requirement to categorize 
individuals into classes of sexual orientation, as equality 
necessitates comparisons to be made between different 
groups. The categorization of individuals is harmful 
because it means that minority groups are asserting their 
“otherness” against the “heteronormal” group (Knop, 
2001; Schwobel, 2012, p. 1129). This could lead to an 
identitarian crisis for those individuals who are forced to 
identify with a certain group to bring legal challenges. 
This erodes the true variety of identities to which 
individuals may ascribe (Grigolo, 2003). Queer theorists 
instead have argued that categories of homosexual and 
heterosexual should not be so “fixed and given” (Grigolo, 
2003; Kornbluh, 2011). A further difficulty is highlighted 
by Grigolo, who argued that categorization into different 
sexual groups is disadvantageous because it “reinforces 
the dichotomy within which the ‘other’ … is defined,” 
meaning that the “position for the dominant (the 
heterosexual man) is confirmed and stabilised” (Grigolo, 
2003, p. 1025). Categorization could mean that the 
minority groups are dominated by those in majority 
category (see also Rosenfeld, 2012, p. 344). 
 
Criticism can also be made as to how the European Court 
has used the comparability test in practice. Arguably, it is 
evidence of the heteronormative model applied, which 
means that the European Court is keen to emphasize the 
entire lack of comparability between non-married and 
married couples (see Fenwick, 2016). Despite the fact that 
gays cannot access the married state, case law 
demonstrates that any case brought by gay couples on the 
basis of discrimination can only be brought by 
comparison to non-married heterosexual couples 
(Hämäläinen v. Finland, 2014; X and Others v. Austria, 
2013). This can be seen, for example, by the joint 
adoption case law. Samesex couples could only bring 
their case specifically by reference to comparison with 
non-married couples (e.g., X and Others v Austria, 2013). 
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The European Court is reluctant to allow any comparison 
with non-married couples (see Johnson, 2015c). Again in 
the case of Hämäläinen v. Finland, which concerned the 
ability of a transgender person to remain married 
following a sex reassignment, any comparison with a 
heterosexual couple was viewed as “insufficiently 
similar” (Fenwick, 2016, p. 255, discussing Hämäläinen 
v. Finland, 2014). The lack of comparability asserted by 
the European Court is then used as a reason to refuse to 
consider Article 14 equality points at all. The European 
Court therefore never considers whether there is an 
“objective or reasonable justification for an impugned 
distinction” (Johnson, 2015c, p. 57). This led Waaldijk to 
describe the use of the comparability test by the European 
Court as “nothing but trouble” (Waaldijk, 2016, p. 243). 
The equality argument requires a comparison. Gays 
therefore have to assert their “otherness” against the 
heteronormative model. This emphasizes the heterosexual 
norm and potentially creates an identity crisis for those 
individuals who cannot so easily identify with one of the 
comparator categories. In addition, it appears that the 
heteronormative model of marriage is so emphasized by 
the European Court that they are not even be able to 
entertain any comparison with a non-married couple (see 
for example, (Hämäläinen v. Finland, 2014; X and Others 
v. Austria, 2013). 
 
Categorization of individuals into groups of sexual 
interest does not create solutions and, in practice, can 
create further problems. Again this exposes a significant 
weakness in the equality argument. Other arguments are 
clearly needed to support this. The developing rights of 
gays to family life under Article 8 are now considered. 
Developing “family life” arguments for same-sex 
partners 
 
As Article 14 is a conditional right, it has to be deployed 
in conjunction with a case being brought forward under 
another article. One pathway to be utilized is the 
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expanded use of the family life argument under Article 8. 
Historically, the European Court refused to recognize 
same-sex partners as having a family life (Kerkhoven and 
Hinke v. The Netherlands, 1992; Mata Estevez v. Spain, 
2001; Simpson v. UK, 1986; X and Y v. UK, 1997). 
Instead, such relationships were always considered 
“generative of private life rather than family life” 
(Cabellero, 2004–2005, p. 152). Critics argued that this 
was another example of the European Convention being 
“predicated on the nuclear, married, heterosexual ideal” 
(Stalford, 2002, p. 411). Gradually, the European Court 
has become more lenient over time with regard to the 
definition of family within Article 8. It has adopted a 
“realistic and flexible approach” (Cabellero, 2004–2005, 
p. 152). This includes protecting de facto situations, 
including unmarried couples and wider relations as well 
as single parents and divorced couples (Berrehab and 
Koster v. The Netherlands, 1988; Boughanemi v. France, 
1996; Kroon v. Netherlands, 1994; Marckx v. Belgium, 
1979). 
 
This expansion of Article 8 European Convention has 
gradually been reflected in the more determined stance 
the European Court has taken toward cases involving gays 
and same-sex couples. In Karner v. Austria the European 
Court stated that “differences based on sexual orientation 
require particularly serious reasons by way of 
justification” (Karner v. Austria, 2003, para. 37). The 
European Court avoided having to consider the question 
under “private life” or “family life” as the applicant had 
brought his claim under the “right to respect for his home” 
(Karner v. Austria, 2003, para. 33). In Schalk and Kopf v. 
Austria (2010), the European Court finally recognized 
that, due to a “rapid evolution in social attitudes” (para. 
93) it would be “artificial to maintain… that… a same-sex 
couple cannot enjoy ‘family life’” (para. 94). It therefore 
concluded that a “cohabiting same-sex couple living in a 
stable partnership, fell within the notion of ‘family life,’ 
just as the relationship of different-sex couple in the same 
situation would” (para. 94). This has been seen by authors 
as a breakthrough case due to the shift in finally 
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recognizing same-sex partners as being protected under 
the right to a family life (Danisi, 2011; O’Mahoney, 2012; 
Sutherland, 2011). However, the difference between 
recognizing that a same-sex couple can form a de facto 
family is very different from giving that family de jure, or 
legal, rights. Although in Schalk and Kopf v. Austria a 
same-sex couple were for the first time recognized as a de 
facto family, their legal rights were denied. The European 
Court did not recognize same-sex marriage due to a lack 
of consensus on the issue among member states, 
preferring to allow national courts to decide this matter 
(Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010, para. 62). Cooper 
argued that this situation is very contradictory (Cooper, 
2011). Having recognized that a same-sex couple form a 
family, it can be argued that “states [should] have a 
positive obligation to legally recognize these different 
family models” (Bribosia et al., 2014, p. 12; see also 
Cooper, 2011, p. 1761). This point was also highlighted 
by the dissenting judges in Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 
who argued that the majority in that case were being 
inconsistent in their use of logic (Cooper, 2011; Hodson, 
2011). 
 
The case law trajectory does point to an expansive 
approach toward the development of positive obligations 
placed on member states under Article 8 (Akandji-
Kombe, 2007). Member states have a duty not to interfere 
with an individual’s private life. They also have a positive 
obligation under Article 8 to ensure effective respect for 
private and family life, through law enforcement, legal 
and regulatory frameworks, and the provision of 
resources.15 In certain areas, namely the right to sexual 
self-determination for transgender persons (see I v. 
United Kingdom, 2002; Christine Goodwin v. UK, 2002) 
and the right to know one’s origins (for example, 
compelling a reluctant putative father to undergo a DNA 
test) (see Mikulic v. Croatia, 2002), this has led to far-
reaching judgments by the European Court. Most 
recently, the European Court has relied on the positive 
obligations under Article 8 to recognize same-sex 
couples’ rights to enter into a registered partnership/civil 
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partnership (Oliari v. Italy, 2015; see also, Hayward, 
2016). Case law recognizing single gay individuals’ right 
to adopt (EB v France, 2008) and same-sex couples’ right 
to adopt outside of marriage (X and Others v. Austria, 
2013) has also followed. This is an area that promises 
much for the future and can help assist with some of the 
deficiencies noted in the equality right argument under 
Article 14. If convincing arguments are utilized before the 
European Court, this may persuade them to find that 
sufficient consensus has been reached among member 
states. A final possibility that should be explored relates 
to Article 12 right to marry. 
Article 12 right to marry 
In Schalk and Kopf v. Austria (2010) the European Court 
had a disappointing treatment of the claim made under 
Article 12. The European Court noted that Article 12 only 
granted the right to marry “to men and women” (para. 52). 
This was contrasted to other articles that referred to 
“everyone” or “no one” and cited the “historical context” 
as being significant (para. 52). This follows the traditional 
approach of the European Court as seen by the case of 
Rees v. United Kingdom, where the European Court 
stated that “Article 12… is mainly concerned to protect 
marriage as the basis of the family” (Rees v. UK, 1986, 
para. 49). It also follows decisions made by domestic 
courts, which in same-sex marriage cases relied on 
traditional definitions of marriage set in legislation.16 The 
grammatical reading by the European Court also reflects 
the approach taken by the Human Rights Council in Joslin 
v. New Zealand (2002). Even the Yogyakarta Principles, 
which can be regarded as more radical, do not allow a 
human right for same-sex couples to marry.17 Once again, 
this decision has been recently reaffirmed by the 
European Court in the decision of Chapin and Charpentier 
v. France (2016), where it was found that there was no 
violation of Article 12 taken together with Article 14. 
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Despite these precedents, the text-driven traditional 
approach by the European Court was not, in fact, 
necessary. Arguably, any argument based on the intention 
of the drafters of the European Convention in the 1950s is 
erroneous. They had no “conscious ambition” to protect 
heterosexual marriage, since same-sex marriage would 
have been unthinkable at the time (Johnson, 2015a, p. 
220). Fenwick disputed the strict interpretation of the 
words “men and women” because it could have been 
intended, instead of excluding same-sex couples, to 
exclude children from the status of marriage (Fenwick, 
2016, p. 253). The definitional argument, therefore, does 
not offer in itself any justification for the European Court 
in refusing to extend marriage to same-sex couples. 
 
The attitude of the European Court also contrasts with the 
decisions of progressive courts that acknowledge the 
necessity of law evolving over time as society changes 
(Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2005, para. 102) 
and that the concept of marriage should not be “stuck in … 
permafrost” (Tobin, 2007). Such a definitional argument 
fails to take account of the social realities of same-sex 
couples living together in identical fashion to oppositesex 
couples (Tobin, 2007). It also contrasts with the “living 
instrument” doctrine the European Court has itself 
developed, on the basis that human rights should be 
rendered “dynamic and evolutive” (e.g., in relation to 
trans persons’ rights, see Christine Goodwin v. UK, 2002, 
para. 74; see also Tahmindjis, 2016 for discussion). In 
justifying the use of a dynamic interpretation in many 
other cases, Letsas explained that over time the European 
Court has “settled on the view that lack of a clear intention 
on the part of the drafters is simply irrelevant when one is 
considering whether to recognise a right or not” (Letsas, 
2010, p. 518). There are many precedents where the 
European Court has demonstrated that it is prepared to 
move away from previous case law where this no longer 
accords with modern reality. Hodson cited the case of 
Christine Goodwin v. UK, which shows the European 
Court using a transformative approach to Article 12 and 
its rigid language, by allowing a “trans person (in their 
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own gender) to marry a person of the opposite gender” 
(Hodson, 2011, p. 172; referring to Christine Goodwin v. 
UK, 2002). Interestingly, in the Christine Goodwin v. UK 
case the European Court was influenced by an “emerging 
consensus,” and reference was also made to a “continuing 
international trend” (Christine Goodwin v. UK, 2002, 
para. 84; see also Tobin, 2007). In reality, over a 16-year 
period since the first case concerning trans persons’ rights 
had been considered (Rees v. UK, 1996), there had been, 
in fact, very little progress in member states recognizing 
trans persons’ rights (McGoldrick, 2016). Bribosia et al. 
commented that the European Court can rely on an 
emerging consensus rather than an “arithmetic rule” 
(Bribosia et al., 2014, p. 22). The trans person cases are  
an illustration of how the European Court has been 
prepared to find a consensus and move forward on an 
issue where the arguments are convincing and persuasive. 
 
A separate justification for the restrictive approach taken 
by the European Court toward Article 12 (in contrast to 
the expansive approach under Article 8 right to respect for 
private and family life) is that marriage should be viewed 
as a separate category or “lex specialis” (Rees v. UK, 
1996). The dictionary definition explains this to be a “law 
governing a specific matter.” This means that the 
“doctrine states that the law governing a specific subject 
matter overrides a law that only governs general matters” 
(U.S. Legal Dictionary, n.d.) All other European Court 
case law concerning the equalization of family rights for 
gays and same-sex couples under the positive 
development of Article 8 family life has taken place 
outside of the consideration of marriage (see Waaldijk, 
2016). Johnson also commented that the European Court 
has developed a “two-track approach” (Johnson, 2015c, p. 
69). The jurisprudence on sexual orientation 
discrimination issues is regarded as “entirely distinct” to 
that of marriage (Johnson, 2015c, p. 69). Yet it is not 
explained thoroughly by the European Court why this 
should be the case. 
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One answer could mean that marriage is viewed by the 
European Court as having a special status, such that it 
cannot be subject to the usual detailed scrutiny. Hodson 
argued that marriage is being set apart from the other 
family rights and being treated as an “untouchable, almost 
sacred, category” (Hodson, 2011, p. 177; and see also 
Fenwick, 2016). In Oliari v. Italy the European Court 
refused to consider the case under Article 12 and declared 
the complaint on this point as “manifestly ill-founded” 
(Oliari v. Italy, 2015, para. 194; see also, Hayward, 2016). 
This can be seen as a “retrograde step” by the European 
Court and a strengthening of its attitude in refusing to 
consider any right to same-sex marriage (Fenwick, 2016; 
Hayward, 2016, p. 30). Again in Chapin and Charpentier 
v. France (2016) no violation of Article 12 was found. The 
approach of the European Court can be greatly criticized. 
As stated earlier the European Court appears to be 
continuing to promote a heterosexual view of marriage 
(see section titled “The Equality Argument Requires 
Categorization of Individuals Into Classes of Sexual 
Orientation”). At present in treating marriage as 
fundamentally different from the rest of the family law 
case law involving sexualities, Grigolo noted that a 
“structural problem has been created” (Grigolo, 2003, p. 
2040). In relation to Article 8 there is a principle of 
“equality of familial choices” and yet in relation to Article 
12 a “specific choice” is secured (Grigolo, 2003, p. 1040). 
By not even entertaining any comparisons to non-married 
couples, the European Court does not allow any 
immediate hope of a recognition of same-sex marriage 
under Article 12. 
 
It needs to be explored in further detail as to why marriage 
is given such a sacred special status by the European 
Court. One explanation could be that marriage is seen by 
the European Court as a moral or religious right, meaning 
that it should have a minimal role in regulation (Bradley, 
2003; Miller, 2005). Brauch noted that “particularly in the 
area of morals” wide margins are given (Brauch, 2004–
2005, p. 119). Even if it were correct to review marriage 
as primarily a religious right, it is not always easy to 
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pinpoint why the European Court need be so deferential 
in the area of religion (Lewis, 2007). There are also 
specific difficulties with the European Court regarding 
marriage as a religious right. Sachs J in the South African 
Constitutional Court case of Fourie explained that 
“[m]any may see a religious dimension to marriage, but 
this is not something that the law is concerned with” 
(Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2005, para. 102). 
Civil marriage is largely about a “set of legal protections 
and benefits” (Miller, 2005, p. 2186).18 Civil marriage 
needs to be differentiated from the religious concept. 
Bradley also concluded that “in a secular society, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to justify restrictions on 
marital capacity, founded on Church doctrine” (Bradley, 
2003, p. 130). If we move away from the religious or 
moral or religious reading of marriage, it becomes much 
more difficult to justify the wide MoA reserved to 
marriage. 
Yet Article 12 as interpreted by the European Court at 
present seems to be an unpromising line to pursue. 
However, the developing equality concept (see section 
titled “ECtHR Engagement with Article 14) and the 
evolving nature of the family case law concerning same-
sex couples under Article 8 (see section titled 
“Developing ‘Family Life’ Arguments for Same-Sex 
Partners”) could lead to a dynamic interpretation of 
Article 12. In reality, the European Court can never 
divorce its legal jurisprudence from the actual realities of 
public attitudes across Europe. Ultimately, as Johnson 
stated, the “implicit motivating principle” in relation to 
the interpretation of Article 12 is that allowing same-sex 
couples to marry is currently regarded as a “step too far,” 
bearing in mind the cultural conditions across Europe 
(Johnson, 2015c, p. 71). In Schalk and Kopf v. Austria 
(2010) the European Court was careful to refer to the 
“deep-rooted social and cultural connotations” of 
marriage, which national authorities are in the best place 
to assess. The European Court continues to emphasize 
lack of consensus in these cases (see Chapin and 
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Charpentier v. France, 2016; Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 
2010). Perhaps this is necessary to ensure that the 
European Court retains the respect of all its member states 
and ensures that its judgments are enforced. At the same 
time, however, the European Court has started to discuss 
an “emerging consensus” in relation to same-sex marriage 
between member states (Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 
2010). An incremental or step-by-step approach by the 
European Court is to be welcomed. It is more likely to 
result in lasting change, without any backlash in public 
opinion, which ultimately could retard the cause sought to 
be advanced. Ultimately, the most convincing arguments 
are needed to persuade the European Court that a 
consensus has developed. It is suggested that Article 14 
(equality) should be utilized together with a progressive 
reading of the positive obligations under the family law 
aspect of Article 8 and a new dynamic interpretation of 
Article 12, right to marry. 
Conclusion 
 
The text of the European Convention does not include a 
specific sexual orientation non-discrimination clause. 
This lack of direct protect for gays and same-sex couples 
could be ameliorated if more member states signed the 
freestanding Protocol 12 (Wintemute, 2004). However at 
present, for proponents of same-sex marriage in member 
states that have not ratified Protocol 12, existing 
provisions of the European Convention and the case law 
of the European Court have to be adapted to suit their 
cause. This article has considered a critical analysis of the 
existing arguments before the European Court. The 
historical reliance on the Article 8 privacy right has 
difficulties when it comes to same-sex marriage, a right 
so clearly connected with an individual’s public status. 
Concentration on an equality argument can address many 
of these issues. This is because of the close connections 
to citizenship, its symbolic status, and the success on the 
international stage that such arguments have had 
(Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2005; Obergefell et 
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al. v. Hodges, Director, Ohio Department of Health, 
2015). However, difficulties with the equality argument 
remain, not least its conditional status under the European 
Convention of Human Rights. Even if the Protocol 12 
were to be ratified by more member states, there are other 
concerns. These include the vagueness of a wide MoA 
and the need for categorization into sexual orientation 
categories that an equality argument requires. This may 
not be desirable either because of the strengthening of the 
heteronormative approach of the European Convention or 
because of the difficulties of individuals identifying with 
certain set categories. The equality argument alone 
therefore needs to be strengthened by new revitalized 
arguments concerning Articles 8 and 12. 
 
In this respect, the developing family law argument under 
Article 8 is of use. Historically, the European Court 
refused to recognize same-sex partners as having a 
“family life” (see section titled “Developing ‘Family Life’ 
Arguments for Same-Sex Partners”). Yet over time case 
law has developed dramatically, and Article 8 has been 
interpreted flexibly (Cabellero, 2004–2005) to include a 
wide range of families, far removed from the traditional 
model. Finally, in 2010 gays were recognized as having a 
family life (Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010, para. 94). 
In 2015 a reading of the positive obligations under Article 
8 family life led to the European Court imposing a right 
for same-sex couples to enter into a registered 
partnership/ civil partnership (Oliari v. Italy, 2015). Yet 
again, there are currently limits to the extent of Article 8, 
as this does not entitle same-sex couples to enter into 
marriage (Oliari v. Italy, 2015). This exposes the 
difference between recognizing that a same-sex couple 
can form a de facto family and giving that family the legal 
right to marry. The current position is unsatisfactory and 
contradictory (Cooper, 2011; Bribosia et al., 2014; 
Hodson, 2011). Yet the trajectory of the European Court’s 
judgments on family law under Article 8 is to further 
expand which families can fall under this protection (see 
section titled “Developing ‘Family Life’ Arguments for 
Same-Sex Partners”). It is argued that over time the fact 
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that the family life aspect of Article 8 has finally been 
interpreted to apply to same-sex couples (Schalk and 
Kopf v. Austria, 2010) will play increasing importance. 
This is an essential element in requiring a dynamic 
interpretation of Article 12. 
 
Lastly, this article calls for a new interpretation of Article 
12 (right to marry).19 Disappointing treatment has been 
given to this article by the European Court to date (see 
section titled “Article 12 Right to Marry”). A textual 
reading has been made of Article 12 to grant this right 
only to “men and women” (Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 
2010). Yet such a limited approach is not necessary, given 
the European Court’s widely developed dynamic 
interpretation techniques used in other cases involving 
Article 12 (Christine Goodwin v. UK, 2002). Many 
progressive courts consider it a necessity that law should 
change as society changes (Constitutional Court of South 
Africa, 2005, para. 102). In the case of Christine Goodwin 
v. UK (2002) the European Court was influenced by an 
“emerging consensus,” and an overall arithmetic majority 
of member states recognizing trans persons’ rights to 
marry in their own sex was not necessary (para. 84; see 
also, Tobin, 2007). It is clear that consensus plays an 
important role in relation to same-sex marriage. However, 
if the arguments portrayed in this piece are set out in the 
most convincing fashion, this could assist the European 
Court in determining that a sufficient consensus has 
arrived. The developing equality concept (see section 
titled “ECtHR Engagement with Article 14”) and the 
evolving nature of the family case law concerning same-
sex couples under Article 8 (see section titled 
“Developing ‘Family Life’ Arguments for Same-Sex 
Partners”) could lead to a dynamic interpretation of 
Article 12.
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Notes 
1. Section 3(1)(a) of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 includes a bar on heterosexual access to civil 
partnership. 
2. See Sue Wilkinson’s Witness Statement in Wilkinson v. Kritzinger (2006). 
3. The following member states have enacted same-sex marriage laws: Germany, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, and the UK (except Northern Ireland). 
4. Same-sex marriage is not recognized in several European countries, and, in addition, marriage is 
defined as a union solely between a man and a woman in the constitutions of Armenia, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Serbia, Slovakia, and Ukraine. See 
Fenwick (2016) for discussion. 
5. Fenwick (2016, p. 270) explains that gay propaganda laws are still in force in Russia. 
6. Article 14 provides that “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention 
shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, 
birth or other status.” 
7. The Council of Europe Web site contains details on member states that have ratified Protocol 12 
of the European Convention. See http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/ search-on-treaties/-
/conventions/treaty/177/signatures?p_auth=0Kq9rtcm. As of 12 July 2017 Protocol 12 had been 
ratified by 20 out of 47 member states. 
8. Article 8 of the ECHR provides that “(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and 
family life, his home and his correspondence. (2) There shall be no interference by a public 
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic 
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 
9. Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to 
the national laws governing the exercise of this right. 
10. Foster (2011) further explained that under Article 44 of the European Convention, a decision of 
the European Court becomes final three months after the decision, where both parties declare that 
they will not request a reference to the Grand Chamber, or when the Grand Chamber rejects such 
a request. 
11. Stress was placed by the European Court in Oliari v. Italy (2015) on the “movement towards legal 
recognition” (para. 178) and the “continuing international trend of legal recognition of same-sex 
couples” (para. 112). This is discussed by Cooper (2011, p. 1748), who argued that there is reason 
to be “cautiously optimistic.” 
12. Barrett (2006–2008) discussed at p. 695 the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Lewis v. Harris 
(2006) and at the Supreme Court of Hawaii in Baehr v. Lewin. See also Lombino, 2003. See also 
Crane (2003–2004, p. 465) referring to Goodridge v. Department of Public Health (2004). 
13. Grigolo (2003, p. 1030) stated that in this case the “[c]ourt did not find it necessary to examine the 
case under Article 14.” 
14. Other cases have also stressed the importance of the equality argument under Article 14 (see also, 
X and Others v. Austria, 2013; Vallianatos v. Greece, 2013; Hämäläinen v. Finland, 2014). 
15. In Marckx v. Belgium (1979) para. 31 the ECtHR explained that Article 8 placed “positive 
obligations on the states in addition to the duty of non-interference in private and family life.” See 
also Hayward (2016) and O’Mahoney (2012). 
16. E.g., the English High Court in Wilkinson v. Kritzinger (2006) and the Irish High Court in Zappone 
and Gilligan v. Revenue Commissioners (2006). 
17. Yogyakarata Principles 24E and 24F on the Application of International Human Rights Law in 
Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (http://www.yogyakarta principles.org/). 
18. Miller (2005) referring to Namath (2004). 
19. Article 12 provides that “[m]en and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to 
found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right.” 
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*E.H.R.L.R. 33 Abstract 
There remains no right to same-sex marriage before the European Court 
of Human Rights (the Court). Yet it seems likely that at some stage the 
Court will recognise same-sex marriage. Recent dicta stresses the 
movement towards legal recognition across Member States. It is only a 
lack of consensus, leading to a wide Margin of Appreciation, which 
prevents the Court recognising same-sex marriage. This article proposes 
that if the Court continues with this approach, they should at least outline 
in future judgments how many domestic legislatures need to legislate in 
favour of same-sex marriage, before they will determine that a consensus 
will exist. This is due to the constitutional, manifold legal and symbolic 
implications of marriage. It is essential for a same-sex couple to know 
when their marriage will be legally recognised. If done in a consistent 
manner, this would increase the legitimacy of the Court and has the major 
advantages of transparency, certainty and predictability. 
1. Introduction 
There continues to be no right to same sex-marriage before the Court.1 
Following Oliari v Italy, Member States are obliged to provide same-sex 
couples with some form of civil partnership or registered partnership.2 This 
is a breakthrough for same-sex partners3 although in its judgment the 
Court concentrated upon the difference between the lack of legal and 
protections in Italy and the "social reality of the applicants" who were 
widely accepted.4 Fenwick and Hayward argue that the Court by doing this 
"sought to relate its scope to circumstances arising locally, in Italy, and 
most likely to arise in Western European States".5 In addition, although civil 
partnership is increasingly seen as having an intrinsic value in itself6 this 
will also not satisfy those proponents of same-sex marriage who view 
marriage as the gold standard.7 
However, recognition of same-sex marriage by the Court at some stage 
now seems likely. Stress was placed by the Court in Oliari v Italy on the 
"movement towards legal recognition" and the "continuing *E.H.R.L.R. 34 
international trend of legal recognition of same-sex couples".8 The Court 
justifies the reason for not introducing same-sex marriage on the lack of 
consensus between Member States.9 
This lack of consensus leads to a wide Margin of Appreciation (MoA), 
otherwise known as area of discretion,10 given to Member States. Today, 
15 Member States recognise same-sex marriage.11 This accords with a 
"global movement to legalise same-sex marriage".12 Reform is by no 
means complete, as certain Central and Eastern European states continue 
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to ban same-sex marriage and constitutionally define marriage as between 
a man and a woman.13 Russia, a Council of Europe Member State, seems 
to be a long way away from considering protections for same-sex 
couples.14 A claim is now being brought to the Court from three same-sex 
couples in Russia who are claiming a right to same-sex marriage.15 As 
Russia has no form of legal protection for same-sex couples, the Court is 
considering the matter as a "claim for some means of formalising their 
relationship in Russia, via a form of registered partnership".16 It remains to 
be seen whether the Court will confine Oliari v Italy to countries where 
same-sex couples are socially accepted, which is very different from the 
homophobia present in Russian society. What will be crucial in the Court’s 
analysis here is the level of consensus deemed to exist between Member 
States on this issue. 
It remains debateable whether the Court is following the correct approach 
in considering lack of consensus, leading to a wide MoA, as determinative 
in relation to same-sex marriage. Commentators argue that placing such 
emphasis on consensus ignores the interests of the minority group.17 They 
also argue that in cases that fall within the MoA doctrine due to there being 
no consensus, there is a lack of legal analysis18 and no high level of 
scrutiny.19 Instead, the consensus standards results in a fact-dependent 
*E.H.R.L.R. 35 approach, with "little, if any constraints on state power".20 
This author has written elsewhere that such an approach means that 
Member States could be relying on erroneous21 or discriminatory reasons 
in refusing to sanction same-sex marriage, reasons which are not 
investigated by the Court.22 This article sets out a novel approach by 
suggesting that if the Court continues to stress the need for consensus in 
future judgements regarding same-sex marriage, it should at least outline 
how many domestic legislatures need to legislate in favour of same-sex 
marriage, before it will determine that a consensus exists. Certainty is 
needed. This is due to the constitutional, manifold legal and symbolic 
implications of marriage. It is essential for a couple to know when their 
marriage will be legally recognised.23 This is also stressed by international 
case-law24 and international human rights covenants.25 Marriage bestows 
many legal rights26 and is often connected to citizenship.27 
The suggested approach will increase the legitimacy of the Court as it 
would link any new decision on movement of consensus in relation to 
same-sex marriage back to a democratic mandate of the legislatures of 
Member States. This is needed at a time when certain political factions are 
discussing leaving the Council of Europe.28 The proposed reform also has 
the major advantages of transparency, certainty and predictability. The 
next section sets out the conundrum facing the Court in balancing the 
competing tensions of universalism and relativism in relation to same-sex 
marriage. Section 3 details a critique of the existing interpretation of 
consensus. Section 4 sets out case-law from the area of sexualities 
demonstrating the lack of certainty over how consensus is determined. 
Finally, section 5 considers the proposed reform in more detail and 
considers the advantages this would bring. 
2. The compromise between universalism and relativism 
One of the central challenges for the Court is to uphold the universal 
standard of human rights, whilst respecting regional differences. Fenwick 
and Hayward explain that in the context of rights to legal recognition of 
same-sex couples, there is much difficulty for the Court in "adjudicating in 
an increasingly nationalistic context"29 where Eastern European countries 
take a much more conservative approach in this regard.30 Yet this 
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approach by the Court attracts much criticism. Popplewell-Scevak argues 
that given the European Convention on Human Rights (European 
Convention) Preamble ’s promise to "protect and enforce human rights … 
it is perplexing to see the court refrain from legalising same-sex 
marriage …". *E.H.R.L.R. 36 31 Some commentators state that the Court 
should have a leading, standard setting, aspirational role.32 Benvenisti, for 
example, argues that the Court has a "duty to set universal standards".33 
This would mean in relation to same-sex marriage that the Court should 
no longer rely on a lack of consensus leading to a wide MoA. Indeed, the 
Court is well aware that the European Convention cannot be "frozen in 
time".34 Concepts such as "living instrument" allow the Court to operate 
"evolutive" and "dynamic" interpretative techniques so that the European 
Convention can be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions rather 
than what the drafters thought back in the 1950s.35 Such techniques are 
used throughout the case-law which will be examined in the relevant area 
of sexualities and family law.36 
However, in an area as sensitive as same-sex marriage, the Court wishes 
to avoid any charge that it is engaging in "judicial politics".37 Unlike the role 
of the Supreme Court in the US for instance, the Court has to constantly 
adhere to the states’ MoA.38 There needs to be a compromise between the 
competing interests at stake. The MoA alongside consensus (which the 
latter is one of the key factors in determining the width of the MoA) are the 
"primary tools"39 employed by the Court in its case-law on same-sex 
marriage in ensuring it does not overstep the "primary responsibility"40 
given under the European Convention to Member States to secure human 
rights.41 The doctrine of subsidiarity42 has been recently re-emphasised.43 
The role of the Court is in fact secondary. Its task is to "examine the 
domestic decision" and ensure compatibility with the European 
Convention.44 This is all part of securing agreement and social cooperation 
in the face of moral pluralism,45 which is particularly important in an area 
such as same-sex marriage. As set out above, it remains debateable 
whether the Court is following the correct approach in this regard.46 
However, as the Court currently determines that a lack of consensus is 
decisive in reaching a wide MoA,47 this article argues that at least more 
clarity and guidance is needed as to when a consensus is deemed to have 
been reached. As stated above, there are constitutional, manifold legal 
and symbolic implications of marriage.48 Couples are entitled to know when 
they will be able to enter into a same-sex marriage. *E.H.R.L.R.37 
 
3. The consensus standard critiqued 
Commentators argue that consensus, in relation to many human rights, is 
often the most important factor in determining the width of the MoA given 
to a Member State.49 When considering same-sex marriage, it is clear that 
lack of consensus is the critical factor.50 The MoA varies greatly depending 
on what rights are involved. 51 It can and frequently does evolve over time. 
Factors which are commonly cited in determining the width of the MoA 
include the importance of the right, the Member State interest involved and 
whether there is a consensus on an issue.52 Certain rights are given a 
narrow MoA.53 Equally, certain vulnerable groups, including gay people, 
are given extra protection.54 Where discrimination concerns gay people, for 
example, the Member State will need to have "very weighty reasons for 
the restriction in question".55 Logically, now that same-sex couples fall 
under the definition of family under art.8,56 the "very weighty reasons" test 
should lead to a breach of art.12 (right to marriage) being found in relation 
to same-sex couples bar from marriage. Such was the view of the minority 
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judges in Schalk v Austria.57 It is only because the Court determines there 
to be a wide MoA (due to a lack of consensus) in relation to marriage under 
art.12 which prevents the Court moving forward in this area.58 
Many of the criticisms surrounding MoA and its key factor of consensus 
centre around the fact that it is very difficult to understand how it works 
and that it is lacking in predictability.59 Some commentators even argue 
that it is not "consistent with the rule of law".60 There is no certainty as to 
when the Court will determine that sufficient consensus has been reached 
to recognise same-sex marriage. Bribosia et al. reject the consensus 
argument on the basis that it is "fraught with methodological imprecision".61 
Confusion reigns with regards to the terminology used, and multiple terms 
are used including "common European standard", "common European 
approach", "emerging consensus" or "trend".62 The Court also 
demonstrates no consistency in determining what sources are appropriate 
for establishing a consensus.63 For example, on occasion emphasis has 
been placed on scientific reports, and this emphasis is later disregarded in 
similar *E.H.R.L.R. 38 cases.64 There are also issues arising in relation to 
the thoroughness of the research on which the Court makes its decision.65 
However, the emphasis placed on consensus as the determinative factor 
for the width of the MoA ensures that the Court is acting in concert with 
domestic authorities and within the dictates of subsidiarity.66 Debate 
continues about the appropriateness of stressing consensus in relation to 
same-sex marriage.67 This article suggests that if the Court in future 
judgments continues to concentrate on the need for consensus, it should 
at least outline how many domestic legislatures need to legislate in favour 
of same-sex marriage, before it will determine that a consensus exists. 
This will increase the legitimacy of the Court, as it will link the Court’s 
decision back to the democratic mandate of the Member States’ 
legislatures. If applied in such a manner, the doctrine of consensus could 
be an important legitimising tool. This could give the Court’s judgments in 
this area extra weight, which is useful at a time when certain political 
factions are discussing leaving the Council of Europe.68 The next section 
examines the lack of certainty resulting from how the Court has applied 
the doctrine of consensus in its developing line of case-law concerning 
sexualities. 
4. Case-law demonstrating the lack of certainty over how consensus is 
determined 
In the area of family law and sexualities, the Court has employed a 
dynamic interpretative technique. The Court has not been insistent on 
demonstrating consensus in order to move case-law forwards. Indeed, it 
has been prepared to depart from previous precedents in the areas of 
decriminalisation of same-sex sexual activity,69 equalisation of the age of 
consent for same-sex couples,70 same-sex couples’ tenancy rights,71 
employment of gay people in the military,72 definition of family concerning 
gay people,73 gay persons’ right to adopt74 and most recently same-sex 
couples’ rights to form civil partnerships,75 all without demonstrating a 
consistent method as to how consensus is determined. All of this case-law 
has meant a progressive approach to the development of gay rights and 
has to be applauded as such. Fenwick and Hayward also argue that a 
further move towards an increasing consensus in relation to legal 
recognition of same-sex couples rights can be done by removing 
"asymmetry of access" to protected legal partnerships.76 They explain 
asymmetry of access to arise when same-sex and opposite-sex couples 
  
102 
 
are given different legal statuses. Erasing asymmetry of access in the 
context of Western European countries this would mean removing 
inequalities where same-sex couples can only access registered 
partnerships and not marriage.77 Such a course of action together with an 
increasing number of Eastern European countries introducing *E.H.R.L.R. 
39 for the first time some level of registered partnership, would 
undoubtedly increase the pressure on the Court to recognise an increasing 
level of consensus. In turn this would make the position of Eastern 
European countries which afford same-sex couples no legal protections 
as being seen to be "starkly anomalous".78 However, there would still 
remain doubt as to when the Court would deem there to be a sufficient 
level of consensus to recognise a right to same-sex marriage. There is an 
underlying problem in that the Court has shown no consistent application 
as to determine when consensus exists. The Court is insistent on 
consensus being the decisive factor here,79 but its case-law leaves no 
clues as to when this will be determined to exist. Key cases are now 
examined in more detail. 
The first in this important line of cases is Dudgeon v United Kingdom, 
which concerned criminalisation of sodomy in Northern Ireland. This was 
subsequently found to contravene art.8 (right to respect for private life) and 
has been lauded as "open[ing] the door for LGBTQI rights to be include 
under the [European] Convention".80 A flaw in the judgment, for those 
seeking to understand when the Court will advance the case for same-sex 
marriage, is that the Court never thoroughly explained its departure from 
previous case-law. The reversal of precedent was done on the basis of a 
"better understanding, and in consequence an increased tolerance, of 
homosexual behaviour in the great majority of Member States".81 Little 
guidance was given as to what was meant about a "better 
understanding".82 The Court did consider other domestic laws83 but never 
thoroughly documented how many other Member States’ legislatures were 
required to have introduced legislation. Letsas criticises this as instance of 
the Court making a "moral" decision, rather than determining "some 
commonly accepted standards".84 Confusing terminology such as "better 
understanding" does little to develop our understanding of when a 
sufficient consensus will be reached in relation to same-sex marriage. 
Brauch also considers that case-law demonstrates that the Court utilises 
the concept of MoA, with its key factor of consensus, in a manner which 
results in the standard sometimes changing without warning.85 The case 
he discusses concerned gay peoples’ employment in the military.86 
Previously national security defences put forward by Member States were 
given a wide MoA.87 In Smith v United Kingdom, the Court determined 
(despite the argument to the contrary by the UK government)88 that no 
defence could be upheld on the basis of national security. This was 
because "particularly serious reasons" had to exist in relation to 
restrictions which concerned the "most intimate part of an individuals’ 
private life".89 Ultimately, the UK were not successful in their defence which 
the Court interpreted as "founded solely upon the negative attitudes of 
heterosexual personnel towards those of homosexual orientation".90 
Despite national security defences previously being given a wide MoA,91 
suddenly no MoA was given to the UK. Again, although advancing LGBT 
rights, the sudden shift in position by the Court was unpredictable. The UK 
had prepared *E.H.R.L.R. 40 its defence on the basis of a wide MoA and 
had no notice from the Court that this no longer existed, arguably meaning 
that the UK did not prepare its case to best effect. 
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The case of Karner v Austria,92 considered the rights of a surviving same-
sex partner to inherit a tenancy. The Court again departed from previous 
precedent93 to find a breach of art.14 (equality) in conjunction with art.8 
(privacy).94 The issue of consensus was avoided. Although third party 
interveners brought up international examples of equal treatment of 
unmarried same-sex and opposite-sex couples,95 these were not 
considered in the Court’s judgment. Instead, the Court introduced a new 
dicta that "weighty reasons" were needed in justifying differences in 
treatment between opposite-sex and same-sex partners.96 Whilst the case 
was obviously an advance for LGBT rights by making any Member States’ 
discriminatory law against gay people subject to a heightened test, it did 
not address the issue concerning consensus. It offers no clues to be able 
to predict when a consensus will be deemed to exist in relation to same-
sex marriage. 
Another change from previous case-law occurred in the recognition of 
same-sex relationships under the "family" aspect of art.8. The Court had a 
long entrenched approach97 to not recognising same-sex relationships 
under the family aspect of art.8.98 Instead, such relationships were always 
considered under the private life aspect.99 It was not until Schalk v Austria 
(2010) that same-sex couples were recognised as having family rights.100 
This has been described as "remarkable"101 progress. The Court justified 
its extension of case-law on the basis of the "rapid evolution of social 
attitudes towards same-sex couples".102 Again, although this case 
illustrates the dynamic interpretative techniques of the Court, there was no 
explanation as to how the Court gauged the change in social attitudes. 
There was consideration of the legislative status of same-sex couples 
internationally, but the Court stated this was insufficient to amount to a 
European consensus in relation to same-sex marriage.103 Yet despite the 
lack of consensus in relation to same-sex marriage, the Court did 
transform previous case-law to recognise same-sex couples having a right 
to family life under art.8. This approach of the Court is confusing. A "rapid 
evolution of social attitudes" cannot be the same as consensus, as no 
consensus was determined to exist in relation to the right to marry.104 It 
appears from Schalk v Austria (2010) that consensus is not needed for 
art.8 (right to a private and family life), but is required for art.12 (right to 
marry.) Yet again, however, there is no clue as to when consensus will be 
reached for the purpose of art.12. This article sets out a suggestion that 
the Court should clarify in future judgments when consensus will be 
deemed to have been reached. 
The lack of clarity as to the weight given to consensus arguments in this 
area is further revealed by the most recent line of cases before the Court 
concerning civil partnership. In Vallianatos v Greece consensus played an 
important role in determining that there was a breach of art.14, taken in 
conjunction with art.8.105 Where Greece had reserved civil partnership 
rights to opposite-sex couples only, an "evolving" or "minority" 
consensus106 was deemed important as only two states which had 
introduced such statuses had reserved them specifically to opposite-sex 
couples. Confusingly this "minority" consensus was seen as *E.H.R.L.R. 
41 more important than the fact that overall (at that stage) only a minority 
of Contracting States had introduced same-sex registered partnerships. 
This judgment shows that in some cases the Court looks at consensus 
within a selected group of Member States, rather than consensus across 
all Member States. 
In Oliari v Italy (2015) consensus played an important role.107 The Court 
performed an extensive survey of comparative law and found that for the 
  
104 
 
first time a "thin majority" of states recognised a right to some level of civil 
partnership.108 This was an important reason for the Court’s decision that 
art.8 had been breached. Yet in other cases the Court has taken no regard 
of consensus. In the recent case of Ratzenbock v Austria,109 which 
concerned an opposite-sex couple wishing to enter into a civil partnership, 
on the grounds that this was a lighter form of recognition, the Court did not 
consider consensus at all. Instead, the majority of the Court considered 
that different-sex couples were not in a comparable situation to that of 
same-sex couples. This was because the "institutions of marriage and … 
registered partnership [were] essentially complementary in Austrian 
law".110 As no comparator was found the Court did not go on to "assess the 
difference of treatment or the justification for the difference".111 This seems 
at odds with previous decisions made in Schalk v Austria and Vallianatos 
v Greece where a comparison was made between same and opposite-sex 
couples and their access to legal statuses.112 It also meant that the Court 
never considered a consensus analysis at all, despite this being seen as 
decisive in Oliari v Italy.113 Interestingly, Fenwick and Hayward argue that 
a consensus could be found in this area, depending on how the question 
is framed.114 If the Court had asked if following the introduction of same-
sex partnerships, the majority of Member States had confined them to 
same-sex partners the answer would have been in the affirmative. 
However, if the Court had asked instead whether the majority of states 
following introduction of same-sex partnerships had "maintained 
asymmetry of access" the answer would have been in the negative, as 
most Member States following the introduction of registered partnerships 
had gone on to introduce same-sex marriage.115 Austria is one of the few 
countries to have maintained registered partnerships for same-sex 
couples and marriage for opposite-sex couples. This further serves to 
highlight the confusing treatment of consensus by the Court. 
In a similar manner to the transformation of the legal treatment of gay 
people before the Court, the treatment of transgender persons by the 
Court has also undergone a major change.116 Early case-law resulted in a 
denial of transpersons’ rights and a wide MoA, deemed necessary due to 
a lack of consensus.117 Yet 16 years later transpersons’ rights were 
recognised, including the right to marry in their new sex.118 The Court made 
a clear commitment to a "dynamic and evolutive approach" in order to 
"render [the European Convention ’s] rights practical and effective, not 
theoretical and illusory".119 However, when reviewing the case-law before 
the Court, no clear explanation was given as to how the Court justified this 
change in *E.H.R.L.R. 42 approach. The first in the line of case-law did not 
deem it appropriate to consider the domestic law in Member States120 and 
merely stated that the matter be kept "under review".121 Further case-law 
did at least take note of international comparisons and established this as 
a valid methodology towards consensus building.122 Eventually, 16 years 
later, the Court was swayed by an "emerging consensus"123 and reference 
was also made to a "continuing international trend".124 The variety of 
terminology used leads to confusion.125 On the facts as well, over the 16-
year period examined, there had been very little progress in the number of 
European countries recognising transpersons’ rights.126 To add to the 
confusion, the Court also examined states outside of Europe, including 
Australia and New Zealand. Brauch concludes that there are no legal 
standards to be found in such decisions, arguing that the Court was not 
"engaged in legal analysis, but in policy making".127 It creates difficulties for 
those wishing to determine when a consensus will be determined to have 
been reached in relation to same-sex marriage. This leads to a lack of 
clarity and predictability as to when the Court will introduce same-sex 
marriage. The Court frequently reverses previous cases. Reliance is made 
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upon a consensus standard that is not thoroughly explained. Change is 
needed here. If the Court determines that a matter falls within the MoA due 
to a lack of consensus, as is the case for same-sex marriage, Member 
States should be able to predict when a sufficient consensus will be 
deemed to have been reached. 
5. Proposed reform and the advantages this would bring 
This article suggests that if the Court continues to stress the need for 
consensus in future judgments regarding same-sex marriage, it should at 
least outline how many domestic legislatures need to legislate in favour of 
same-sex marriage, before it will determine that a consensus exists. This 
will increase the legitimacy of the Court and also has major advantages of 
transparency, certainty and predictability. Legitimacy is a particularly 
important at present with certain political factions threatening to leave the 
Council of Europe.128 The "legitimacy of international law is usually 
attributed to the States’ [original] consent".129 This argument surely holds 
less weight 50 years after the originally signatures.130 The question can 
also be raised as to how true the original consent argument holds in the 
face of the fact of the extensive interpretative techniques used by the 
Court. As demonstrated above, the case-law concerning sexualities has 
evolved rapidly over the course of the last few years.131 A challenge is 
therefore faced in Central and European states (whose people largely 
have a more conservative approach to these matters)132 to ensure 
enforcement of any judgment in this area. *E.H.R.L.R. 43 
 
As Wintemute comments, forcing minority views on the rest of the 
countries would "risk a political backlash, which could cause some 
governments [to] threaten to leave the convention system".133 The Court 
also faces "a substantial structural handicap"134 in getting its decisions 
enforced, as this depends upon the actions of Member States.135 Were the 
Court to take a leading role, too far in advance of public opinion, this could 
lead to a lack of enforcement. Examples of Member States failing to 
enforce decisions of the Court are easy to find.136 Consensus remains an 
important argument and is "a vital force in judicial policy that the European 
Court uses when it fears that going against consensus will render its 
rulings ineffectual".137 Several judges in the Court have also opined that 
they believe there is a link between consensus and enforcement and 
acceptance of judgments.138 As an international court, the Court is never 
going to have a democratic mandate. However, if consensus can be linked 
back to the democratic legislatures of Member States, this will increase 
the legitimacy of the Court’s role. The proposed reform also has the major 
advantages of increasing legitimacy, transparency, certainty and 
predictability. The Court would be operating within the rule of law and not 
trespassing into a political role. 
6. Conclusion 
In recent years there has been a transformation in the treatment of LGBT 
rights. The Court now requires Member States to offer some form of legal 
protection to same-sex couples Europe-wide (although this could be 
confined to countries where same-sex couples are accepted socially),139 
but there continues to be no right to same-sex marriage.140 This is because 
of the lack of consensus among Member States on the issue.141 There 
remains a divide between the largely liberal Western states and the more 
conservative states of Central and Eastern Europe.142 It seems likely, 
however, that at some stage the Court will determine that there is a right 
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to same-sex marriage.143 The difficulty remains that currently proponents 
of same-sex marriage are left with little to guide them as to when the Court 
will determine this moment has arrived. Certainty is needed. This is due to 
the constitutional, manifold legal and symbolic implications of marriage. It 
is essential for a couple to know if they can legally marry.144 
The issue of same-sex marriage recognition across Europe illustrates the 
difficult balance, which the Court has to make, between upholding the 
universal standard of human rights, whilst respecting regional differences. 
In relation to same-sex marriage, it remains debateable as to whether the 
Court is following the correct approach in considering lack of consensus, 
leading to a wide MoA, as determinative in relation *E.H.R.L.R. 44 to 
same-sex marriage. Critics argue that this ignores minorities145 and results 
in a lack of legal analysis146 and no high level of scrutiny.147 However, in 
politically sensitive areas such as same-sex marriage, the Court wishes to 
avoid any charge that it is engaging in "judicial politics".148 A wide MoA, 
due to the emphasis on lack of consensus ensures that the Court does not 
overstep the "primary responsibility"149 given under the European 
Convention to Member States to secure human rights.150 Despite the 
emphasis on consensus it is far from clear how the Court determines 
whether a consensus exists.151 There are also confusions in relation to the 
terminology used around consensus, where numerous versions of the 
name are used.152 Again, no consistency is demonstrated in determining 
what sources are appropriate for establishing a consensus.153 Analysis of 
case-law relating to sexualities and family law reveals very little to aid our 
understanding. Despite advancing human rights protections for gay people 
and same-sex couples, case-law demonstrates a very inconsistent and 
confusing approach to the use of consensus.154 Even worse, it results in 
the charge that the Court is not acting in accordance with the rule of law.155 
This article sets out a novel approach by suggesting that if the Court 
continues to stress the need for consensus in future judgments regarding 
same-sex marriage, it should at least outline how many domestic 
legislatures need to legislate in favour of same-sex marriage, before it will 
determine that a consensus exists. This will increase the legitimacy of the 
Court as it would link any new decision on movement of consensus in 
relation to same-sex marriage back to a democratic mandate of the 
legislatures of the Member States concerned. This is needed at a time 
when certain political factions are discussing leaving the Council of 
Europe.156 Case-law concerning sexualities has evolved rapidly over the 
last few years.157 A challenge is therefore faced in Central and European 
states (whose people largely have a more conservative approach to these 
matters)158 to ensure enforcement of any judgment in this area. The Court 
also faces "a substantial structural handicap"159 in  getting its decisions 
enforced, as this depends upon the actions of Member States.160 Forcing 
minority views on countries which would otherwise be opposed could also 
result in a *E.H.R.L.R. 45 political backlash.161 
 
Consensus therefore remains an important argument which many 
European judges opine is linked to enforcement and acceptance of 
judgements.162 As an international court, the Court is never going to have 
a democratic mandate. However, if consensus can be linked back to the 
democratic legislatures of the Member States concerned this can increase 
the legitimacy of the Court’s role. Consensus could therefore, if applied in 
the suggested more consistent manner, aid the legitimacy of judgments. 
The proposed reform would also improve transparency, certainty and 
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predictability as proponents of same-sex marriage would be able to judge 
when the necessary consensus had arrived. 
Frances Hamilton 
Senior Lecturer in Law at Northumbria University 
E.H.R.L.R. 2018, 1, 33-45 
1 Schalk v Austria (App. No.30141/04), judgment of 24 June 2010; Hämäläinen v Finland (App. No.37359/09), 
judgment of 16 July 2014; and Chapin v France (App. No.40183/07), judgment of 9 June 2016. 
2 Oliari v Italy (App. Nos 18766/11 and 36030/11), judgment of 31 July 2015. 
3 G. Zago, "A Victory for Italian Same-Sex Couples, a Victory for European Homosexuals? A Commentary on 
Oliari v Italy" (2015) Articolo 29 (Leiden University). 
4 Oliari v Italy (App. Nos 18766/11 and 36030/11) at [73]. 
5 H. Fenwick and A. Hayward, "Rejecting Asymmetry of Access to Formal Relationship Statuses for Same and 
Different-Sex Couples at Strasbourg and Domestically" [2017] E.H.R.L.R. 544, 551. 
6 Vallianatos v Greece (App. Nos 29381/09 and 32684/09), judgment of 7 November 2013; Oliari v Italy (App. 
Nos 18766/11 and 36030/11); and Fenwick and Hayward, "Rejecting Asymmetry of Access to Formal 
Relationship Statuses for Same and Different-Sex Couples at Strasbourg and Domestically" [2017] E.H.R.L.R. 
544. 
7. See Sue Wilkinson in her Witness Statement contained in Wilkinson v Kitzinger [2006] EWHC 2022 (Fam) at 
[6]. 
8. See Oliari (App. Nos 18766/11 and 36030/11). E. Sutherland, "A Step Closer to Same-Sex Marriage 
Throughout Europe" (2011) 15 Edin. L. Rev. 97, 98 states that "[e]ven on the Court’s reasoning, it is arguably 
only a matter of time (perhaps some time) until the right to marry becomes a reality for same-sex couples 
throughout Europe". Interestingly, the trend towards greater rights being given to same-sex couples is also 
reflected in the Yogyakarta Principles Plus 10 adopted on 10 November 2017 and available 
at http://yogyakartaprinciples.org/ [Accessed 22 January 2018]. They note in the Preamble that there "have been 
significant developments in international human rights law and jurisprudence on issues relating to sexual 
orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics …" and that discrimination on these 
grounds can be compounded by discrimination on other grounds including that of amongst a lengthy list "marital 
or family status …". Although the Yogyakarta Principles Plus 10 contain nothing specifically in relation to same-
sex marriage, they do include an Additional State Obligation relating to Equality and Non-Discrimination (Principle 
2) which states that Contracting States should "[t]ake all appropriate steps to ensure that reasonable 
accommodation is provided, where needed, in order to promote equality and eliminate discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics". 
9 See Schalk (App. No.30141/04) at [57], Hämäläinen (App. No.37359/09) at [39] and Chapin v France (App. 
No.40183/07). 
10 See P. Butler, "Margin of Appreciation—A Note Towards a Solution for the Pacific (2008–2009) 39 Vic. U. 
Wellington L. Rev. 687 and H.C. Yourow, Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human 
Rights Jurisprudence (Netherlands, Brill, 1996). 
11 Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom (apart from Northern Ireland). 
12 C.A.R.L. Poppelwell-Scevak, "The European Court of Human Rights and Same-Sex Marriage: The Consensus 
Approach", Norwegian Open Research Archives (NORA), 2016. 
  
108 
 
13 Same-sex marriage is not recognised in several European countries and, in addition, marriage is defined as a 
union solely between a man and a woman in the constitutions of Armenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine. See H. Fenwick, "Same Sex Unions and the 
Strasbourg Court in a Divided Europe: Driving Forward Reform or Protecting the Court’s Authority Via Consensus 
Analysis" [2016] E.H.R.L.R. 248. See also Fenwick and Hayward, "Rejecting Asymmetry of Access to Formal 
Relationship Statuses for Same and Different-Sex Couples at Strasbourg and Domestically" [2017] E.H.R.L.R. 
544. 
14 See Fenwick, "Same Sex Unions and the Strasbourg Court in a Divided Europe: Driving Forward Reform or 
Protecting the Court’s Authority Via Consensus Analysis" [2016] E.H.R.L.R. 248, 270 who explains that gay 
propaganda laws are still in force in Russia. See also Fenwick and Hayward, "Rejecting Asymmetry of Access to 
Formal Relationship Statuses for Same and Different-Sex Couples at Strasbourg and Domestically" [2017] 
E.H.R.L.R. 544 who refer to the "state-based and social acceptance of homophobia". See also P. Johnson, 
"Homosexual Propaganda in the Russian Federation: Are They in Violation of the European Convention on 
Human Rights?" (2015) 3(2) Russ. L.J. 37. 
15 Fedetova and Shipitko v Russia, communicated on 2 May 2016. 
16 Fenwick and Hayward, "Rejecting Asymmetry of Access to Formal Relationship Statuses for Same and 
Different-Sex Couples at Strasbourg and Domestically" [2017] E.H.R.L.R. 544, 557. 
17 See Fenwick, "Same Sex Unions and the Strasbourg Court in a Divided Europe: Driving Forward Reform or 
Protecting the Court’s Authority Via Consensus Analysis" [2016] E.H.R.L.R. 248 and K. Dzehtsiarou, "Does 
Consensus Matter? Legitimacy of European Consensus in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights" 
[2011] P.L. 534; L. Hodson, "A Marriage by Any Other Name? Shalk and Kopf v Austria" (2011) 11(1) H.R.L.R. 
170; J.A. Sweeney, "Margin of Appreciation: Cultural Relativity and the European Court of Human Rights in the 
Post-Cold War Era (2005) 54 I.C.L.Q. 459; Lord Lester, "The European Convention in the New Architecture of 
Europe" (1996) P.L. 6; and E. Benvenisti, "Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Standards" (1998–
1999) 31 NYUJ of Inter. L. and Politics 843. 
18 T. Lewis, "What Not to Wear: Religious Rights, the European Court and the Margin of Appreciation" (2007) 56 
I.C.L.Q. 395, 414 comments that the MoA should not be used as an "intellectually lazy option of running for cover". 
19 See for discussion M. Hutchinson, "The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the European Court of Human 
Rights" (1999) 48 I.C.L.Q. 638 and J. Brauch, "The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law" (2004–2005) 11 Columbia J. of Eur. Law 113. 
20 Y. Shany, "Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law" (2005) 16(5) Eur. J. of 
Inter. L. 907, 912 
21 For example, Member States could be relying on discredited arguments such as the slippery slope argument 
(that same-sex marriage would lead to polygamy for example) as well as the definitional argument (that "traditions 
change and dictionaries are not the law" and the procreation argument (that marriage is for procreative purposes 
only). 
22 F. Hamilton, "Why the Margin of Appreciation is not the Answer to the Gay Marriage Debate" [2013] E.H.R.L.R. 
47. 
23 In Estin v Estin 334 US 541, 553 (1948) Robert Jackson J commented that "one thing that people are entitled 
to know from the law is whether they are formally married". See also B. Stark, "When Globalization Hits Home: 
International Family Law Comes of Age" (2006) 36 Vanderbilt J. of Trans. L. 1551, and L. McClain, "Deliberative 
Democracy, Overlapping Consensus and Same-Sex Marriage" (1997–1998) Fordham L.R. 1241. 
24 See, e.g. Goodridge v Department of Public Health 798 NE 2d 941 (Mass., 2003); Loving vVirginia 388 US 1 
(1967); and Obergefell v Hodges 576 US (2015). 
25 E.g. art.12 Right to Marry European Convention on Human Rights. 
26 E.g. on intestacy, inheritance and tax purposes. 
  
109 
 
27 See N. Bamforth, "Sexuality and Citizenship in Contemporary Constitutional Argument" (2012) 10(2) Inter. J. 
Const. L. 477; R. Frimston, "Marriage and Non-Marital Registered Partnerships: Gold, Silver and Bronze in Private 
International Law" (2006) P.C.B. 352; and E. Aloni, "Incrementalism, Civil Unions and the Possibility of Predicting 
Same-Sex Marriage" (2010–2011) 18 Duke J. of Gender L. and Pol’y 105. 
28 E. Bribosia, I. Rorive and L. Van den Eynde, "Same-Sex Marriage: Building an Argument Before the European 
Court of Human Rights in Light of the US Experience" 2014 32(1) Berkeley J. of Inter. L. 1 referring to R. 
Wintemute, "Consensus is the right approach for the European Court of Human Rights" (12 August 2010), The 
Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/law/2010/aug/12/european-court-human-rights-consensus [Accessed 
22 January 2018]. 
29 Fenwick and Hayward, "Rejecting Asymmetry of Access to Formal Relationship Statuses for Same and 
Different-Sex Couples at Strasbourg and Domestically" [2017] E.H.R.L.R. 544, 545. 
30 See Fenwick and Hayward, "Rejecting Asymmetry of Access to Formal Relationship Statuses for Same and 
Different-Sex Couples at Strasbourg and Domestically" [2017] E.H.R.L.R. 544, 545 and fn.14. 
31 Poppelwell-Scevak, "The European Court of Human Rights and Same-Sex Marriage: The Consensus 
Approach", Norwegian Open Research Archives, p.1. 
32 See Dzehtsiarou, "Does Consensus Matter? Legitimacy of European Consensus in the Case Law of the 
European Court of Human Rights" [2011] P.L. 534, 540. Dzehtsiarou at 540 also refers to Ronald Macdonald, 
"The Margin of Appreciation", in Ronald Macdonald, Franz Matscher and Herbert Petzold (eds), The European 
System for the Protection of Human Rights (Martin Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), p.24 who argues that consensus 
would mean the European Court would "forfeit its aspirational role". N. Shuibne, "Margins of Appreciation; 
National Values, Fundamental Rights and EC Free Movement Law" (2009) 34(2) Eur. L. Rev. 230, 256 also 
argues that when interpreting the role of the EU Charter in an EU context there is a "discrete supranational" 
purpose in advancing fundamental rights. 
33 Benvenisti, "Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Standards" (1998–1999) 31 NYUJ of Inter. L. 
and Politics 843, 843. 
34 B. Tobin, "Gay Marriage—A Bridge Too Far?" (2007) 15 Ire. Stud. L. Rev. 175 referring to the Irish Supreme 
Court decision in Zappone and Gilligan v Revenue Commissioners [2008] 2 IR 417. 
35 See G. Letsas, "Strasbourg’s Interpretative Ethic: Lessons for the International Lawyer" (2010) 21(3) E.J.I.L. 
509 for further explanation. 
36 E.g. transgender persons have transformed their position, to allow full recognition of rights in their new sex. 
See Goodwin v United Kingdom (1996) 22 E.H.R.R. 123. See Section 4. 
37 Benvenisti, "Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Standards" (1998–1999) 31 NYUJ of Inter. L. 
and Politics 843, 846. 
38 See D. Teutonico, "Pajic v Croatia" (2016–2017) 25 Tulane J. of Inter. and Comp. L. 461. 
39 D.L. Donoho, "Autonomy, Self-Governance, and the Margin of Appreciation: Developing a Jurisprudence of 
Diversity Within Universal Human Right" (2001) 15 Em. Inter. L. Rev. 391, 451. 
40 D. McGoldrick, "A Defence of the Margin of Appreciation and an Argument for its Application by the Human 
Rights Committee" (2016) 65(1) I.C.L.Q. 21, 32. 
41 Hutchinson, "The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the European Court of Human Rights" (1999) 48 I.C.L.Q. 
638. 
42 Article 1 of the European Convention. Fenwick, "Same Sex Unions and the Strasbourg Court in a Divided 
Europe: Driving Forward Reform or Protecting the Court’s Authority Via Consensus Analysis" [2016] E.H.R.L.R. 
248, 250 also emphasises the importance of "subsidiarity related devices". 
43 Council of Europe, "Brighton Declaration High Level Conference on the Future of the 
ECHR", http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2012_Brighton_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf (2012) B 12 [Accessed 
22 January 2018]. 
  
110 
 
44 Hutchinson, "The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the European Court of Human Rights" (1999) 48 I.C.L.Q. 
638, 640. 
45 McClain, "Deliberative Democracy, Overlapping Consensus and Same-Sex Marriage" (1997–1998) Fordham 
L.R. 1241. 
46 See Section 1 Introduction. 
47 Schalk (App. No.30141/04) at [57], Hämäläinen (App. No.37359/09) at [39] and Chapin (App. No.40183/07). 
48 See Section 1 Introduction. 
49 e.g. Lewis, "What Not to Wear: Religious Rights, the European Court and the Margin of Appreciation" (2007) 
56 I.C.L.Q. 395; E. Wada, "The Margin of Appreciation and the Right to Assisted Suicide" (2005) 27 Loy. of L.A. 
Inter. and Comp. L. Rev. 275; Butler, "Margin of Appreciation—A Note Towards a Solution for the Pacific" (2008–
2009) 39 Vic. U. Wellington L. Rev. 687; R. Nigro, "The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Case-Law of the 
European Court of Human Rights on the Islamic Veil" (2010) 11 H.R.L.R. 531; Hutchinson, "The Margin of 
Appreciation Doctrine in the European Court of Human Rights" (1999) 48 I.C.L.Q. 638; Brauch, "The Margin of 
Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law" (2004–
2005) 11 Columbia J. of Eur. Law 113; and McClain, "Deliberative Democracy, Overlapping Consensus and 
Same-Sex Marriage" (1997–1998) Fordham L.R. 1241. 
50 Schalk v Austria (App. No.30141/04) at [57], Hämäläinen (App. No.37359/09) at [39] and Chapin (App. 
No.40183/07). 
51 Fenwick, "Same Sex Unions and the Strasbourg Court in a Divided Europe: Driving Forward Reform or 
Protecting the Court’s Authority Via Consensus Analysis" [2016] E.H.R.L.R. 248, 251 states that in practice 
"uncertainty arises in respect of every aspect of it". See also Poppelwell-Scevak, "The European Court of Human 
Rights and Same-Sex Marriage: The Consensus Approach" (2016). 
52 See Donoho, "Autonomy, Self-Governance, and the Margin of Appreciation: Developing A Jurisprudence of 
Diversity Within Universal Human Right (2001) 15 Em. Inter. L. Rev. 391, for further explanation. 
53 For example privacy and personal autonomy: Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1982) 4 E.H.R.R. 149. 
54 Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1982) 4 E.H.R.R. 149. See McGoldrick, "A Defence of the Margin of Appreciation 
and an Argument for its Application by the Human Rights Committee" (2016) 65(1) I.C.L.Q. 21, 25. 
55 Karner v Austria (2003) 38 E.H.R.R. 528. 
56 Schalk (App. No.30141/04). 
57 Schalk (App. No.30141/04). Dissenting Opinion of Judges Rozakis, Spielmann and Jebens at [8]. 
58 See, e.g. Schalk (App. No.30141/04). 
59 Wada, "The Margin of Appreciation and the Right to Assisted Suicide" (2005) 27 Loy. of L.A. Inter. and Comp. 
L. Rev. 275, 280; Butler "Margin of Appreciation—A Note Towards a Solution for the Pacific" (2008–2009) 39 Vic. 
U. Wellington L. Rev. 687, 702; Hutchinson, "The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the European Court of 
Human Rights" (1999) 48 I.C.L.Q. 638, 641; Brauch, "The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law" (2004–2005) 11 Columbia J. of Eur. Law 113, 121; 
Shany, "Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law" (2005) 16(5) Eur. J. of Inter. L. 
907, 932; Benvenisti, "Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Standards (1998–1999) 31 NYUJ of 
Inter. L. and Politics 843, 844; McGoldrick, "A Defence of the Margin of Appreciation and an Argument for its 
Application by the Human Rights Committee" (2016) 65(1) I.C.L.Q. 21, and Lester, "The European Convention in 
the New Architecture of Europe" (1996) P.L. 6. 
60 Brauch, "The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: Threat 
to the Rule of Law" (2004–2005) 11 Columbia J. of Eur. Law 113, 138. 
61 Bribosia et al., "Same-Sex Marriage: Building an Argument Before the European Court of Human Rights in 
Light of the US Experience" 2014 32(1) Berkeley J. of Inter L. 1, 18. 
  
111 
 
62Popplewell-Scezak, "The European Court of Human Rights and Same-Sex Marriage: The Consensus 
Approach" (2016), p.39. 
63 Dzhetsiarou, "Does Consensus Matter? Legitimacy of European Consensus in the Case Law of the European 
Court of Human Rights" [2011] P.L. 534, 544. 
64 Look at adoption cases Frette v France (2002) 38 E.H.R.R. 438 which placed emphasis on the division in the 
scientific community about the effect which individual gay adoption would have on the child. This approach was 
subsequently regarded as discriminatory: X v Austria (2013) 57 E.H.R.R. 14. 
65 Dzehtsiarou, "Does Consensus Matter? Legitimacy of European Consensus in the Case Law of the European 
Court of Human Rights" [2011] P.L. 534, 539. 
66 McGoldrick, "A Defence of the Margin of Appreciation and an Argument for its Application by the Human Rights 
Committee" (2016) 65(1) I.C.L.Q. 21, 28 referring to Nicolas Bratza, Evidence to UK Joint Committee on Human 
Rights, 13 March 2012, HC 873-iii Q140, former President of the European Court, who saw this as a safeguard 
"to prevent any rapid and arbitrary development of the Convention". See also Dzehtsiarou, "Does Consensus 
Matter? Legitimacy of European Consensus in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights" [2011] 
P.L. 534. 
67 See Section 1 Introduction. 
68 See E. Bribosia, I. Rorive and L. Van den Eynde, "Same-Sex Marriage: Building an Argument Before the 
European Court of Human Rights in Light of the US Experience" 2014 32(1) Berkeley J. of Inter. L. 1 referring 
to R. Wintemute, "Consensus is the right approach for the European Court of Human Rights" (12 August 2010), 
The Guardian. 
69 Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1982) 4 E.H.R.R. 149. 
70 Sutherland v United Kingdom (1996) 22 E.H.R.R. CD182. 
71 Simpson v United Kingdom (App. No.11716/85), judgment of 14 May 1986, and Karner v Austria (2003) 38 
E.H.R.R. 528. 
72 Smith and Grady v United Kingdom (1999) 29 E.H.R.R. 493, and Lustig-Prean and Beckett v United Kingdom 
(2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 601. 
73 X and Y v United Kingdom (App. No.21830/93), judgment of 22 April 1997; Kerkhoven v Netherlands (App. 
No.15666/89), decision of 19 May 1992); JRM v Netherlands (App. No.16944/90), decision of 8 February 1993; 
and Schalk (App. No.30141/04). 
74 Frette v France (2002) 38 E.H.R.R. 438 and EB v France (2008) 47 E.H.R.R. 21. 
75 Oliari (App. Nos 18766/11 and 36030/11). 
76 They define asymmetry of access to mean 
77 Fenwick and Hayward, "Rejecting Asymmetry of Access to Formal Relationship Statuses for Same and 
Different-Sex Couples at Strasbourg and Domestically" [2017] E.H.R.L.R. 544. 
78 Fenwick and Hayward, "Rejecting Asymmetry of Access to Formal Relationship Statuses for Same and 
Different-Sex Couples at Strasbourg and Domestically" [2017] E.H.R.L.R. 544, 563 define asymmetry of access 
to mean where different sex couples have "two options: cohabitation or marriage, while same-sex couples are 
confined to cohabitation only. But a form of asymmetry also arises in states which have introduced registered 
partnerships for same-sex couples, leaving availability of marriage only to different-sex couples". 
79 Schalk (App. No.30141/04); Oliari (App. Nos 18766/11 and 36030/11); and Chapin (AppNo.40183/07). 
80 Popplewell-Scezak, "The European Court of Human Rights and Same-Sex Marriage: The Consensus 
Approach" (2016), p.9. 
81   Dudgeon (1982) 4 E.H.R.R. 149 at [60]. 
82 Dudgeon (1982) 4 E.H.R.R. 149 at [60]. 
83 Dudgeon (1982) 4 E.H.R.R. 149 at [60]. 
84 Letsas, "Strasbourg’s Interpretative Ethic: Lessons for the International Lawyer" (2010) 21(3) E.J.I.L. 509, 531. 
  
112 
 
85 Brauch, "The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: Threat 
to the Rule of Law" (2004–2005) 11 Columbia J. of Eur. Law 113, 137. 
86 Smith (1999) 29 E.H.R.R. 493. 
87 Smith (1999) 29 E.H.R.R. 493 at [3], referring to Leander v Sweden (1987) 9 E.H.R.R. 433 at [59] and Engel 
v Netherlands (1976) 1 E.H.R.R. 647 at [57]. 
88 See Smith (1999) 29 E.H.R.R. 493 at [61] where the UK Homosexuality Policy Assessment Team indicated a 
"military risk from a policy change…". See also [66] where the Parliamentary Select Committee Report dated 24 
April 1991 stated that "the presence of people known to be homosexual can cause tension in a group of people 
required to live and work sometimes under great stress and physically at very close quarters, and thus damage 
its cohesion and fighting effectiveness …". 
89Smith (1999) 29 E.H.R.R. 493 at [89]. 
90 Smith (1999) 29 E.H.R.R. 493 at [96]. 
91 Smith (1999) 29 E.H.R.R. 493 at [3] referring to Leander (1987) 9 E.H.R.R. 433 at [59] and Engel (1976) 1 
E.H.R.R. 647 at [57]. 
92 Karner v Austria (2003) 38 E.H.R.R. 528. 
93 Simpson v United Kingdom (App. No.11716/85). 
94 Karner (2003) 38 E.H.R.R. 528. 
95 Karner (2003) 38 E.H.R.R. 528 at [36]. The third party interveners were ILGA Europe, Liberty and Stonewall. 
96 Karner (2003) 38 E.H.R.R. 528 at [37]. 
97 S. Caballero, "Unmarried Cohabiting Couples Before the European Court of Human Rights: Parity with 
Marriage?" (2004–2005) 11 Col. J. of Eur. L. 151, 166. 
98 E.g. see X v United Kingdom (App. No.21830/93);; Simpson (App. No.11716/85) and Kerkhoven v 
Netherlands (App. No.15666/89). 
99 Caballero, "Unmarried Cohabiting Couples Before the European Court of Human Rights: Parity with 
Marriage?" (2004–2005) 11 Col. J. of Eur. L. 151, 152. 
100 Schalk (App. No.30141/04) at [94]. 
101 Hodson, "A Marriage by Any Other Name? Shalk and Kopf v Austria" (2011) 11(1) H.R.L.R. 170, 175. See 
also Bribosia et al., "Same-Sex Marriage: Building an Argument Before the European Court of Human Rights in 
Light of the US Experience" (2014) 32(1) Berkeley J. of Inter. L. 1. 
102 Schalk (App. No.30141/04) at [93]. 
103 Schalk (App. No.30141/04). 
104 Schalk (App. No.30141/04). 
105 Vallianatos v Greece (App. Nos 29381/09 and 32684/09). 
106 Fenwick and Hayward, "Rejecting Asymmetry of Access to Formal Relationship Statuses for Same and 
Different-Sex Couples at Strasbourg and Domestically" [2017] E.H.R.L.R. 544, 550, referring to [91] and [92]. 
107 Oliari (App. Nos. 18766/11 and 36030/11). 
108 Oliari (App. Nos. 18766/11 and 36030/11). 
109 Ratzenbock v Austria (App. No.28475/12), judgment of 26 October 2017. 
110 Ratzenbock (App. No.28475/12) at [40]. 
111 H. Fenwick and A. Hayward, "Equal Civil Partnerships: Implications of Strasbourg’s Latest Ruling for Steinfeld 
and Keidan", UK Human Rights Blog, 21 November 2017, https://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2017/11/21/equal-civil-
partnerships-implications-of-strasbourgs-latest-ruling-for-steinfeld-and-keidan-helen-fenwick-andy-
hayward/ [Accessed 22 January 2018]. 
112 Schalk (App. No.30141/04) and Vallianatos (App. Nos 29381/09 and 32684/09). 
113 Oliari (App. Nos 18766/11 and 36030/11). 
  
113 
 
114 H. Fenwick and A. Hayward, "Equal Civil Partnerships: Implications of Strasbourg’s Latest Ruling for Steinfeld 
and Keidan", UK Human Rights Blog, 21 November 2017, https://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2017/11/21/equal-civil-
partnerships-implications-of-strasbourgs-latest-ruling-for-steinfeld-and-keidan-helen-fenwick-andy-
hayward/ [Accessed 22 January 2018]. 
115 H. Fenwick and A. Hayward, "Equal Civil Partnerships: Implications of Strasbourg’s Latest Ruling for Steinfeld 
and Keidan", UK Human Rights Blog, 21 November 2017, https://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2017/11/21/equal-civil-
partnerships-implications-of-strasbourgs-latest-ruling-for-steinfeld-and-keidan-helen-fenwick-andy-
hayward/ [Accessed 22 January 2018]. 
116 See for comment M. Grigolo, "Sexualities and the ECHR: Introducing the Universal Sexual Legal Subject" 
(2003) 14(5) Eur. J. of Inter. L. 1023, 1025. 
117 Rees v UK (1987) 9 E.H.R.R. 56. See also Popplewell-Scezak, "The European Court of Human Rights and 
Same-Sex Marriage: The Consensus Approach" (2016), for comment. 
118 Goodwin (1996) 22 E.H.R.R. 123. 
119 Goodwin (1996) 22 E.H.R.R. 123 at [74]. 
120 Rees (1987) 9 E.H.R.R. 56 at [42]. 
121 Rees (1987) 9 E.H.R.R. 56 at [47]. 
122 Cossey v United Kingdom (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 622. 
123 Goodwin (1996) 22 E.H.R.R. 123 at [84]. See also Tobin, "Gay Marriage—A Bridge Too Far?" (2007) 15 Ire. 
Stud. L. Rev. 175. 
124 Goodwin (1996) 22 E.H.R.R. 123 at [84]. 
125 Dzehtsiarou, "Does Consensus Matter? Legitimacy of European Consensus in the Case Law of the European 
Court of Human Rights" [2011] P.L. 534, 541. See also Brauch, "The Margin of Appreciation and the 
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law" (2004–2005) 11 Columbia J. 
of Eur. Law 113. 
126 McGoldrick, "A Defence of the Margin of Appreciation and an Argument for its Application by the Human 
Rights Committee" (2016) 65(1) I.C.L.Q. 21. 
127 Brauch, "The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: Threat 
to the Rule of Law" (2004–2005) 11 Columbia J. of Eur. Law 113, 147. See also Popplewell-Scezak, "The 
European Court of Human Rights and Same-Sex Marriage: The Consensus Approach" (2016). 
128 See E. Bribosia, I. Rorive and L. Van den Eynde, "Same-Sex Marriage: Building an Argument Before the 
European Court of Human Rights in Light of the US Experience" 2014 32(1) Berkeley J. of Inter. L. 1 referring 
to R. Wintemute "Consensus is the right approach for the European Court of Human Rights" (12 August 2010), 
The Guardian. 
129 Dzehtsiarou, "Does Consensus Matter? Legitimacy of European Consensus in the Case Law of the European 
Court of Human Rights" [2011] P.L. 534, 536 referring to Macdonald, "The Margin of Appreciation" (1993), p.123, 
a former judge of the European Court, who states the whole system of European human rights protection "rests 
on the fragile foundations of the consent of the Contracting Parties". 
130 Dzhetsiarou, "Does Consensus Matter? Legitimacy of European Consensus in the Case Law of the European 
Court of Human Rights" [2011] P.L. 534, 536 referring to G. Letsas, "The Truth in Autonomous Concepts: How to 
Interpret the ECHR" (2004) 15 Eur. J. of Inter. L. 279, 304 
131 See Section 4. 
132 See Fenwick, "Same Sex Unions and the Strasbourg Court in a Divided Europe: Driving Forward Reform or 
Protecting the Court’s Authority Via Consensus Analysis" [2016] E.H.R.L.R. 248. 
133 See Wintemute, "Consensus is the right approach for the European Court of Human Rights" (12 August 
2010), The Guardian. 
  
114 
 
134 Dzehtsiarou, "Does Consensus Matter? Legitimacy of European Consensus in the Case Law of the European 
Court of Human Rights" [2011] P.L. 534, 534. 
135 Fenwick, "Same Sex Unions and the Strasbourg Court in a Divided Europe: Driving Forward Reform or 
Protecting the Court’s Authority Via Consensus Analysis" [2016] E.H.R.L.R. 248 who explains that the European 
Court cannot "rely on coercion". This is in contrast to domestic legislatures who have their decisions enforced 
immediately. See also Donoho, "Autonomy, Self-Governance, and the Margin of Appreciation: Developing a 
Jurisprudence of Diversity Within Universal Human Right (2001) 15 Em. Inter. L. Rev. 391, 422. 
136 For example Hirst v United Kingdom (No.2) (2004) 38 E.H.R.R. 825 removing the blanket ban on prisoners’ 
voting rights has met with delayed enforcement in the UK. A. Donald and P. Leach, Parliaments and the European 
Court of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2016), p.245 who comment on this as an important example for 
those who assert the primacy of Parliament. 
137 Bribosia, "Same-Sex Marriage: Building an Argument Before the European Court of Human Rights in Light 
of the US Experience" 2014 32(1) Berkeley J. of Inter. L. 1, 19. 
138 Dzhetsiarou, "Does Consensus Matter? Legitimacy of European Consensus in the Case Law of the European 
Court of Human Rights" [2011] 3 Public Law 534, 544–545 referring to K. Dzehtsiarou, Interview with Judge of 
the ECtHR Corneliu Birsan (European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg, 2010) and K. Dzehtsiarou, Interview 
with Judge of the ECtHR Renate Jaeger (European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg, 2010). 
139 Oliari (App. Nos 18766/11 and 36030/11). 
140 Schalk (App. No.30141/04). 
141 Schalk (App. No.30141/04) at [57]. 
142 See Fenwick, "Same Sex Unions and the Strasbourg Court in a Divided Europe: Driving Forward Reform or 
Protecting the Court’s Authority Via Consensus Analysis" [2016] E.H.R.L.R. 248 for discussion. 
143 Schalk (App. No.30141/04) at [105] and Oliari (App. Nos 18766/11 and 36030/11) at [178]. 
144 See Section 1. 
145 See Fenwick, "Same Sex Unions and the Strasbourg Court in a Divided Europe: Driving Forward Reform or 
Protecting the Court"s Authority Via Consensus Analysis" [2016] E.H.R.L.R. 248, 270; Dzehtsiarou, "Does 
Consensus Matter? Legitimacy of European Consensus in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights" 
[2011] P.L. 534, Hodson, "A Marriage by Any Other Name? Shalk and Kopf v Austria (2011) 11(1) H.R.L.R. 170; 
Sweeney, "Margin of Appreciation: Cultural Relativity and the European Court of Human Rights in the Post-Cold 
War Era" (2005) 54 I.C.L.Q. 459; Lester, "The European Convention in the New Architecture of Europe" (1996) 
1 Public Law 6; and Benvenisti, "Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Standards" (1998–1999) 31 
NYUJ of Inter. L. and Politics 843. 
146 See Lewis, "What Not to Wear: Religious Rights, the European Court and the Margin of Appreciation" (2007) 
56 I.C.L.Q. 395, 414. 
147 See for discussion Hutchinson, "The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the European Court of Human Rights" 
(1999) 48 I.C.L.Q. 638 and Brauch, "The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law" (2004–2005) 11 Columbia J. of Eur. Law 113, 137. 
148 Benvenisti, "Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Standards (1998–1999) 31 NYUJ of Inter. L. 
and Politics 843, 846. 
149 McGoldrick, "A Defence of the Margin of Appreciation and an Argument for its Application by the Human 
Rights Committee" (2016) 65(1) I.C.L.Q. 21, 32. 
150 Hutchinson, "The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the European Court of Human Rights" (1999) 48 I.C.L.Q. 
638. 
151 Bribosia, "Same-Sex Marriage: Building an Argument Before the European Court of Human Rights in Light 
of the US Experience" 2014 32(1) Berkeley J. of Inter. L. 1. 
  
115 
 
152 Popplewell-Scezak, "The European Court of Human Rights and Same-Sex Marriage: The Consensus 
Approach" (2016). 
153 Dzhetsiarou, "Does Consensus Matter? Legitimacy of European Consensus in the Case Law of the European 
Court of Human Rights" [2011] P.L. 534, 544. 
154 See Section 3. 
155 See, e.g. Brauch, "The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: 
Threat to the Rule of Law" (2004–2005) 11 Columbia J. of Eur. Law 113. 
156 Bribosia, Rorive and Van den Eynde, "Same-Sex Marriage: Building an Argument Before the European Court 
of Human Rights in Light of the US Experience" 2014 32(1) Berkeley J. of Inter. L. 1 referring to Wintemute, 
"Consensus is the right approach for the European Court of Human Rights" (12 August 2010), The 
Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/law/2010/aug/12/european-court-human-rights-consensus [Accessed 
22 January 2018]. 
157 See Section 4. 
158 See Fenwick, "Same Sex Unions and the Strasbourg Court in a Divided Europe: Driving Forward Reform or 
Protecting the Court’s Authority Via Consensus Analysis" [2016] E.H.R.L.R. 248. 
159 Dzehtsiarou, "Does Consensus Matter? Legitimacy of European Consensus in the Case Law of the European 
Court of Human Rights" [2011] P.L. 534. 
160 Fenwick, "Same Sex Unions and the Strasbourg Court in a Divided Europe: Driving Forward Reform or 
Protecting the Court’s Authority Via Consensus Analysis" [2016] E.H.R.L.R. 248 and Donoho, "Autonomy, Self-
Governance, and the Margin of Appreciation: Developing a Jurisprudence of Diversity Within Universal Human 
Right (2001) 15 Em. Inter. L. Rev. 391, 422 
161 See Wintemute, "Consensus is the right approach for the European Court of Human Rights" (12 August 
2010), The Guardian. See also Y. Zylan, States of Passion: Law, Identity and Social Construction of Desire 
(Oxford University Press, 2011), p.214 and R. Verchick, "Same-Sex and the City" (2005) 37 Urban L. Rev. 191 
who discuss backlash following the Massachusetts Supreme Court decision in Goodridge v Department of Public 
Health (2003) 798 N.E. 2d 941, to introduce same-sex marriage in that state in 2003 was widely linked to a 
backlash in public opinion across the US 
162 See Dzhetsiarou, "Does Consensus Matter? Legitimacy of European Consensus in the Case Law of the 
European Court of Human Rights" [2011] P.L. 534, 544–545 referring to K. Dzehtsiarou, Interview with Judge of 
the ECtHR Corneliu Birsan (European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg, 2010) and K. Dzehtsiarou, Interview 
with Judge of the ECtHR Renate Jaeger (Strasbourg, European Court of Human Rights, 2010). 
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Commentary on cited Published Work 
contained in PART TWO: SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE, THE EU AND THE CAPACITY 
OF THE CONCEPT OF CITIZENSHIP TO 
EXTEND THE RIGHTS OF SAME-SEX 
COUPLES 
 
(4)  ‘Hamilton, F., ‘The Differing Treatment of Same Sex 
Couples by European Union Law and the European 
Convention on Human Rights: The European Union 
Concept of Citizenship’ (2.1) (2015) Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 87-113. 
 
(5) Hamilton, F., and Clayton-Helm, L., Same Sex 
Relationships Choice of Law and the Continued 
Recognised Relationship Theory’ 3(1) (2016) Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 1 -31.  
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(6) Hamilton, F., The Expanding Concept of EU Citizenship 
Free Movement Rights and the Potential Positive 
Impact this has for Same-Sex Couples Relocating 
Across Borders (2018) Family Law 693 - 696 
 
A more holistic approach towards the recognition of same-sex 
couples’ relationships, needs to consider not only the ECtHR 
position but also the ever-expanding role of the EU. This forms 
the subject matter of part 2. Publications 4 and 5 were 
published at a time before the Brexit vote and Publication 6 
updates this to comment on recent influential CJEU case law 
and the possible position of UK same-sex couples’ post-Brexit. 
Publications 4 and 5 both have positive conclusions about the 
possible role of the EU in this regard. Publication 4 stresses 
the potential of the EU concept of citizenship resulting in 
expanding free movement provisions and publication 5 
recommends a unified conflicts of law system under an EU 
umbrella. Publication 6 critically analyses the recent Coman 
case which illustrates the CJEU providing extensive 
interpretations of citizenship rights (including rights of 
residence) to non-EU national same-sex spouses of EU 
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citizens, even where the receiving country does not recognise 
same-sex couples’ relationships.167   
Publication 4 expands the work set out in part one by taking a 
comparative approach between EU and ECtHR treatment of 
same-sex couples. Both organisations were initially reluctant 
to recognise unconventional types of ‘family life.’ Whilst the 
ECtHR has played a major role in the advancement of 
LGBTQ+ rights,168 traditionally, proponents in these cases 
have relied upon privacy arguments (under article 8 ECHR).169 
As explained in part one, although the ECtHR now recognises 
same-sex couples as having a family life under Article 8 
ECHR,170 the ECtHR does not require contracting states to 
legalise same-sex marriage due to a lack of consensus.171 At 
                                                          
167 Coman (n11).  
 
168 In practice the ECtHR has adopted a gradually increasing level of 
protections for LGBTQ+ persons and same-sex couples. See n131.  
 
169 Other authors who also argue this point include Johnson, P., ‘An 
Essentially Private Manifestation of Human Personality’: Constructions of 
Homosexuality in the European Court of Human Rights’ (n87); Stark (n80) 
and Danisi (n132). This is reflected by case law before the ECtHR including 
for example Dudgeon v UK (n126); Sutherland v UK (n132); Smith and 
Grady v UK (n126) and Lustig-Prean and Beckett v UK (n131). 
 
170 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (n8).  
 
171 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (n8).  
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the time publication 4 was published in 2015, the CJEU was 
even stricter than the ECtHR. Being excluded from the EU 
definition of ‘family member’ has wide ranging consequences. 
It is necessary to fall in this category in order to access wide 
ranging free-movement and EU citizenship rights.172 The 
CJEU remained heavily influenced by a traditional and 
hierarchal view of family statuses. Heterosexual marriage 
received the clearest protection, but did not include same-sex 
                                                          
172 Publication 4 refers to a ‘plethora of benefits’ (See Stalford (n90) at 427) 
accorded to EU citizens and their family members. The additional rights 
include a right of residence (Citizenship Directive 2004/ 38 article 14(1)), 
recourse to a member state’s social assistance scheme (Citizenship 
Directive 2004/ 38 Article 14(3)), ensuring ‘equal treatment with host-
country nationals’ (Citizenship Directive 2004/38 Article 24), allowing family 
members to take up employment or self-employment (Citizenship Directive 
2004/38 Article 23), and a right of continuous legal residence after 5 years 
(Citizenship Directive 2004/38 Article 16). Family members of EU citizens 
also entitled to extensive schooling protection for children. (See Fairhurst, 
J., Law of the European Union, Ninth Edition, (Pearson Publishing 2012) 
at 405) who comments on the extensive protection in relation to the EU 
worker’s children’s rights to be admitted to ‘primary and secondary 
schooling system, as well as to vocational courses in further and higher 
education, pursuant to art 12 Regulation 1612/68  referring to Casagrande 
(Case C-9/74) and Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department (Case C-413/99). Citizens are protected from discrimination 
under Article 18 TFEU which has led to far reaching results for non-
economically active citizens, as in Grzelcyk v Centre Public d’adide Sociale 
d’Ottignies Louvaine-la-Neuve (Case C-184-99) which entitled the 
applicant French student to obtain access to minimum subsistence 
allowance (known as ‘minimex’) in Belgium. The EU now has far-reaching 
protections from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Article 
19 TFEU is the legal basis for the adoption of measures to ‘combat 
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation.’ The EU has also adopted the provision 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 2000/C 364/01 at art 21(1) which 
includes ‘same-sex orientation’ as  ground for discrimination.  
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spouses. EU law stressed subsidiarity and allowed EU 
member states to determine their own policy in relation to 
same-sex marriage.173  Although the EU listed registered 
partners as family members, this was strictly subject to 
subsidiarity.174 Co-habitees were not (and still are not) 
included within the status of family members, instead having 
to prove that they have a relationship ‘duly attested.’175   
Building on original ideas from publication 2, publication 4 
developed a contrast between the ECtHR traditional emphasis 
on ‘private life’176 (where LGBTQ+ persons are concerned) as 
compared with the potential of the EU concept of citizenship. 
As discussed above whilst the ECtHR has played an important 
role in advancing LGBTQ+ rights,177 privacy based claims are 
unhelpful when it comes to same-sex marriage claims.178 This 
                                                          
173 At the time of writing publication 4 (pre Coman (n11)), although 
registered partners were listed in the family members protected this was 
strictly subject to subsidiarity as provided by then Citizenship Directive 
2004/38 art 2(2)).  
174 See Ibid. 
 
175 Citizenship Directive 2004 /38 Article 3(2). 
 
176 See n132. 
 
177 In practice the ECtHR has adopted a gradually increasing level of 
protections for LGBTQ+ persons and same-sex couples. See n131.  
 
178 The stress on privacy before the ECtHR has resulted in what Johnson 
‘An Essentially Private Manifestation of Human Personality’: 
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is because marriage is more than a private contract179 and 
involves entering into an institution and conferring a status.180  
It is a concept very much on the public stage.181 In contrast, 
EU emphasis on citizenship, publication 4 argues, contains 
much potential for proponents of same-sex marriage. EU 
citizenship has already led to an extensive array of rights,182 
including EU free movement of persons’ protections.183 In 
addition the concept of citizenship has a close connection to 
equality184 and the participation in the public order which 
                                                          
Constructions of Homosexuality in the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(2010) (n87) describes as a ‘significant limitation… in respect of the 
‘evolution’ of LGBTQ+ rights across Europe.’ 
 
179 See Lord Penzance in Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee (n133). 
 
180 See Lord Penzance in Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee (n133). 
 
181 For discussion of the ECtHR emphasis on privacy see Johnson, P, ‘An 
Essentially Private Manifestation of Human Personality’: Constructions of 
Homosexuality in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2010) (n87) at 76. 
For further criticism see also Sedgewick (n135) at 71 and Grigolo (n135) at 
1040. 
 
182 See n172.   
 
183 O’Neill, A., ‘Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage in the European 
Community: the European Court of Justice’s Ability to Dictate Social Policy’ 
(2004) 37 Cornell Int’l L. J. 199 at 201 who argued that the EU concept of 
free movement required protection of the right of same-sex couples to 
move from one state to another. 
 
184 Bamforth (n58) at 478 references Marshall, T. H., ‘Citizenship and 
Social Class’ in Marshall, T. H. and Bottomore, T., (eds) (1992) Citizenship 
and Social Class at 18 whose classic definition of equal citizenship states 
that ‘all who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and 
duties with which the status is endowed.’  
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theorists argue citizenship involves.185  Brenda Cossman for 
instance, characterises citizenship as being ‘about the process 
of becoming recognised subjects, about the practices of 
inclusion and membership, both social and legal.’186 
Publication 4’s analysis concludes that in comparing EU and 
ECtHR dual and differing treatment of same-sex couples, that 
it is the EU which offers the most potential for future 
development. Of importance here is the EU concept of 
citizenship, expansion of EU free movement provisions, and 
growing interplay between the EU and the ECtHR.187   In 
                                                          
185 For discussion see Rosenfeld, M., ‘Introduction: Gender, Sexual 
Orientation and Equal Citizenship’ (2012) 10(2) IJCL 340 at 340 and 
O’Mahoney (n151) at 554-555. See also Baroness Hale in Ghaidan v 
Godin-Mendoza (n124) per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 132 where 
she stated that ‘[d]emocracy is founded upon the principle that each 
individual has equal value…’  
 
186 Cossman, B., Sexual Citizens: The Legal and Cultural Regulation of Sex 
and Belonging (n137). 
 
187  The EU plans to accede to the ECHR and there are growing instances 
of comparative constitutionalism’ or ‘judicial borrowing’ between the 
institutions.  EU accession criteria also demands compliance with human 
rights. The European Parliamentary Assembly, (1999) ‘Building Greater 
Europe without Dividing Lines’ (Opinion on the Report of the Committee of 
Wise Persons) 15 Opinion No. 208 considers the two institutions to be 
‘natural partners’ and Joris T. and Vandenberghe, J.,‘The Council of 
Europe and the European Union: Natural Partners or Uneasy Bedfellows?’ 
(2008-2009) 15 Colum J Eur L 1,3 argue that they are ‘increasingly active 
in the same fields’ and should therefore, according to the European 
Parliament Assembly, not ‘waste resources see European Parliamentary 
Assembly, (2002) ‘The Council of Europe and the New Issues Involved in 
Building Europe’, Recommendation No. 1578 at para 4.) 
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contrast the traditional emphasis on privacy by the ECtHR as 
demonstrated in part one is never going to be sufficient in this 
regard. This prediction is borne out by subsequent CJEU case 
law (analysed in publication 6).188  
Publication 5 continues with the theme of EU involvement. 
This publication (co-written with Dr Lauren Clayton-Helm) 
looks at how private international law treats same-sex couples 
whose marriage involves more than one nationality or who 
cross international boundaries. In situations where several 
different jurisdictions’ laws are involved, it is necessary to 
determine which country’s laws apply. Work in this area is 
necessary as it is essential for a couple to know if their 
marriage will be recognised following an international 
relocation. 189 Publication 5 was published in 2016, prior to the 
Coman case.190  At that time EU law emphasised subsidiarity. 
Non-EU same-sex spouses or registered partners could not 
                                                          
188 See Coman (n11) and MB (n11) 
 
189 In Estin v Estin (n164) Robert Jackson J commented that ‘one thing that 
people are entitled to know from the law is whether they are formally 
married.’ See also Stark (n80) and Smart, P. St. J., ‘Interest Analysis, False 
Conflicts, and the Essential Validity of Marriage’ (1985) 14 Anglo-American 
L Rev 225, 225 who has commented that the need to settle this question 
is underlined by the ‘unparalleled importance of marriage.’ 
 
190  See Coman (n11). 
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exercise the right of free movement to move with their EU 
citizen spouse to a new EU state, where the receiving state did 
not recognise same-sex marriage. In reality there were 
‘meagre right(s)…’ afforded to same-sex couples.191 
Publication 5 therefore advocated EU involvement in a unified 
conflicts of law system, to bring beneficial and consistent 
results. The Coman case has now radically altered the 
position. Non-EU same-sex spouses of EU citizens will be 
granted citizenship rights (including rights of permanant 
residence) when their EU citizen same-sex spouse relocates 
to a different state in the EU.  This is even the case, where as 
on the facts of Coman, the couple relocated to Romania, an 
EU jurisdiction, which does not allow their own citizens to enter 
into same-sex marriages, or registered partnerships.  
 
Publication 5 contains a detailed analysis of which choice of 
law rule192 should be applied to all same-sex relationships in 
terms of essential validity and considers that EU level action 
                                                          
191 Cox, B., ‘Same-Sex Marriage and Choice of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, 
Are we still Married when we return home?’ (1994) Wisconsin L. Rev. 1033 
at 1040. 
 
192 A Choice of law rule is the mechanism which determines which 
jurisdiction’s laws should be applied to a legal matter.  
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will lead to more consistent results. Formal validity looks at the 
rules and requirements surrounding the actual ceremony, 
such as the requirement of witnesses and the vows that must 
be undertaken. This is usually uncontroversial and depends 
upon the lex loci celebratioinis. Essential validity on the other 
hand covers all aspects of a marriage which are not associated 
with formalities, the primary example being the capacity to 
marry. Choice of law rules are significant as they determine 
which jurisdictions’ laws should be applied to a legal matter. In 
the case of same-sex marriage this will ultimately determine if 
it will be recognised, which is of obvious importance to the 
couple involved.193 Concerning essential validity of any 
marriage, the domestic standpoint recognises little 
agreement.194  This is clearly unsatisfactory. Commentators 
                                                          
193 Recognition of a marriage not only involves symbolical importance but 
also manifold legal rights.  
 
194 See part 2 of Publication 5 which analyses in depth the different 
traditional competing choice of law theories, all of which have flaws. In brief 
the dual domicile theory considers that if either parties’ pre-nuptial domicile 
would invalidate the marriage, this would result in non-recognition. In 
contrast the intended matrimonial home theory turns to the law of the 
husband’s domicile unless the couple intend to set up home in another 
country. Other options include the real and substantial connection test, 
which focuses on the country which will be most affected by the marriage 
as opposed to considerations about the people involved in the marriage. 
The elective dual domicile test would apply the domiciliary law of either 
party.  Another option is that of the lex loci celebrationis which applies the 
law of the jurisdiction where the marriage was celebrated.  
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agree that the current law is ‘baffling’195 and in need of 
‘reformulat[ion]…’196 Publication 5 reviewed the position in 
light of the necessity of dealing with same-sex relationships.197 
Application of interest analysis198 allows consideration of the 
public policy reasons behind a choice of law rule. Whilst this is 
designed to promote fairness,199 interest analysis has been 
critised as resulting in ‘confusion, lack of consistency and 
limited predictability.’200  US experience of interest analysis in 
                                                          
195 Juenger, F., ‘Conflict of Laws; A Critique of Interest Analysis’ (1984) 32 
American J of Comp Law 1, at 1 referring to Cardozo, B. N., The Paradoxes 
of Legal Science (Columbia University Press, 1928) at 67. 
196 Reed (n92) at 450.  See also Davie, M., ‘The Breaking-Up of Essential 
Validity of Marriage Choice of Law Rules in English Conflict of Laws’ (1994) 
23 Anglo-American L Rev 32. 
197 This term is used in this context to refer to both same-sex marriages 
and all types of civil partnerships and registered unions. 
 
198 Interest analysis is the idea that the most applicable law is the one that 
has the most interest in being applied after consideration of public policy 
reasons and was originally founded in the USA and applied on a case-by-
case basis. Interest analysis was founded by Currie (n93) (1863).  
 
199 Supporters of interest analysis argue that it produces fair solutions in 
each of the different cases it is used in because of its flexibility. Juenger 
(n195) at 48 states that this is what supporters of interest analysis claim, 
although he strongly disagrees with interest analysis arguing at 49 ‘[t]hus 
Currie’s methodology supplies subterfuge to promote the very result-
orientation that he deplored.’ 
200 See Juenger (n195) at 1 referring to Cardozo (n195) at 27 who turn 
refers to comments from Chief Judge Fule in Neumier v Kuehner 31 NY 2d 
121 at 127 (1972) acknowledging lack of consistency in the US context.’ 
See also Brilmayer, L., ‘Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent’ 
(1980) 78 Michigan L Rev 392 and Wrign, J. S., ‘The Federal Courts and 
Nature and Quality of State Law’ (1967) 13 Wayne L. Rev. 317 at 334. 
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the fields of contract and tort has according to critics resulted 
in an ‘ad hoc case-by-case approach.’201 Commentators 
conclude that other jurisdictions should not follow the same 
approach, especially when considering marriage where 
certainty is essential.202 In order to tackle the lack of 
consistency a system of dépeçage 203 is applied to interest 
analysis. Choice of law is determined not on a case by case 
basis but on an issue by issue basis. In relation to essential 
validity of marriage, each of the incapacities to marry204 would 
be governed by its own choice of law rule. This can be 
criticised for complicating an already ‘complex methodology’ 
by further ‘issue splitting.’205  Advantages include allowing 
                                                          
201 Tooker v Lopez (1969) 24 N. Y. 2d 569, 584. 
 
202 Davie (n196) at 43. See also Fruehwald, S., “Choice of Law and Same-
Sex Marriage” (1999) 51 Florida Law Review 799.  
203 The concept of dépeçage in a conflict of laws context, means that 
different issues within a case may be governed by the laws of different 
states 
 
204 The other incapacities to marry include age, consanguinity and affinity, 
polygamy, consent and marriage after divorce. Publication 5 considers 
what choice of law should be applied same-sex relationships. 
 
205 See Juenger (n195) at 41. 
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greater certainty206 whilst continuing to maintain public policy 
reasons as crucial to the choice of law.  
 
In determining the choice of law to be applied to same-sex 
relationships, publication 5 sets out all of the public policy 
factors to be applied. Of general relevance to all cases of 
essential validity of marriage, are concerns about the 
importance of validating a marriage,207 simplicity,208 EU 
uniformity internationally,209 protecting the parties to a 
marriage210 and ‘sociological, religious and moral’ 
considerations.211 When focusing on same-sex relationships, 
                                                          
206 Reed (n92) suggests that a rules based theory should avoid ‘excessive 
judicial particularistic intuitionism’ at 390.  
 
207 See Ibid. and Cox (n191). 
 
208 This is important for all staff such as marriage registrars, immigration 
officers and social security staff who are not necessarily legally trained but 
are involved with important tasks concerning the validity of a marriage. 
 
209 Reed (n92) at 391. See Cox (n191) and Leflar, R., ‘Choice Influencing 
Considerations in Conflicts Law’ (1966) 41 NYU L. Rev. 267. 
 
210 Examples of protecting the parties to a marriage can be seen in relation 
to minimum age restrictions or concerns relating to consent such as fraud, 
duress or mistake. Eg, Davie (n196) 54 stated that in relation to lack of 
consent that the ‘purpose behind the law will generally be to protect the 
person from the consequences of their misapprehension or weakness.’ 
 
211 In this context there are rules prohibiting consanguinity (which concerns 
a blood relationship between the parties) and affinity (which concerns 
parties who are already related through marriage).  
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publication 5 draws on other public policy considersations, 
analysed elsewhere in this work and argues that concerns 
about citizenship, equality and symbolism all call for a more 
extended choice of law rule for same-sex relationships. Equal 
citizenship is ofter referred as having a ‘constitutional 
character’ due to the number of public rights concerned.212  
Publication 5 therefore sees citizenship as a strong public 
policy factor in favour of having a more extensive choice of law 
rule. Arguments on the basis of equality are very important for 
same-sex marriage proponents.213 In many international 
cases which have been successful in relation to same-sex 
marriage, equality arguments have often been an important 
factor.214 Publication 7 considers in detail the symbolism of 
                                                          
212 For discussion see Cossman, B., Sexual Citizens: The Legal and 
Cultural Regulation of Sex and Belonging (n137) p.27. See also n172 for 
further detail as to the number of rights associated with EU citizenship. 
213 For discussion see Marshall, K. L., ‘Strategic Pragmatism or Radical 
Idealism? The Same-Sex Marriage and Civil Rights Movements 
Juxtaposed’ (2010) 2 Wm. & Mary Pol’y Rev. at 199-200 and Dunlap 
(n139).  
 
214 See cases from the US Supreme Court such as Goodridge  (n165)  as 
discussed by Jonah Crane “Legislative and Constitutional Responses to 
Goodridge v Department of Public Health” (2003-2004) 7 New York 
University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy 465 and Obergefell (n6).  
As well as leading cases from Canada, such as Halpern v Canada 
(Attorney General) (65 OR (3d) 161 (Ont CA) (2003) as discussed by 
L’Heureux-Dube, C (2003) 1(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 
35 and South Africa such as Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie 
and Another (n124). 
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marriage.215  On this view to be denied the status of a marriage 
is to be demoted to a second-class status. The strength of the 
symbolism argument can also be seen by same-sex couples 
in the UK, France and Denmark continuing to fight for same-
sex marriage, even after being given many legal rights through 
the institution of civil partnership. Symbolism is another strong 
public policy argument favouring a more extensive choice of 
law rule.  
 
Publication 5 goes on to set out a novel choice of law 
mechanism, which is termed the continued recognised 
relationship theory.  The applicable choice of law rule should 
be that of the country where the couple intend to reside, or if 
their marriage has been subsisting for a reasonable period of 
time, it should be the law of the country where they previously 
lived. This goes beyond traditional choice of law theories as it 
considers both the law of the country of future domicile 
                                                          
215 Other authors such as Triger , Z.,’Fear of the Wandering Gay: Some 
Reflections on Citizenship, Nationalism and Recognition in Same-Sex 
Relationships (2012) 8(2) International Journal of Law in Context  268 and 
Dorf, M.C., ‘Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s 
Social Meanings’ (2011) 97 Virginia L. Rev. 1267 also consider that 
marriage has a symbolic status.  
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together with the law where the couple previously resided.216 
At the same time respect is given to individual countries’ 
domestic policies as there is nothing in this suggested choice 
of law rule which requires individual countries to allow same-
sex marriage to take place within their own jurisdiction. 
Publication 5 advocates the involvement of the EU in order to 
avoid limping marriages,217 and ‘divergences between 
Member States.’218 Publication 5 concludes that the EU 
system needed to act on this topic because of the imperative 
of free movement for EU citizens. EU citizens are unlikely to 
relocate across the EU if their family members cannot move 
with them.  
Both publications 4 and 5 stressed the important role which 
could be played by the EU in this area. These predictions have 
been borne out by recent CJEU case law including the Coman 
                                                          
216 As set out above a more extensive choice of law is justified because of 
the additional public policy reasons which apply to same-sex relationships, 
namely the concerns of citizenship, symbolism and equality. 
 
217 For example where a marriage is recognised in one country but not 
another. 
 
218 For discussion see Moir and Beaumont (n74) at 269. 
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case219 and the MB case.220 Publication 6 was written at the 
request of Family Law Editor Liz Walsh. It analyses Advocate 
General Melchior Wathelet’s Opinion, which has subsequently 
been endorsed by the CJEU in Coman.221 Following the 
decision from the CJEU, whilst Member States can determine 
whether to introduce same-sex marriage or civil partnership on 
a domestic level they must recognise the free movement of EU 
citizens and their families and therefore grant permanent 
residence rights to non-EU spouses of same-sex marriages 
conducted abroad. Publication 6 explains that this reverses 
years of EU concentration on subsidiarity and represents a 
further development of EU citizenship and the ever expanding 
notion of who is a family member. A further recent CJEU case 
MB considers the situation of trans persons who (prior to the 
legalisation of same-sex marriage in 2013) were under the UK 
Gender Recognition Act 2004 required to annul their already 
exisiting marriages in order to be recognised in their new 
sex.222 If they did not do this, they could not access other state 
                                                          
219 Coman (n11).   
 
220 MB (n11).  
 
221 Coman (n11). 
 
222 MB (n11). 
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benefits such as state pensions from the age of 60 for women 
(prior to pension reform). This was found by the CJEU to be 
direct discrimation contrary to Article 4 of Directive 79/7 which 
prohibits all forms of discrimination on grounds of sex as 
regards social security.223 It also represents another example 
of the expanding nature of EU family law and far reaching 
interventions from the CJEU. With an estimated publication 
date of 30th March 2020, my chapter in the forthcoming edited 
book collection224 will set forth in further detail a chapter 
analysing the potential of the EU, through manifold influences 
of the EU concept of citizenship, extensive free movement 
provisions and non-discrimination requirements and 
strengthening ties between the EU and the Council of Europe 
to further advance LGBTQ+ persons and same-sex couples’ 
rights.  
 
 
                                                          
 
223 See MB (n11) paragraph 29. 
 
224 Contract agreed with Routledge, with myself as lead editor (Dr Guido 
Noto La Diega as co-editor) under the working title ‘Same-Sex 
Relationships, Law and Society.’ 
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June [2018] Fam Law 693 
EU Citizenship free movement rights and same-sex 
couples 
Frances Hamilton, Senior Lecturer in Law, Northumbria University 
 
 
Frances’ research interests involve the difficulties facing individual countries and international courts in recognising same-sex 
relationships. She takes a comparative law approach as well as looking at human rights law and an EU free movement 
perspective. She is also interested in the necessary interaction between legal and social change in this area. She has worked as 
Senior Lecturer in Law at Northumbria University since 2009 and prior to this worked as a solicitor in London. 
 
 
On 11 January 2018, Advocate General Melchior Wathelet stated in his Advocate General’s Opinion in the case 
of Relu Adrian Coman and Others v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigra˘ri and Others (Case C-673/16) 
(‘Coman’) that non-EU citizen same-sex spouses should be granted the right of permanent residence if their EU 
citizen same-sex spouse relocated to a different state in the EU. This would be the case even if the couple relocated 
to a jurisdiction, which does not allow their own citizens to enter into same-sex marriages, or registered 
partnerships. 
 
The case concerned Mr Coman, a Romanian national, who married his US partner Mr Hamilton in Brussels in 
2010. In 2012 they decided to move to Mr Coman’s home state of Romania. However, the plan was thwarted. 
Romania does not allow same-sex marriage on a domestic basis and therefore also refused to recognise a foreign 
same-sex marriage. Mr Hamilton, not being an EU national himself, was consequently refused a right of 
permanent residence in Romania. Advocate General Melchior Wathelet ruled against the Romanian authorities 
and stated that, as a matter of EU law, whilst EU Member States can determine whether to introduce same-sex 
marriage/ civil partnership on a domestic level they must recognise the free movement of EU citizens and their 
families and therefore grant permanent residence rights to non-EU spouses of same-sex marriages conducted 
abroad. If the Advocate General’s Opinion is agreed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) this would greatly 
enhance rights for non-EU citizenship spouses. As such, this is another example of expanding citizenship rights 
granted to family members of EU citizens. After Brexit, UK citizens would not be able to benefit from EU free 
movement rights, amongst the ever expanding number of rights granted to EU citizens and their family members. 
Concept of EU citizenship 
The concept of European citizenship has led to greatly enhanced rights across Europe for EU citizens and their 
family members. As part of the expanding concept of citizenship, the EU has increased the level of its human 
rights protections. These include the right to access human rights protections under Art 7 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, which includes a right to private and family life broadly defined. This provision broadly 
echoes the protections guaranteed by Art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (European Convention). 
The EU now has far-reaching protections from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Article 19 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is the legal basis for the adoption of measures to 
‘combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation’. The EU also adopted Art 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights which includes ‘sexual orientation’ 
as a ground for discrimination. This further expands the grounds for discrimination from those stated in Art 14 of 
the European Convention. As the European Convention text was drafted in the 1950s, it noticeably does not 
include sexual orientation as a ground for discrimination in its stated text. Instead the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) has been required to use its dynamic interpretative techniques to expand protections for LGBTQ 
individuals.  
Further EU citizenship rights are given to individuals who fall under the definition of family as defined by EU 
law. Once included within this definition, EU citizens’ family members (even if not EU citizens themselves) can 
access a ‘plethora of benefits.’ (see Helen Stalford, ‘Concepts of Family Under EU Law – Lessons from the 
ECHR’ 16(3) International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family at p 427 for further comment). As well as 
protections based on human rights, EU citizens and their family members are entitled to a whole host of benefits. 
These include free movement rights between Member States (TFEU, Art 20(2)), additional rights of residence 
(TFEU, Art 14(1)), extensive non-discrimination provisions (TFEU, Arts 18 and 24 and case law such as 
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Grzelczyk v Centre Public d’aide Sociale d’Ottignies Louvain-la-Neuve (Case C-184–99) which greatly extended 
citizenship non-discrimination rights for non-economically active citizens), rights to take up employment or self-
employment (TFEU, Art 23), access to the member state’s social assistance scheme (TFEU, Art 14(3)) and rights 
of access to education for children (Art 12, Regulation 1612/68 as interpreted by case law further extending 
educational rights for example Casagrande v Landeshauptstadt München (Case C-9/74) and Baumbast and R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department (Case C-413/99)). 
EU law definition of family member 
 
It therefore becomes essential to understand which individuals are included within the definition of family 
member by EU law. This matter is particularly pertinent for same-sex couples where many countries have 
introduced varying forms of same-sex marriage, civil partnership and registered unions, with varying degrees of 
rights granted. Whilst 15 European nations have recognised same-sex marriage (as of March 2018 this includes 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK (excluding Northern Ireland) with Austria to introduce same-sex marriage 
from 1 January 2019) and many more recognise civil partnership (Andorra, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Liechtenstein, Slovenia and Switzerland) the position is far from clearly decided 
across Europe. Within the UK, Northern Ireland has not introduced same-sex marriage. They have civil 
partnership only. Other European states have introduced no form of legal status for same-sex partners and continue 
to reserve marriage for opposite sex couples. The Coman case concerned Romania. Although in recent years 
Romania has made great strides in recognising LGBTQ rights including decriminalising homosexuality, 
introducing anti-discrimination laws and equalising the age of consent for instance, it still provides no legal status 
for same-sex partners. Romania’s Civil Code determines that marriage must be between persons of the opposite 
sex (Art 259 of Romanian Civil Code). 
 
Up until the Advocate General Melchior Wathelet’s Opinion, the EU had always determined that subsidiarity 
should take precedence and allowed individual EU states to determine whether or not to recognise same-sex 
marriage or other forms of civil partnership. In EU law there remains a hierarchy or recognised statuses. Spouses 
are most clearly protected and fall clearly within the definition of family member (Citizenship Directive 2004/38 
Art 2(2)(a)). Although it could be argued that the word ‘spouse’ is gender-neutral and so should include same-sex 
partners (see Dimitri Kochenov, ‘On Options of Citizens and Moral Choices of States: Gays and European 
Federalism’ 33(1) Fordham International Law Review 156 at 190) EU law has until Advocate General Melchior’s 
recent Advocate General’s Opinion not recognised that approach. The commentary on Art 9 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU provides that ‘[t]here is, however, no explicit requirement that domestic laws 
should facilitate such marriages. International courts and committees have so far hesitated to extend the 
application of the right to marry to same-sex couples’. Advocate General Melchior Wathelet’s Opinion would 
therefore reverse years of the subsidiarity approach and represent a further expansion of EU citizenship and the 
ever-expanding notion of who is a family member and therefore entitled to further EU citizenship rights such as 
permanent residency. 
 
The traditional EU concept of spouse did therefore not include same-sex couples. Whilst EU law does include 
registered partnerships under the definition of family member, whether they would be given any EU citizenship 
rights depended upon whether the EU receiving state would recognise such relationships (Directive 2004/38 Art 
2(2)). This again strengthens the concept of subsidiarity. This would also be likely to change, should Advocate 
General Melchior Wathelet’s Opinion be recognised by the ECJ. Further down the list of protected statuses are 
cohabitees. This is an important category to consider for same-sex couples living in states which do not allow 
same-sex marriage or civil partnership, as there could be no opportunity to enter into a more regulated relationship. 
Within EU law, cohabitees are only included within the definition of family member if they have a relationship 
‘duly attested’ (Citizenship Directive 2004/38 Art 3(2)). No firm guidance is given as to what is meant by a 
relationship duly attested, but it is likely to mean a relationship of several years duration. It should be pointed out 
that in relation to same-sex cohabitees, it is unlikely that further citizenship rights would be granted following 
Advocate General Melchior Wathelet’s Opinion, even if enforced by the ECJ. Advocate General Melchior 
Wathelet does not recommend that any EU country should be forced to introduce same-sex marriage or registered 
partnership protections. Instead he recommends that all EU countries should be made to grant EU citizenship 
rights, such as permanent residency to non-EU national spouses of EU citizens who married abroad. Cohabitees 
who do not fall within any legally protected categories, would not have any firm rights upon which to rely to 
enforce their union. 
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Impact of Advocate General Melchior Wathelet’s Opinion 
The traditional position in EU law, which emphasised subsidiarity concerns above all else, clearly made it harder 
for same-sex families to relocate across Europe and has been described as a ‘failure for the notion of free 
movement’ (see Stalford’s article above at p 419). It can also be seen as a system which favours heterosexuals 
due to subsidiarity concerns. Dimitri Kochenov refers to heterosexual’s rights as being ‘at the top of the pyramid’ 
(see Kochenov’s article above at p 201). This position would be greatly improved if Advocate General Melchior 
Wathelet’s Opinion is agreed by the ECJ. Advocate General Melchior Wathelet supports a gender neutral 
interpretation of the word spouse and describes that word as being ‘neutral as to the sex of the persons concerned 
and indifferent as the place where the marriage was contracted’. He further backs up his arguments by reference 
to the ‘general evolution’ of Member States of the EU in their treatment of same-sex couples. 
He goes on to refer to human rights arguments whereby same-sex couples now fall within the definition of family 
life (see Schalk and Kopf v Austria (Application No30141/04) [2010] ECHR 1996). In Schalk the ECtHR finally 
recognised that a ‘cohabiting same-sex couple living in a stable partnership, fell within the notion of ‘family life’, 
just as the relationship of different-sex couple in the same situation would’ (Schalk, para 94). This statement has 
been described as a ‘landmark’ in the evolution of ECtHR case law concerning the LGBTQ community (See 
Conor O’Mahoney, ‘Irreconcilable Differences? Article 8 ECHR and Irish Law on Non-Traditional Families’ 
(2012) 26 (1) International Journal of Law Policy and the Family 31 at page 38). 
Ultimately however the ECtHR has stopped short of recognising same-sex marriage due to concerns about the 
‘deep rooted social and cultural connotations’ (Schalk, para 62). This in turn leads to a wider margin of 
appreciation, otherwise known as area of discretion, being granted to EU Member States (Schalk, para 105). To 
this date the ECtHR system does not recognise same-sex marriage. Advocate General Wathelet also draws upon 
further ECtHR case law which he states has ‘provided that there should be a right to some level of legal protection 
for same-sex couples’who should be provided with some form of civil partnership / registered partnership (see 
Coman referring to Oliari and Others v Italy (Application Nos 18766/11 and 36030/11) [2015] ECHR 716 
(ECtHR, 31 July 2015). He further relies upon case law from the ECtHR which has extensively interpreted the 
European Convention to prevent discrimination against LGBTQ individuals (see Coman referring to decisions of 
the ECtHR such as Karner v Austria (Application No 40016/98) [2003] 2 FLR 623 (ECtHR 24 July 2003)). Whilst 
this progressive approach by Advocate General Melchior Wathelet is to be welcomed by pro LGBTQ activists, 
this would actually go further that what is currently provided by the ECtHR.  
In the Oliari case, the ECtHR sought to confine the decision to require Member States to provide some level of 
civil partnership to countries, such as Italy (which the case concerned) who are socially accepting of same-sex 
couples. (For comment see Helen Fenwick and Andy Hayward, ‘Rejecting Asymmetry of Access to Formal 
Relationship Statuses for Same and Different-Sex Couples at Strasbourg and Domestically’ 2017 (6) European 
Human Rights Law Review 545). A new claim is now being brought by a Russian couple, to test whether the 
ECtHR decision in Oliari, which required Italy to introduce a civil partnership law, would be extended to a country 
such as Russia, which is far less socially accepting to the GLBT community (see Irina Borisovna Fedotova and 
Irina Vladimironova Shipitko v Russia (Application No 40792/10) communicated to the ECtHR on 2 May 2016). 
In any event Advocate General Melchior Wathelet’s opinion, even if agreed by the ECJ would not oblige EU 
Member States to introduce any level of civil partnership/ same-sex marriage. Instead, they would only be obliged 
to recognise same-sex marriages (and likely civil partnerships) conducted abroad and provide the non-EU national 
same-sex spouse with citizenship rights such as that of permanent residency. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It should be noted that the Advocate General Melchior Wathelet’s Opinion is not binding on the ECJ. However, 
such opinions are highly influential and a Cambridge Law Research paper reported statistics that the ‘received 
wisdom is that the Court follows the Advocate General in about 70 per cent of cases’ (Carlos Arrebola and Ana 
Julia Mauricio, Cambridge Journal of Comparative and International Law, Vol. 5(1), University of Cambridge 
Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 3/2016). The judges are now in the middle of their deliberations and will give 
their judgments at later date, which is expected to be this summer. If the ECJ follows the Advocate General’s 
opinion this will form part of the general overall approach of the EU which has developed from an international 
economic agreement guaranteeing the right to freedom of movement of goods, services, persons and capital, to 
one of ever-increasing public citizenship rights. EU citizenship leads to a much more extensive array of rights 
than those justified by economic concerns alone and is one of the driving forces behind the expanding definition 
of family member as interpreted by the ECJ. Brexit means however that the UK citizens will not be able to benefit 
from any expanding free movement provisions to include non-EU national same-sex spouses within the definition 
of family member. Without the benefit of the protections of EU law, UK citizens in same-sex relationships will 
have to continue to rely on whatever rights their country of destination sees fit to grant them.   
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Commentary on cited Published Work 
contained in PART THREE ‘INTERNATIONAL 
IMPACT’  
 
(7) Hamilton, F., ‘The Symbolic Status of Same-Sex 
Marriage.’ (2017) 47 Family Law 851   
 
(8) Hamilton, F., ‘Strategies to achieve Same-Sex Marriage 
and the Method of Incrementalist Change’ (2016) 25 
Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 121-153 
 
The final two pieces comprising the third part of this PhD utilise 
comparative methodology.225 They analyse and draw upon the 
work set out in parts one and two and chart the wider 
international implications regarding appropriate strategies for 
success for proponents of same-sex marriage. Publication 7 
stresses the symbolic status of same-sex marriage, and it is 
therefore placed first in part 3 as publication 8 considers the 
                                                          
225Comparative legal methodology is the act of comparing the law of one 
country to that of another. This involves frequently comparing one law against 
another, but can be broader than that to encompass also cultural 
comparisons. For discussion see Eberle (n62).  
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international impact of this point.  Publication 7 considers why 
same-sex marriage remained an important issue even after the 
enactment of civil partnership in the UK in 2004. In contrast to 
other jurisdictions such as France which gave limited rights after 
enacting civil partnership,226 the UK opted to give very similar 
rights on civil partnership to same-sex couples as to those given 
to married heterosexual couples.227 However, very quickly civil 
partnership began to be criticised as a  ‘second-class status’228 
compared in the US to the treatment of blacks in the Jim Crow 
South229 and derided as a ‘weapon’ being utilized against the 
LGBTQ+ community to prevent them accessing same-sex 
marriage.230 In addition, practical differences remain between 
civil partnership and same-sex marriage.231 Parts one and two 
                                                          
226 The French civil partnership legislation, the ‘pacte civil de solidarite’ (the 
PACS) which although providing a large range of rights nearly equivalent to 
marriage, did not include citizenship. 
 
227 Civil partners were given very similar legal rights to married heterosexual 
couple ‘with the exception of the form of ceremony and the actual name and 
status of marriage’ as discussed in Wilkinson v Kritzinger (n57) at paragraph 
49. 
 
228 See Crane (n214) at 471 and Dorf (n215).  
 
229 Marshall, K. (n213).    
 
230 See Triger (n215).   
 
231 Practical differences between same-sex marriage and civil partnership 
include (1) the quadruple lock for religious organisations, (2) the fact that there 
is no requirement to consummate a civil partnership and (3) that adultery is 
not a ground for dissolution of a civil partnership, whereas it is a ground for 
divorce of a marriage.  Should a couple wish to relocate jurisdiction for 
instance, civil partnerships receive less protection from private international 
law and EU law than heterosexual marriage. 
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also illustrate a difference in treatment by the ECtHR and the 
CJEU. 
Ultimately, Publication 7 argues that even following the 
enactment of near equal civil partnership in the UK, it is the 
symbolism of marriage which meant that campaigners continued 
to bring forward their arguments in favour of same-sex 
marriage.232 Publication 7 considers that marriage is the key 
social institution celebrated and recognised around the world and 
references authors who state that ‘assumptions about the 
importance of marriage and its appropriate form have been 
deeply implanted in public policy’.233  Leading judgments have 
also referred to marriage as ‘fundamental.’234 Publication 7 
elaborates on themes developed in part 2 by re-instating the 
close connections between symbolism of marriage and 
citizenship. Publication 7 explains that the ‘ability to form a 
marriage has great relevance to an individuals’ status as an 
equal citizen.’235 Publication 7 concludes that marriage has a 
                                                          
 
232 Grigolo (n135) at 1041 explains that ‘only marriage [not civil partnership] 
can guarantee the symbolic benefits of full equality.’  
 
233 See Aloni (n55) at 141 referring to Cott (n137) at 1. 
 
234 See the Supreme Court of the USA in Obergefell et al v Hodges (n6) at 11. 
 
235 See for example Bamforth (n58) at 478. See also Dorf (n215) and 
Cossman, B., Sexual Citizens: The Legal and Cultural Regulation of Sex and 
Belonging (n137) at 32 which characterises citizenship as being ‘about the 
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symbolic weight that ‘cannot be explained simply by the many 
benefits understood to be guaranteed through it.’236 Publication 
7 considered that for proponents of same-sex marriage, civil 
partnership, even if viewed as unequal, can have a worth of its 
own as a ‘building-block on the road to recognition of same-sex 
marriage.’237 This conclusion should now be updated following 
reflection on the recent Supreme Court Steinfeld judgment.238 
This case resulted in the Supreme Court, declaring the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004’s bar on entry for heterosexual couples to 
be incompatible with Articles 8 and 14 ECHR.239 Law reform has 
now swiftly taken place. The Civil Partnerships, Marriages and 
Deaths (Registration etc) Act 2019 received royal assent on 26th 
March 2019 and came into force on 26th May 2019. In an era 
when same-sex marriage is available, civil partnership has taken 
on an intrinsic value of its own, for those couples, such as in 
Steinfeld who view marriage as associated with patriarchal 
                                                          
process of becoming recognised subjects, about the practices of inclusion and 
membership, both social and legal.’  
 
236 Publication 7. 
 
237 See publications 7 and 8. 
 
238  Steinfeld v Secretary of State for International Development [2018] UKSC 
32 .  
 
239 Ibid.  
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baggage.240 The value attached to statuses such as marriage 
needs continuing scrutiny as a status following other new 
developments such as potential changes to divorce law to 
remove the fault-based grounds.  
Publication 8 utilises the work in parts 1 and 2 as a springboard 
towards further development of appropriate strategies for 
success for proponents of same-sex marriage worldwide. 
Publication 8 endorses the incrementalist or step-by-step 
approach. This theory, also known as the theory of ‘small 
change’ was first advanced by Waaldijjk,241 and subsequently 
developed by Eskridge242and Merin.243  These theorists suggest 
that each country will go through a similar series of stages in their 
path towards legalisation of same-sex marriage.244  Merin, refers 
to a ‘standard sequence’ of events including the first stage of 
‘repeal of sodomy laws, before moving on to prohibiting 
discrimination against LGBTQ+ persons and the final stage of 
                                                          
240 See Ibid. and also the ECtHR in Oliari v Italy (n9) which discussed the 
intrinsic value of marriage.  See also Hayward, A, ‘Relationships with Status: 
Civil Partnership in an Era of Same-Sex Marriage’ in forthcoming edited 
collection, Hamilton, F. and Noto La Diega, G., (Eds.) under the working title 
‘Same-Sex Relationships, Law and Society’ (Routledge, 2020).  
 
241  Waaldijk (n61) at 437. 
 
242 Eskridge (n61).  
 
243 Merin (n61).   
 
244 Aloni (n55).  
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legal recognition of same-sex relationships.’245 Publication 8 
applies a comparative law analysis to the practical application of 
this theory.  Publication 8 argues that incrementalism has been 
followed in practice by many countries including England and 
Wales, Scotland, Denmark, France and Nordic countries. 
Reflecting on the work in part 1, publication 8 also comments that 
in practice ECtHR case law has also developed in an 
incrementalist fashion,246 stopping short of the recognition of 
same-sex marriage due to concerns about a lack of 
consensus.247 
 
Unlike other theorists who use incrementalism to predict when 
change will next occur, publication 8 uses incrementalism in 
connection with a comparative law methodology to establish a 
strategy for success for those who favour same-sex marriage. 
One of the major criticisms of incrementalism is that it proceeds 
too slowly. This can be seen from the fact that worldwide, the 
great majority of countries do not give any  ‘formal recognition to 
                                                          
245 Merin (n61) at 326.  
 
246 In practice the ECtHR has also adopted a gradually increasing level of 
protection for gays and same-sex couples. See n131.  
 
247 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (n8).  
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same-sex couples...’248 However slow change can be seen as 
advantageous as it is more likely to lead to lasting, substantively 
effective and enduring change. Waaldijk argues that 
incrementalism is useful in allowing change over time.249 This is 
because it ‘permit[s] gradual adjustment of antigay mind-sets, 
slowly empowers... gay right advocates and ...discredit antigay 
arguments.’250 It is in this context that publication 8 reiterates the 
point made in publication 7 that smaller change such as anti-
discrimination laws and civil partnership, in due course, could be 
effective as ‘building blocks’ on the road to recognition of same-
sex marriage. Publication 8 looks at the fact that public opinion 
and the enforcement of laws are closely ‘ interwoven… because 
the law has little meaning if it is not enforced’.251   There is a 
correlation between favourable public opinion and legal change 
                                                          
248 Saez, M., ‘General Report ‘Same Sex Marriage, Same-Sex Cohabitation, 
And Same-Sex Families around the World; Why ‘Same’ is so Different’ (2001) 
19 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y and L. 1-56 at 31.  
 
249 See Waaldijk (n61) at 437. 
 
250 Eskridge (n61) at 119. See also Marshall, K (n213) at 199-200 who 
explains that such slow change although frustrating at the time allows ‘public 
opinion to adjust gradually to the changes sought by social movement.’ See 
also Gallagher, M., ‘Why Accommodate? Reflections on the Gay Marriage 
Culture Wars’ (2010) 5 Northwestern J. of L. & Social Pol’y 260-273 at 260 
and Polikoff, N. D., ‘We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and 
Lesbian Marriage will not Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every 
Marriage (1993) 79 Va. L. Rev. 1535-1550. 
 
251 Gonzalez (n99) at 285. 
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in order to achieve success in the long term.252 A change in the 
law alone will not result in public acceptance of same-sex 
couples and publication 8 gives South Africa as an example in 
this context.253 Ultimately, some countries need longer to adjust, 
and change may not come to ‘some jurisdictions for a long time, 
and maybe not ever.’254  Publication 8 in setting forward a 
strategic approach also recommends the use of the legislative 
rather than judicial approach. Incrementalists favour the 
legislative approach as it allows engagement with democratically 
                                                          
252 For example, prior to the enactment of same-sex marriage in England and 
Wales, 53% of those consulted supported same-sex marriage. See ‘Equal 
Marriage: The Government’s Response’ December 2012 at 11 available at  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fil
e/133262/consultation-response_1_.pdf  Public opinion polls in France and 
Denmark also show a consistent support for same-sex marriage prior to 
legislation. For example see in relation to France Ifop poll (June 2008) s62%, 
BVA poll (November 2009) 64%, Credoc poll (July 2010) 61%, TNS-Sofres 
poll (Jan 2011) 58%, Ifop poll (June 2011) 63%, BVA poll (December 2011) 
63%, Ifop poll (October 2012) 61%, BVA poll (October 2012) 58%, CSA poll 
(December 2012) 54%, Ifop poll (December 2012) 60% and prior to legislation 
in Denmark public opinion polls from A YouGov Poll (Dec 2012) found that 
79% of Danes were in favour of same-sex marriage. See also annual public 
opinion pools from the Pew Research Centre, May 2019, A Global Snapshot 
of Same-Sex Marriage available at https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2019/05/17/global-snapshot-sex-marriage/ 
 
253 See Publication 8.  Pew Research Centre, A Global Snapshot of Same-
Sex Marriage, 4 June 2013 available at https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2019/05/17/global-snapshot-sex-marriage/ notes that ‘’In 2013, we 
surveyed 11 of the 28 nations that now have legalized same-sex marriage in 
all or part of their territory. In all but one of them (South Africa), a majority of 
people said homosexuality should be accepted. And while only 32% of South 
Africans said homosexuality should be accepted, that was by far the highest 
acceptance level of the eight African countries surveyed.’ 
 
254  Eskridge (n61) at 119. 
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elected representatives.255  Stychin argues if the judiciary are too 
active in this context it could lead to public opinion being 
polarised.256 Publication 8 goes on to give a detailed analysis of 
the Obergefell v Hodges case before the Supreme Court in the 
US.257 Although this legalised same-sex marriage across the US, 
with the leader of the majority judges referring to rights to liberty 
and equality enshrined in the US constitution,258 this was 
vehemently criticised by the dissenting judges as usurping 
democratic rights.259  
 
 
  
                                                          
255  See Richards (n110) at 733 who referring to the critique of Stychin (n110) 
argues that ‘recognition should happen democratically rather than judicially 
and argues for a democracy in which gays are mobilised as full citizens, 
demanding their rights...’  
 
256 Id.  See also Dent G. W. Jr., ‘The Defense of the Traditional Marriage’ 
(1999) 15 J. of L. & Politics 581-644 at 622.  
 
257 Obergefell v Hodges (n6).  
 
258 Id per Justice Kennedy at 19 (delivering a majority judgment of 5 out of 9 
judges of the US Supreme Court) which determined that the denial of a right 
to marry violated the ‘[r]ights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal 
protection’ guaranteed by the Fourteenth amendment.  
 
259 See Obergefell v Hodges (n6) dissenting judgments from Justice Roberts 
and Scalia 
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movement perspective. 
When the Civil Partnership Act 2004 
(‘CPA’) was introduced in 2004 this was 
a major step forwards for same-sex 
couples. Despite offering near 
equalisation of rights with married 
couples, this piece argues that this was 
insufficient for those same-sex couples 
who favour same-sex marriage. This 
remains a current issue for jurisdictions 
which have not legalised same-sex 
marriage, including Northern Ireland 
and many European states. This piece 
argues that civil partnership is a useful 
concept allowing public mind-sets to 
adjust, en route to the legalisation of 
same-sex marriage. However, civil 
partnership remains tarred by the 
brush of ‘separate but equal.’ Aside 
from the rights granted by marriage 
itself, this article considers that 
marriage contains an important 
symbolical status and is necessary for 
the recognition of gays as equal 
citizens. 
Why same-sex marriage remains 
an important issue 
Although same-sex marriage was 
legalised in England and Wales in 2013 
and Scotland in 2014, in Northern 
Ireland there remains only a right to 
civil partnership. Further, on a Council 
of Europe level there is no right to 
same-sex marriage.1 Today 13 
countries in Europe have introduced 
same-sex marriage2 and an additional 
15 Member States recognise some 
form of civil partnership.3 Yet the 
protections offered by the latter status 
vary widely.4 Some countries continue 
to maintain constitutional provisions 
defining marriage as between a man 
and a woman only.5 This remains an 
issue about which although the 
European Court of Human Rights 
(‘ECtHR’) explains that despite ‘major 
social change . . . there is no European 
consensus …’.6 
When the Civil Partnership Act 2004 
(‘CPA’) was introduced this was a 
momentous occasion for same-sex 
couples. Civil partners were given very 
similar legal rights to married 
heterosexual couple, ‘with the 
exception of a form of ceremony and 
the actual name and status of 
marriage’7. Yet less than a decade later, 
it was felt necessary to enact new 
legislation to legalise same-sex 
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marriage.8 This piece maintains that same-sex marriage remained a goal worth 
seeking because of the symbolic value of marriage. First it will be considered why 
the CPA was not sufficient for proponents of same-sex marriage, before going on 
to outline in further detail the symbolic value of marriage and the close 
connections between marriage and citizenship. 
Why the CPA was not sufficient 
Although ‘registered partnership take different forms in different countries’9, the 
UK wide CPA enacted in 2004 led to near equality of legal rights.10 This is in 
contrast for example with the French pacte civil de solidarte (‘PACS’) which 
although providing a large range of rights nearly equivalent to marriage11 did not 
include citizenship.12 The CPA was enacted in 2004 following a consultation with 
‘stakeholders and the public at large’13. This survey found that the public were 
not prepared at that time for same-sex marriage.14 Speaking in the Second 
Reading of the Civil Partnership Bill in the House of Lords, Baroness Scotland 
linked the CPA firmly to issues surrounding religion stating that this was a ‘secular 
solution’15. Even Stonewall (one of the leading gay rights organisations in the UK) 
considered at that time that civil partnership was ‘preferable to marriage.’16 
 
Yet even with similar legal protections to marriage, for many same-sex couples 
civil partnership was insufficient. Civil partnership by its very existence as a 
separate status was often tarred with the brush of being ‘separate but equal’ and 
relegating same-sex couples to ‘second-class status’17. Marriage was considered 
by many as the gold standard18 whilst civil partnership was compared to the 
treatment of blacks in the ‘Jim Crow South’19. Practical differences also remained. 
Should a couple wish to relocate jurisdiction for instance, civil partnerships 
receive less protection from private international law and EU law than 
heterosexual marriage.20 Over the course of a decade social attitudes evolved, 
and before enacting the 2013 Same-Sex Marriage Act, a government consultation 
found that 53% of the population supported same-sex marriage.21 
Despite the criticisms of civil partnership, it can be argued that it did provide a 
useful staging post on the way to same-sex marriage. Whilst some authors may 
view civil partnerships as stalling progress,22  in contrast this author considers that 
‘civil partnerships are a useful building block on the road to the recognition of 
same-sex marriage’23. This is because ‘[i]ntermediate stage legislation allows 
public opinion to adjust and develop’24. Interestingly in this context, the ECtHR 
has noted the ‘intrinsic value’ of civil partnerships, ‘irrespective of the legal 
effects, however narrow or extensive’25. The key point however, is that marriage 
has a symbolical value which civil partnership could never bestow. Closely 
connected with this are the citizenship rights which marriage, but not civil 
partnership entails. Each of these inter-connected concepts will be considered in 
the next couple of sections. 
 
Symbolism of marriage 
 
Marriage is the key social institution celebrated and recognised around the world. 
Marriage is given great constitutional importance and ‘assumptions about the 
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importance of marriage and its appropriate form have been deeply implanted in 
public policy’26. Marriage is also protected by international conventions27 and 
dicta in influential judgments has referred to marriage as a ‘vital social 
institution’28 and one of the ‘basic civil rights of man’ fundamental to our very 
existence and survival.29 The majority of the US Supreme Court in the important 
2015 judgment of Obergefell v Hodges,30 which licensed same-sex marriage 
across all states of the US, stressed that the right to marry as ‘fundamental’.31 
 
Excluding gays from marriage is to exclude them from an important part of 
society. The South African Constitutional court in Fourie also saw similarities with 
laws preventing mixed race marriage and was keen to have a radical break form 
the past in recognising same-sex marriage. Grigolo also comments that until 
same-sex marriage is recognised, that it should be demanded as otherwise 
minority groups are allowing themselves to be ‘relegated to a second-rate 
position’32. The Wilkinson v Kritizinger case, which was determined before the 
Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 was enacted, contained a witness 
statement by Sue Wilkinson, who was desperately pleading for her Canadian 
same-sex marriage to be recognised in England and Wales.33 For her, offering gays 
and lesbians the ‘ “consolation prize’ of a civil partnership . . . is offensive and 
demeaning’.34 For many same-sex couples marriage was seen as rendering their  
‘existing relationship more real’35  and that marriage would ‘create and make a 
public perception of lasting commitment among lesbians’36. In conclusion, when 
marriage is compared to an extensive civil partnership rights giving regime, ‘the 
practical importance of marriage is overshadowed by its symbolic importance’.37 
This suggests that the institution of marriage itself carries abstract weight that 
cannot be explained simply by the many benefits understood to be guaranteed 
through it. 
 
Marriage and citizenship 
 
An important part of the symbolism of marriage is its close connection with 
citizenship. The ability to form a marriage has great relevance to an individuals’ 
status as an equal citizen.38 The classic formulation for citizenship comes from 
Thomas Marshall who stressed the ‘equal . . . rights and duties with which the 
status is endowed’.39 The close connections between citizenship and equality are 
also stressed in the French40 and Irish constitutions.41 Baroness Hale in a leading 
case before the UK House of Lords also emphasised that ‘[d]emocracy is founded 
on the principle that each individual has equal value’.42 An important practical 
effect of the symbolism of equal marriage is therefore to advance the citizenship 
status of same-sex couples. 
Same-sex couples who are excluded from marriage are not truly equal. They have 
not been accorded the full status of citizenship43 and are not seen as full members 
of society.44 This it can be argued is because of the public nature of marriage.45 
The personal commitment of two individuals through marriage, and the 
citizenship this entails, leads to many consequences for the couples ability to 
‘participate . . . in the public order’46. If the couple do not enter a civil partnership, 
and do not marry, they may lose out on many economic benefits including social 
security benefits, health insurances and the advantages of tax and immigration 
laws. In short, Brenda Cossman characterises citizenship pas being ‘about the  
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process of becoming recognised subjects, about the practices of inclusion and 
membership, both social and legal’47. In a link back to the symbolic value of 
marriage, Grigolo explains that ‘only marriage [not civil partnership] can 
guarantee the symbolic benefits of full equality’.48 
 
Conclusion 
 
Civil partnership provides a useful staging post, allowing ‘public opinion to 
adjust and develop’.49 Yet for many civil partnership was never going to be 
sufficient because of allegations that this was a ‘second-class status’. Marriage 
itself provides an important symbolic status and is protected by international 
conventions and important case law. Therefore excluding gays from marriage is 
to exclude them their ‘status as an equal citizen’. 
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Commentary Conclusions 
 
This work illustrates that against the background of globalisation 
and increasing numbers of international families, a new, more 
holistic approach towards recognition of same-sex couples’ 
rights should be taken. In consideration of focal research 
question one  ‘What role can the ECtHR and the EU play in 
claims for the recognition of same-sex marriage?’, this work 
demonstrates that the ECtHR and the EU have an important role 
to play in claims for recognition of same-sex marriage.  The work 
in part one critiques the use of the MoA doctrine by the ECtHR260 
and sets out a strategy for future development for proponents of 
same-sex marriage before the ECtHR.261 This needs to include 
detailed consideration of how the consensus standard can be 
quantified and measured.262 The work in part 2, which 
foreshadowed recent CJEU case law developments,263 
concluded that  the EU offers the most potential for proponents 
                                                          
260 Publication one argues that use of the MoA means that contracting states 
remain free to determine whether or not to sanction same-sex marriage, 
meaning that erroneous or discriminatory reasons could continue to maintain 
influence. 
 
261 Publication two argues that more concentration on equality arguments 
under Article 14 is needed, in combination with a revitalised by use of the 
family aspect of Article 8 and a new dynamic interpretation of Article 12 (right 
to marry). Publication 3 also recommends that a free standing equality clause 
in the shape of Protocol 12, should be ratified by the contracting states to the 
ECHR. 
 
262 See publication 3.  
 
263  As discussed in Publication 6 this includes the Coman (n11) and MB (n11)  
(as discussed in additional publication 2 included in Appendix 4).  
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of same-sex marriage due to the EU concept of citizenship which 
entails extensive free movement rights for EU citizens and family 
members.264 The EU also provides the best opportunity for a 
unified choice of law provision for same-sex relationships 
relocating across international borders.265 
In consideration of focal research question 2 ‘What further impact 
do pan-European courts’ approaches to same-sex marriage 
cases have internationally?’, work in part 3 demonstrates the 
potential for and developing international impact of pan-
European courts’ approaches to same-sex marriage. Publication 
7 stresses the symbolic value of same-sex marriage,266 and then 
publication 8 considers the international impact of this point. 
Considering strategies for success for proponents of same-sex 
marriage is further developed in publication 8. Comparative law 
methodology is utilised which endorses incrementalism267 or a 
step-by-step approach.268 The same methodology also leads to 
conclusions that the legislative (as opposed to judicial) approach 
is considered to be preferable as it allow countries to enact 
                                                          
264 See n172.  
 
265 Thereby avoiding limping marriages, For example where a marriage is 
recognised in one country but not another  and ‘divergences between Member 
States.’ See Moir and Beaumont (n74) at 269.  
 
266 Grigolo (n135) explains that ‘only marriage [not civil partnership] can 
guarantee the symbolic benefits of full equality.’ 
 
267 Waaldijk (n61). 
 
268 Although criticisms of the incrementalist approach need to be remembered.  
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change in favour of same-sex marriage as a result of action from 
their democratically elected representatives.269   
On reflection, starting from a position of being a  solicitor and 
recent LLM graduate,270  this project has challenged me to write 
in a comparative and international style across a series of legal 
academic disciplines including EU law, ECtHR law and private 
international law.  Key points in development include advancing 
from recognising problems and taking a case based analysis271 
to suggesting solutions and taking broader thematic 
approaches.272 Important conferences include Trento, Italy in 
2014,273 co-organisation of the Northumbria / Sunderland 
conference in 2014274 and the international level conference held 
at Northumbria in 2018.275 The six-year period of publication has 
seen immense change276 but many challenges for proponents of 
                                                          
269  Richards (n110) referring to Stychin (n110).  
 
270 I completed my LLM at Trinity College Dublin in 2009, where I was much 
influenced by the International Family Law course. 
 
271 Publication 1. 
 
272 Publications 2, 3, 4, 5 and 8. 
 
273 The Rights on the Move Rainbow families in Europe Conference’ Trento 
16-17 October 2014 following which I published the additional supporting 
publication 1 set out in Appendix 4. 
 
274  This 2014 conference co-organised with Sunderland University entitled 
‘Social and Legal Implications of Same-sex Marriage in North East’ resulted 
in fifty local activists being invited.  
 
275 The second SLS funded conference entitled ‘Same-Sex Relationships, A 
New Revolutionary Era and the Influence of Legal and Social Change’ took 
place on 10th September 2018. This attracted international presentations from 
academics, lawyers and sociologists based in the UK, Ireland, Italy and the 
Netherlands. 
 
276 Whilst in 2013 only six states in Europe recognised same-sex marriage, by 
2019 this has increased to sixteen states. See n2 for detail.  
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same-sex marriage remain. 277  Even following Coman, some 
countries in Europe continue to refuse to recognise foreign same-
sex marriage.278 This is despite leading international 
organisations worldwide highlighting the importance of equality 
concerns.279 As discussed throughout, Article 14 European 
Convention contains a non-discrimination provision as do 
manifold provisions of EU law280 and the ICPR.281 All of this 
                                                          
 
277 Worldwide over 70 countries continue to criminalise sexual relationships 
between same-sex couples. 
 
278 Noto La Diega, G., in chapter ‘The European approach to recognising, 
downgrading, and erasing same-sex marriages celebrated abroad’ in 
forthcoming edited collection, Hamilton, F. and Noto La Diega, G., (Eds.) 
under the working title ‘Same-Sex Relationships, Law and Society’ 
(Routledge, 2020) explains that ‘.. a minority of countries  (such as Hungary 
and Czech Republic) adopt the erasure model, whereby perfectly valid 
same-sex marriages celebrated abroad do not produce any effects despite 
the virtual availability of civil unions to nationals.’ This is in direct breach of 
both EU Law and European human rights law as enshrined in Coman (n11) 
and Orlandi. (n131).  
 
279 Goal 10 of the UN Sustainable Development Goal is to ‘reduce inequality 
within and among countries.’ The text is available at 
https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-
goals/goal-10-reduced-inequalities.html includes targets of by 2030 to 
‘empower and promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all, 
irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic 
or other status.’ 
280 For example Article 21 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights provides 
for non-discrimination ‘based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic 
or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any 
other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age 
or sexual orientation..’  Other key pieces of EU legislation include the Council 
Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework 
for equal treatment in employment and occupation which prohibits 
discrimination in the area of employment on the basis of sexual orientation, 
religious belief, age and disability and the 2009 Lisbon Treaty which 
introduced a horizontal clause with a view to integrating the fight against 
discrimination into all EU policies and actions (Article 10 TFEU).  
281 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides at Article 
26 that ‘All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall 
prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective 
protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status.’ 
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points to much continuing work for proponents of same-sex 
marriage.  
I continue to be inspired by international comparison282 and 
comparative methodology will be a focal tool in my research 
going forwards. My chapter in the upcoming edited collection for 
Routledge283 will contain an updated comparison between the 
EU and ECtHR approaches considering the potential impact of 
Brexit. In future work, when selecting other jurisdictions pertinent 
for comparison, I intend to look at the USA, the Republic of 
Ireland and Italy. A comparison between the USA and the ECtHR 
provides the focus for a publication currently in draft.284 The 
Republic of Ireland is the subject of two chapters in the Routledge 
book.285 As part of my role as visiting Professor at the University 
of Pisa in Italy in March 2020 I intend to write a joint article with 
Professor Angioletta Sperti comparing the routes taken in 
England and Wales and Italy towards same-sex marriage.  
                                                          
 
282 This was first inspired by attending the major EU funded international 
conference held at the University of Trento in 2014 entitled ‘The Rights on the 
Move Rainbow families in Europe Conference,’ my presentation at which 
formed publication 1 of the additional supporting publications in Appendix 4.  
This can be seen as a formative version of Publication 2 which is published in 
one of the leading international academic journals in the area. 
 
283 My chapter is entitled: ‘The Potential of European Union Law to Further 
Advance LGBTQ+ Persons and Same-Sex Couples’ Rights.’ 
284 Current draft article entitled:’ A Re-Evaluation of the Method of 
Incrementalist Change to Achieve Same-Sex Marriage - A Comparative Study 
between the United States and Europe.’ 
 
285 Contributing authors are: Dr Fergus Ryan, Associate Professor, NUI 
Maynooth and Dr Brian Tobin, Lecturer, NUI Galway, Republic of Ireland. 
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In my future research I am interested in utilising the socio-legal 
doctrinal and comparative approaches employed in this PhD by 
publication to make further comparisons between the developing 
treatment of LGBTQ+ persons and other areas which are also 
concerns when considering equal citizenship. In this respect I 
have work under review concerning Northern Ireland treatment 
of LGBTQ+ persons and women’s access to abortion rights. 
Following a presentation at the EPATH conference in April 
2019,286 the US Journal of Sociology Study287 requested 
publication of a further article which will consider the use of 
consensus by ECtHR in relation to a comparison between 
LGBTQ+ persons and same-sex marriage cases and developing 
case law concerning transpersons. Following request by the 
International Labor Rights Case Law Journal288 I have written a 
case note on CJEU advancement of transpersons’ rights on the 
basis of non-discrimination concerning access to UK state 
pension.289  
                                                          
286 The 3rd European Professional Association for Trans Gender Health was 
held in Rome in April 2019.  
 
287 The Journal of Sociology Study’s website is available at 
http://www.davidpublisher.org/Home/Journal/SS 
 
288The International Labor Rights Case Law Journal website is available at   
https://brill.com/view/journals/ilrc/ilrc-overview.xml. Please note this journal 
uses Americans spellings. 
 
289 In the case of MB (n11) the CJEU determined that the requirement of the 
Gender Recognition Act 2004, which required trans persons to annul their 
marriage before they would be granted a full Gender Recognition Certificate 
in their new sex (prior to same-sex marriage being legalised in 2013), which 
was also necessary to claim state pension benefits for women from the age 
of 60, contravened Article 4 Council Directive 79//7/EEC non-discrimination 
provisions.  
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I also plan to further develop the impact of my work. Working with 
multi-university partners,290 we are investigating obtaining 
funding in order to create a worldwide hub of LGBTQ+ legal rights 
to be specifically targeted at the STEM sector.291 The next stage 
is to confirm intermediate level funding in order to engage with 
focus groups of the intended end users. This will determine what 
information would be most beneficial.292 Although at a 
developmental stage, the potential significance of this work lies 
in assisting LGBTQ+ STEM workers to access legal information 
about foreign law. This may ultimately not only change the 
behavior of individuals but also company human resources 
policies concerning advice to LGBTQ+ STEM workers travelling 
abroad.293 
I have also designed and successfully piloted to the Women in 
Leadership Programme a course on the Gender Pay Gap and 
Company Response, which I am now investigating into turning 
into a stand-alone CPD course. This is also the subject of a 
potential separate impact case study in developmental stage. I 
have recently been appointed Equality Lead including 
                                                          
290 See n24.  
 
291 It is anticipated that this would be hosted on the charity, Pride in STEM’s 
webpage. 
 
292 Pride in STEM have provisionally agreed to put the focus groups together.  
 
293 It is anticipated that this will develop into an impact case study, with 
associated future bids and suggested dissemination events at relevant 
scientific bodies. 
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responsibility for a team application for Northumbria University 
Faculty of Business and Law’s application for the Athena Swan 
Bronze Award. This has inspired further potential work including 
the proposal of a Feminist Job Application project, considering 
how University promotion opportunities work in practice, which 
may involve rewriting job applications in a feminist voice. I have 
also been successful in achieving funding from the VC’s Equality 
and Diversity Programme to update Northumbria University’s in-
house policies concerning travel guidance resource for LGBTQ+ 
staff members. I am excited about the future multiple possibilities 
and consider that work in this area is essential. The development 
of LGBTQ+ rights for proponents of same-sex marriage 
illustrates that change is possible, but that many issues remain 
to be considered.  
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Subject: Request for " The Expanding Concept of EU Citizenship Free 
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Free Movement Rights and the Potential Positive Impact this has for 
Same-Sex Couples Relocating Across Borders. Family Law. ISSN 
0014-7281  
Family Law Journal Article 2018.pdf  
The following reason was given: 
Dear Sir/Madam, I am a private international law researcher at the 
University of Antwerp (Belgium) writing my PhD on EU private international 
law. I was interested to read the contribution by F. Hamilton on Expanding 
of EU citizenship rights to free movement as it deals with an issue that is 
relevant for my research: substitution of traditional private international 
law by EU primary law (in this case free movement). Kind regards, 
Aleksandrs Fillers  
Please consider removing restrictions or uploading the full text to the 
archive so that it will be available immediately to future searchers. 
Accept the request  
Reject the request  
From: Northumbria Research Link <as.researchlink@northumbria.ac.uk> 
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request<http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/cgi/users/home?screen=Request%3A
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To: AS researchlink <as.researchlink@northumbria.ac.uk> 
Subject: Request for " The Expanding Concept of EU Citizenship Free 
Movement Rights and the Potential Positive Impact this has for Same-Sex 
Couples Relocating Across Borders " 
 
This item has been requested from Northumbria Research Link by 
m.m.adam.czwarno@gmail.com . Please can you respond.  
Hamilton, Frances (2018) The Expanding Concept of EU Citizenship 
Free Movement Rights and the Potential Positive Impact this has for 
Same-Sex Couples Relocating Across Borders. Family Law. ISSN 
0014-7281  
Family Law Journal Article 2018.pdf  
The following reason was given: 
I'm a student of law and history at the College of Inter-Area Individual 
Studies In the Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of Warsaw. 
Currently collecting academic material to write a legal opinion on the ECJ 
ruling in Relu Adrian Coman and Others v Inspectoratul General pentru 
Imigrări (Case C-673/16).  
Please consider removing restrictions or uploading the full text to the 
archive so that it will be available immediately to future searchers. 
Accept the request  
Reject the request  
 
From: Northumbria Research Link 
[mailto:as.researchlink@northumbria.ac.uk]  
Sent: 27 April 2017 14:12 
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To: AS researchlink <as.researchlink@northumbria.ac.uk> 
Subject: Request for " Why the margin of appreciation is not the answer to 
the gay marriage debate " 
 
This item has been requested from Northumbria Research Link by 
sandra.lukosek@yahoo.de . Please can you respond. 
Hamilton, Frances (2013) Why the margin of appreciation is not the 
answer to the gay marriage debate. European Human Rights Law 
Review, 2013 (1). pp. 47-55. ISSN 1361-1526  
The following reason was given: 
Dear Sir or Madam, I am working on behalf of an exchange programme 
from Humboldt University, Berlin/ Germany. I am preparing for an 
exchange seminar with German and Armenian students about the ECHR. 
One of the topics will be: Implications of the margin of appreciation and the 
principle of subsidiarity in the context of Art. 8 and 12 - Same sex marriage 
regulations in the domestic legislation of Armenia and Germany. I think it 
would be very helpful to take this Article into consideration and I woul be 
very gratful, if you could send it to me. Thank you and kind regards Sandra  
Please consider removing restrictions or uploading the full text to the 
archive so that it will be available immediately to future searchers. 
 
From: Northumbria Research Link 
[mailto:as.researchlink@northumbria.ac.uk]  
Sent: 13 March 2017 14:21 
To: AS researchlink <as.researchlink@northumbria.ac.uk> 
Subject: Request for " Why the margin of appreciation is not the answer to 
the gay marriage debate " 
 
This item has been requested from Northumbria Research Link by 
mcknight-c5@email.ulster.ac.uk . Please can you respond. 
Hamilton, Frances (2013) Why the margin of appreciation is not the 
answer to the gay marriage debate. European Human Rights Law 
Review, 2013 (1). pp. 47-55. ISSN 1361-1526  
The following reason was given: 
To Whom it Concerns, I am a final year Law student at Ulster University and 
I am doing a dissertation regarding same-sex marriage in Northern Ireland 
and the role of the devolved government in protecting human rights. 
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Obviously as part of this the margin of appreciation needs to be discussed 
and I believe this article would be of help. If this article is used it will 
obviously be fully referenced and acknowledged within the work in 
accordance with OSCOLA referencing. Thank you in advance Caoimhe 
McKnight  
Please consider removing restrictions or uploading the full text to the 
archive so that it will be available immediately to future searchers. 
From: Northumbria Research Link 
[mailto:as.researchlink@northumbria.ac.uk]  
Sent: 10 February 2017 01:43 
To: AS researchlink <as.researchlink@northumbria.ac.uk> 
Subject: Request for " Why the margin of appreciation is not the answer to 
the gay marriage debate " 
 
This item has been requested from Northumbria Research Link by 
claerwen.ohara@gmail.com . Please can you respond. 
Hamilton, Frances (2013) Why the margin of appreciation is not the 
answer to the gay marriage debate. European Human Rights Law 
Review, 2013 (1). pp. 47-55. ISSN 1361-1526  
The following reason was given: 
Hello, I would like to request a copy of this article as part of some research 
that I am conducting in order to put together a phd proposal. I cannot 
access this article through the Monash University database. Thank you  
Please consider removing restrictions or uploading the full text to the 
archive so that it will be available immediately to future searchers. 
 
 
From: Mills, L [lmills@sun.ac.za] <lmills@sun.ac.za>  
Sent: 20 November 2018 09:59 
To: Frances Hamilton <frances.hamilton@northumbria.ac.uk> 
Subject: [SPAM] MB v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions 
 
Dear Frances, 
 
My name is Lize and I am a law lecturer at Stellenbosch University 
in South Africa. I am currently trying to write an article comparing 
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the decision of MB v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions to 
that of a South African decision, namely KOS v Minister of Home 
Affairs - the similarity being that in both instances the State 
required persons who have had their natal sex changed, to first 
terminate their marriage before their sex change would be 
recognised, despite clear enabling legislation to the contrary.  
While doing my research, I came across a reference to your article:  
Hamilton, Frances (2018) MB v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions: Further Development from the European Court of Justice for 
LGTBQ Persons. Family Law. ISSN 0014-7281  
 
Our librarian has tried his best to find a copy of the article but there 
is an embargo placed on this until 2020? Is this correct? Do you 
perhaps have information as to how and when I will be able to 
acquire a copy? 
Kind regards, 
Lize 
 
Dr L Mills   
Senior Lecturer  |  Department of Private Law   
Faculty of Law    
e: lmills@sun.ac.za  |  t: +27 21 808 3179/84  
a: Old Main Building | Room 1009  
Cnr of Ryneveld and Victoria Streets 
Stellenbosch 
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Appendix 2 
 
Guest Seminars and Conferences I have organised in my 
role as Co-Convenor for the Northumbria University Gender 
Sexuality and the Law Research Interest Group  
 
Talks which I have organised as Gender Sexuality and the Law 
Research Interest Group Co-Convenor include;  
 
7 May 2019, Two Speakers on the Recognition of Foreign Same-
Sex Marriage,’ Tomás Dombos, Hatter Society, Hungary and Dr 
Guido Noto La Diega, Northumbria University.  
 
7 February 2019, Dr Andy Hayward, Durham University, 
‘Relationship with Status – The Emerging Institution of Civil 
Partnership in England and Wales.  
 
10th September 2018, The second SLS funded conference 
entitled ‘Same-Sex Relationships, A New Revolutionary Era and 
the Influence of Legal and Social Change’ took place on 10th 
September 2018. This attracted international presentations from 
academics, lawyers and sociologists based in the UK, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands and Cyprus. 
 
3 May 2018, Dr Sarah Lamble, Birkbeck University on the subject 
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of ‘Queer Approaches to Transformative Justice. 
 
24th April 2018, Dr Chris Dietz, Leeds University on the subject 
of the ‘Self Declaration Model of Gender in Denmark.3 
 
December 2017, Dr Raven Bowen, York University on 
‘Understanding Duality – Examining Engagement in Sex Work 
Alongside Square Jobs.,’  
 
March 2015, Prof Rosemary Auchmuty, Reading University on 
Civil Partnership Dissolution. 
 
October 2014, Dr Nikki Godden-Rausal Newcastle University on 
Revenge Porn  
 
June 2014. Co-organised with Sunderland University entitled 
‘Social and Legal Implications of Same-sex Marriage in North 
East’ resulted in fifty local activists being invited. 
 
October 2013, Professor Rosemary Hunter, Kent University on 
the Feminist Judgments Project.   
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Ethical Approval Confirmation 
 
From: EthicsOnline@Northumbria <EthicsOnline@Northumbria>  
Sent: 01 November 2018 09:10 
To: Frances Hamilton <frances.hamilton@northumbria.ac.uk> 
Subject: Research Ethics: Your submission has been approved 
 
Dear Frances Hamilton, 
Submission Ref: 12110 
Following independent peer review of the above proposal*, I am 
pleased to inform you that APPROVAL has been granted on the basis 
of this proposal and subject to continued compliance with the 
University policies on ethics, informed consent, and any other policies 
applicable to your individual research.  You should also have current 
Disclosure & Barring Service (DBS) clearance if your research involves 
working with children and/or vulnerable adults.    
* note: Staff Low Risk applications are auto-approved without independent 
peer review. 
The University’s Policies and Procedures are here 
All researchers must also notify this office of the following: 
 Any significant changes to the study design, by submitting an 
‘Ethics Amendment Form’ 
 Any incidents which have an adverse effect on participants, 
researchers or study outcomes, by submitting an ‘Ethical 
incident Form’ 
 Any suspension or abandonment of the study. 
Please check your approved proposal for any Approval 
Conditions upon which approval has been made.  
Use this link to view the submission: View Submission 
Research Ethics Home: Research Ethics Home 
Please do not reply to this email. This is an unmonitored mailbox. 
If you are a student, queries should be discussed with your 
Module Tutor/Supervisor. If you are a member of staff please 
consult your Department Ethics Lead.  
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Primae Facie Case 
 
(a) Working Title: ‘What Role Can the European Court of Human 
Rights (‘ECtHR’) and the European Union (‘EU’) Play in 
Relation to Same-Sex Marriage Claims and What Further 
Impact Does This Have Internationally? 
(b) Summary (300 words maximum). This work has been 
published at a time of rapid social and legal change worldwide 
concerning the recognition of same-sex relationships. When 
this work was begun in 2012 only six countries in Europe had 
same-sex marriage and today that number is up to 15. Unlike 
many prominent works on this matter which are highly 
influenced by feminist / queer theoretical approaches, the 
research methodology utilised is largely doctrinal, socio-legal 
and comparative in nature. These works make a novel and 
significant contribution to the prior knowledge base in a number 
of ways. (1) They provide a benchmark in relation to ECtHR 
case law concerning same-sex marriage. A novel critique of 
same-sex marriage claims based on the European Convention 
is set forward together with a novel critique of the consensus 
doctrine and a suggested original approach of how the ECtHR 
can address this. (2) Further articles demonstrate originality by 
predicting the importance of EU recognition of same-sex 
relationships where free movement of EU citizens and their 
non-EU national same-sex spouses are concerned and by 
recommending a novel conflicts of law theory. In addition 
further original work is demonstrated by discussing the impact 
of Brexit in relation to free movement rights of same-sex 
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couples.  (3) When considering international repercussions a 
novel approach is suggested by stating that incrementalism can 
be used in a strategic manner. These works have been 
impactful in relation to informing teaching, being utilised in 
international conferences and supporting present and 
anticipated future funding applications. Many have been 
assessed as internationally excellent following peer review in 
preparation for Northumbria University’s Research Excellence 
Framework (REF 2021) selection and have been cited in 
international academic literature. 
 
(c) List of published work on which the application is based:  
 
(1) Frances Hamilton, ‘Why Margin of Appreciation is Not the 
Answer to the Gay Marriage Debate’ (2013) 1 European 
Human Rights Law Review 47 -55. 
 
(2) Frances Hamilton, ‘Gays and the European Court of Human 
Rights: the Equality Argument ‘pp75-80 in ebook C 
Casonato and A Schuster (eds) ‘Rights on the Move – 
Rainbow Family in Europe: Proceedings of the Conference 
Trento 16-17 October 2014 (Universita degli studi di Trento 
2014) available online at http://eprints.biblio.unitn.it/4448 
 
(3) Frances Hamilton, ‘The Case for Same-Sex Marriage 
Before the European Court of Human Rights’ (2017) 
Journal of Homosexuality 1-25.  
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(4) Frances Hamilton, ‘Same-Sex Marriage, Consensus, 
Certainty and the European Court of Human Rights’ (2018) 
1 European Human Rights Law Review 33 – 45. 
 
(5) Frances Hamilton, ‘The Differing Treatment of Same Sex 
Couples by European Union Law and the European 
Convention on Human Rights: The European Union 
Concept of Citizenship’ (2015) 2(1) Journal of International 
and Comparative Law 87-113. 
 
(6) Frances Hamilton and Lauren Clayton-Helm, ‘Same Sex 
Relationships Choice of Law and the Continued 
Recognised Relationship Theory’ (2016) 3(1) Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 1 -31.  (Contribution as 
Joint Author). 
 
(7) Frances Hamilton, ‘The Expanding Concept of EU 
Citizenship Free Movement Rights and the Potential 
Positive Impact this has for Same-Sex Couples Relocating 
Across Borders’ (2018) Fam Law 693 – 696. 
 
(8) Frances Hamilton, ‘The Symbolic Status of Same-Sex 
Marriage’ (2017) 47 Fam Law 851-854. 
 
(9) Frances Hamilton, ‘Strategies to achieve Same-Sex 
Marriage and the Method of Incrementalist (2016) 25 
Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 121-153 
283 
 
Co-authorship Agreement Documentation 
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(1) Hamilton, F., ‘Gays and the European Court of Human 
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C. and Schuster, A. (eds) ‘Rights on the Move – Rainbow 
Family in Europe: Proceedings of the Conference Trento 
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Gays and the European Court of Human Rights: the Equality 
Argument   
Frances Hamilton1   
Abstract   
This piece articulates specific difficulties for the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) in 
engaging with equality arguments in relation to same-sex marriage. It is argued that it is a necessity to 
engage with equality arguments due to the close connections between equality, citizenship and 
marriage. The text of the European Convention of Human Rights (‘ECHR’) does not assist as Article 14 
(equality) is a conditional right only. Whilst earlier cases concerning gay rights were secured by a right 
to privacy (Article 8) with a narrow margin of appreciation which reflected a universally understood 
concept, in relation to equality arguments there is greater relativist scope leading to a wider margin 
of appreciation. Lastly, in seeking to engage in equality arguments comparisons between different 
groups categorised by sexual orientation are required, thereby further emphasising the concept of the 
dominant heterosexual norm.   
Keywords   
Same-Sex Marriage, Equality, Citizenship, Margin of Appreciation   
* * * * *   
Introduction   
Traditionally, privacy arguments have been the most successful in the advancement of 
gay rights before the ECtHR. This point has been asserted by other authors2 and is also 
                                                          
1 Frances Hamilton is a Senior Lecturer in Law at Northumbria University.   
 
2 Other authors who also argue this point include Paul Johnson, ‘An Essentially Private Manifestation of Human 
Personality’: Constructions of Homosexuality in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2010) 10(1) Human Rights 
Law Review 67; Barbara Stark, ‘When Globalization Hits Home: International Family Law Comes of Age’, (2006) 
36 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1551 and Carmelo Danisi, (2011) ‘How far can the European Court of 
Human Rights go in the Fight Against Discrimination? Defining New Standards in its Non-Discrimination 
Jurisprudence’ 9(4) International Journal of Constitutional Law 793.   
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reflected in the case law of the ECtHR.3 It is argued that locating the protection of gay rights 
specifically within the protection of privacy has limited the scope for the evolution of gay 
rights.45 In contrast until recently there have been far fewer arguments made under Article 
14, which is the non-discrimination clause in the ECHR. Article 14 (equality) is a conditional 
right which can only be asserted where another alleged violation of the ECHR is made 
simultaneously.6 Throughout its earlier judgments in the area of gay rights the ECtHR did not 
find it necessary to consider the arguments brought forward on the basis of Article 14. In 
Dudgeon v UK, the ECtHR found that ‘there is no call to rule on the merits’ of Article 14 as the 
same complaint had already been examined under Article 8’7 and this set a trend for further 
cases following the same approach.8 Whilst more recent cases have given credence to 
arguments of equality,9 these continue to have to be made in connection with Article 8. The 
success of equality arguments has also been limited.10 In relation to same-sex marriage, a 
wide margin of appreciation was afforded to contracting states to determine their own 
policies, due to a lack of consensus.11   
                                                          
3 Cases include for example Dudgeon v UK, Application No 7525/76, Judgment of 22 October 1981; Sutherland 
v UK, Application No 25186/94, Judgment of 21 May 1996; Smith and Grady v UK, Application Nos 33985/96 and   
 
4 /96, Judgment of 27 September 1999 and Lustig-Prean and Beckett v UK, Application Nos 31417/96 and 
32377/96, Judgment of 27 September 1999.   
 
5 Paul Johnson, ‘An Essentially Private Manifestation of Human Personality’: Constructions of Homosexuality in 
the European Court of Human Rights’ (2010) 10(1) Human Rights Law Review 67.   
 
6 See for further explanation George Letsas, ‘Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation’ (2006) 26(4) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 705 at 708.   
 
7 Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1982) 4 E.H.R.R. 149 at paragraph 69. Michele Grigolo, ‘Sexualities and the ECHR: 
Introducing the Universal Sexual Legal Subject’ (2003) 14(5) European Journal of International Law 1023 reports 
at 1030 that in this case the ‘[c]ourt did not find it necessary to examine the case under Article 14.’    
 
8 See for example ADT v UK (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 33 at paragraph 40, Lustig-Prean and Beckett v UK (2000) 29 
E.H.R.R .548 at paragraphs 107-109 and Smith and Grady v UK (2000) 29 E.H.R.R. 493 at paragraphs 114 – 116.   
 
9 Cases where the ECtHR has given more emphasis to equality arguments include for example Karner v Austria, 
Application No 40016/98, Judgment of 24 July 2003,Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v Portugal, Application No 
33290/96, Lardner v Austria, Application No 18297/03, Judgment of 3 February, EB v France, X and Others v 
Austria, Application No 19010/07, Judgment of 19 February 2013.   
 
10 For example Schalk and Kopf v Austria 53 E.H.R.R. 20.   
 
11 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 20 at paragraph 105.   
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Concentration upon the protection of privacy, means that the ECtHR has not evaluated 
and developed equality arguments under Article 14. It is necessary to engage in equality 
arguments in relation to the case for same-sex marriage, which is a concept very much on the 
public stage. Equality arguments make a strong case for same-sex marriage because of the 
close connections between equality, citizenship and marriage. This piece considers specific 
difficulties for the ECtHR in utilizing the equality argument.   
The Limitations of the Privacy Argument in Relation to Same-Sex Marriage    
Arguments based on privacy12 result in basic protections for gays, and would not be 
successful in relation to same-sex marriage. The stress on privacy before the ECtHR has 
resulted in what  Johnson describes as a ‘significant limitation… in respect of the ‘evolution’ 
of lesbian and gay human  rights across Europe.’13 Marriage is a concept very much on the 
public stage and cannot be protected by a right to be ‘let alone.’ Whilst privacy was a valuable 
argument when considering the early gay rights cases such as the decriminalisation of 
sodomy, this argument is no longer so effective when gays want to obtain public rights such 
as same-sex marriage.   
The difference between being protected under privacy as opposed to equality has a 
huge impact upon the extent of the rights protected. Bamforth argues that this debate is 
important on a constitutional level.14 Whilst privacy is a right to be ‘let alone,’ in contrast 
equality is associated with citizenship and its public status.15 An important part of citizenship 
                                                          
 
12 The right to privacy has traditionally been defined as containing a focus on a right to be ‘let alone.’ It is 
described by Mill as ‘a circle around every individual human being which no government … ought to be permitted 
to overstep.’ John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy (London, New York and Toronto: Longmans Green 
and Co, 1936) at 943.   
 
13 Paul Johnson, ‘An Essentially Private Manifestation of Human Personality’: Constructions of Homosexuality in 
the European Court of Human Rights’ (2010) 10(1) Human Rights Law Review 67 at 76. For further criticism see 
also Eve Sedgewick, Epistemology of the Closet (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990) at 71 and Michele Grigolo, 
‘Sexualities and the  ECHR: Introducing the Universal Sexual Legal Subject’ (2003) 14(5) European Journal of 
International Law 1023 at 1040.  
 
14 Nicholas Bamforth, ‘Sexuality and Citizenship in Contemporary Constitutional Argument’ (2012) 10(2) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 477.   
 
15 Nicholas Bamforth, (2012) ‘Sexuality and Citizenship in Contemporary Constitutional Argument’ (2012) 10(2) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 477-492 at 478 referring to Marshall, ‘Citizenship and Social Class’, 
in Marshall and Bottomore (eds), (1992) Citizenship and Social Class 18.   
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in this context concerns its connections with marriage.16 Thus, depending on whether the 
ECtHR relies upon privacy or equality determines whether it will be possible to recognise 
same-sex marriage. In a traditional reliance upon privacy arguments, the ECtHR has limited its 
remit for development. This is in contrast to other jurisdictions that have relied successfully 
upon the equality argument in relation to same-sex marriage.17 It is argued that it is necessary 
for the ECtHR to engage with this argument in order to recognise same-sex marriage. 
Obstacles remain for the ECtHR in using the equality argument. Firstly, the equality argument 
has a wider margin of appreciation than that of privacy. Secondly, the equality argument 
requires categorisation of different groups of sexual orientation therefore reinforcing the idea 
of the heteronormative standard.  
 
Equality has a Wider Margin of Appreciation than Privacy   
 
In this section a specific disadvantage for the ECtHR in seeking to utilize the equality argument 
before the ECtHR is identified. The doctrine of margin of appreciation18 has come under 
criticism for many reasons, including vagueness, lack of transparency19 and the fact that it 
                                                          
16 See for further discussion Angela Harris, ‘Loving Before and After the Law’ (2007-2008) 76 Fordham  
International Law Review 2821 at 2822, Nicholas Bamforth, (2012) ‘Sexuality and Citizenship in Contemporary  
Constitutional Argument’ (2012) 10(2) International Journal of Constitutional Law 477, Nancy Cott, Public Vows: 
A History of Marriage and the Nation 2 (2000) at 1, Brenda Cossman, (2007) Sexual Citizens: The Legal and 
Cultural Regulation of Sex and Belonging 27, Dimitri Kochenov (2009) ‘On Options of Citizens and Moral Choices 
of States: Gays and European Federalism’ 33(1) Fordham International Law Review 156 at 163.  
  
17 See for example Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another (CCT 60/40)[2005] ZACC 19; 2006 
(3) BCLR 355 (CC); 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC), 1 December 2005 and and United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S.  (2013) 
(Docket No. 12-307).   
 
18 The margin of appreciation has been described as ‘amount of discretion...in fulfilling their obligations 
under the ECtHR’ Petra Butler, ‘Margin of Appreciation - A Note towards a solution for the Pacific’ (2008-2009) 
39 Victoria University Wellington Law Review 687 at 695 referring to Howard Charles Yourow, Margin of 
Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights Jurisprudence (Netherlands: Brill, 1996) at 13 
who describes the margin of appreciation as ‘[t]he latitude of deference or error which the Strasbourg organs 
will allow to national legislative, executive, administrative and judicial bodies.’   
 
19 See Emily Wada, ‘A Pretty Picture The Margin of Appreciation and the Right to Assisted Suicide’ (2005) 
27 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 275 at 280; Petra Butler, ‘Margin of 
Appreciation - A Note towards a solution for the Pacific’ (2008-2009) 39 Victoria University Wellington Law 
Review 687 at 702; Michael Hutchinson, ‘The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the European Court of Human 
Rights’ (1999) 48 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 638 at 641 and Jeffrey Brauch, ‘The Margin of 
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leaves the door open for potential discrimination against minorities.20 The criticism of the 
margin of appreciation here relates to the varying widths given to the margin of appreciation 
in respect of specific rights. In relation to privacy cases the ECtHR has confirmed that there is 
a narrow margin of appreciation,21 leading to a strong protection of privacy interests. This was 
justified in respect of privacy arguments because of the harm which the restriction of private 
sexual lives could do to individuals and also the consensus among contracting states that there 
is no need to criminalise such activities. Such arguments do not apply to same-sex marriage. 
Same-sex marriage cannot be brought forward on the basis of a privacy argument as it is a 
concept on the public stage. Instead an equality argument has to be used. In areas of little 
international consensus the ECtHR applies a wide margin of appreciation.22 It is therefore no 
                                                          
Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law’ (2004-
2005) 11  113 at 121.  
20 See Loveday Hudson, ‘A Marriage by any other name? Shalk and Kopf v Austria’ 11(1) Human Rights Law 
Review 170. See also Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Standards’ (1998-1999) 
31 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 843 and George Letsas, ‘Strasbourg’s 
Interpretative Ethic: Lessons for the International Lawyer’ European Journal of International Law 509, Sweeney, 
‘Margin of Appreciation: Cultural relativity and the European Court of Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era’ 
(2005) 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 459 at 462 quoting Lester, ‘Universality versus 
Subsidiarity: a Reply’ (1998) 1 European Human Rights Law Review 73 at 76 and Frances Hamilton, ‘Why 
Margin of Appreciation is Not the Answer to the Gay Marriage Debate’2013(1) European Human Rights 
Law Review 47.   
 
21 See Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1982) 4 E.H.R.R. 149 at paragraph 52, Lustig-Prean and Beckett 
v UK (2000) 29 E.H.R.R. 548 at paragraph 82 and in Smith and Grady (2000) 29 E.H.R.R. 493 at 
paragraph 89 the ECtHR discussed the fact that since these cases concerned ‘a most intimate part of 
an individual’s private life’, there must exist ‘particularly serious reasons’ before such interferences can 
satisfy the requirements of Article 8 paragraph 2 of the Convention.’ See also ADT v UK (2001) 31 
E.H.R.R. 33 at paragraph 38.   
 
22 Tom Lewis, ‘What not to wear: Religious rights, the European Court and the Margin of Appreciation’ 
(2007) 56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 395 at 397; Rafaella Nigro, ‘The Margin of 
Appreciation Doctrine and the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights on the Islamic Veil’ 
(2010) 11 Human Rights Law Review 531; Michael Hutchinson, ‘The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine 
in the European Court of Human Rights’ (1999) 48 International and  Comparative Law Quarterly 638 
and Emily Wada, ‘A Pretty Picture The Margin of Appreciation and the Right to Assisted Suicide’ (2005) 
27 Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review at 279 who comments that while 
the ‘presence of a consensus does not of itself mean that there is a [narrow] margin of appreciation… 
the absence of a consensus is probably a decisive factor in finding that there is a [wide] margin of 
appreciation.’ See also Jeffrey Brauch, ‘The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law’ (2004-2005) 11 Columbia Journal of 
European Law 113 at 128.   
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surprise that when it came to same-sex marriage a wide margin of appreciation was found. In 
Schalk and Kopf v Austria, the ECtHR stated that ‘[t]he issue of same-sex marriage concerned 
a sensitive area of social, political and religious controversy. In the absence of consensus, the 
State enjoyed a particularly wide margin of appreciation.’23 In moving from privacy as the 
main focus of gay rights to an equality argument, the ECtHR has potentially weakened 
protection for gays by moving from the universally understood right of privacy to the more  
amorphous right of equality.24 The next section considers a further difficulty with the use of 
the equality argument by the ECtHR.   
The Equality Argument Requires Categorisation of Individuals into Classes of 
Sexual Orientation   
Throughout its case law the ECtHR refers to gays as ‘homosexuals’, creating a clear 
categorisation of sexual interests.25 This was the common practice of the ECtHR, but in using 
a privacy argument there was scope for moving away from this practice should it become to 
be seen as unfavourable. Categorisation of individuals into different groups dependent upon 
sexual orientation means that the idea of the heteronormative stereotype is reinforced.26 
When the equality argument is deployed it becomes a requirement to categorise individuals 
into classes of sexual orientation, as equality necessitates comparisons to be made between 
different groups. The categorisation of individuals is harmful as it means that minority groups 
are asserting their ‘other’ness against the ‘heteronormal’ group, and further it creates an 
identitarian crisis as individuals have to fit themselves within specific boxes which may be 
inappropriate. The deployment of the equality argument exacerbates these critiques.    
Queer theorists challenge the categorisation of relationships into homosexual and 
heterosexual and argue that categories should not be seen ‘fixed and given.’27 This could lead 
                                                          
23 Schalk and Kopf v Austria 53 EHRR 20 at paragraph 45. 
    
24 See also Douglas Lee Donoho, ‘Autonomy, Self-Governance, and the Margin of Appreciation: 
Developing a Jurisprudence of Diversity within Universal Human Rights’ (2001) 15 Emory International 
Law Review 391 at 416-417.   
 
25 See for example Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1982) 4 E.H.R.R. 149 at paragraph 32; Sutherland v 
UK, Admissability, Application Number 25186/94, 21 May 1996 at paragraph 2; Lustig-Prean and 
Beckett v UK (2000) 29 E.H.R.R. 548 at paragraph 67; Smith and Grady (2000) 29 E.H.R.R. 493 at 
paragraph 74 and Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v Portugal (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 47 at paragraph 30.   
 
26 Michele Grigolo, ‘Sexualities and the ECHR: Introducing the Universal Sexual Legal Subject’ (2003) 
14(5) European Journal of International Law 1023 on this practice.   
27 See Ibid. and Felicia Kornbluh, ‘Queer Legal History: A Field Grows Up and Comes Out’ (2011) 
36(2) Law and Social Inquiry 537.   
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to an identitarian crisis for those individuals who are forced to identify with a certain group, 
thereby eroding the true variety of identities to which individuals may ascribe.28 By ascribing 
labels to certain categories such as the use of homosexual, this is turn forcing individuals to 
join a particular group in order to bring legal challenges. It also confirms the dominance of the 
heteronormative norm. Grigolo explains that categorisation into different sexual groups is 
disadvantageous because it ‘reinforces the dichotomy within which the ‘other’ ...is defined’ 
meaning that the ‘position for the dominant (the heterosexual man) is confirmed and 
stabilised.’29 It is argued that the use of equality argument has exacerbated the need to 
categorise individuals into groups of sexual interests, as equality necessitates a comparison 
to be made.30    
Conclusion   
This piece sets out some of the specific difficulties facing the ECtHR in seeking to engage 
in the equality argument as opposed to privacy. It is necessary to deploy the use of the 
equality argument because of the close connections between the interlocking concepts of 
marriage, equality and citizenship. International examples from South Africa and the US have 
also demonstrated the importance of the equality argument on the international stage.31 As 
Polikoff, a queer theorist, states ‘when the claim for same-sex marriage is based on equality 
                                                          
 
28 See Ibid. See also Michele Grigolo, ‘Sexualities and the ECHR: Introducing the Universal Sexual 
Legal Subject’ (2003) 14(5) European Journal of International Law 1023 at 1027-1028; and Felicia 
Kornbluh, ‘Queer Legal History: A Field Grows Up and Comes Out’ (2011) 36(2) Law and Social Inquiry 
537 at 539.   
 
29 Michele Grigolo, ‘Sexualities and the ECHR: Introducing the Universal Sexual Legal Subject’ (2003) 
14(5) European Journal of International Law 1023 at 1025.   
 
30 See Marta Cartabia, ‘The European Court of Human Rights: Judging non-discrimination’ (2011) 9(4) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 808-814 at 812 Cartabia notes that ‘the very structure of the 
discrimination test as such is responsible for the unpredictable outcomes of the controversies’ because 
‘… [as] a matter of fact, judging non-discrimination implies drawing a comparison between different 
persons and situations.’   
 
31 See for example Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another (CCT 60/40)[2005] 
ZACC 19; 2006 (3) BCLR 355 (CC); 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) (1 December 2005) and United States v. 
Windsor, 570 U.S.  (2013) (Docket No. 12-307).   
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it can still be problematic.’32 It has been demonstrated that the ECtHR traditionally focused 
on privacy as a justification, meaning that equality has not been the main focus for the ECtHR. 
The text of the ECHR itself does not aid the ECtHR as article 14 is a conditional right. The free 
standing right to equality under Protocol 12 has not been ratified by the UK. Also in deploying 
the equality argument the ECtHR is moving from the privacy concept which has a narrow 
margin of appreciation, to a much wider margin of appreciation under an equality doctrine 
around which there is a variable standard and therefore less guaranteed protection for gays 
and same-sex couples. Finally, the equality argument presupposes categorisation of 
individuals into certain specific boxes of sexual interest. This may not be desirable either 
because of the strengthening of the heteronormative approach of the ECtHR or because of 
the difficulties of individuals in identifying with certain set categories. It has become necessary 
for the ECtHR to deploy arguments based on equality when cases are brought concerning 
same-sex marriage, but the author has here articulated some of the specific difficulties for the 
ECtHR in this regard. The way forward based on equality is not easy, and it is arguably for that 
reason that the  ECtHR in Schalk and Kopf v Austria settled for a lack of consensus argument.33    
                                                          
32 Nancy Polikoff, ‘Equality and Justice for Lesbian and Gay Families and Relationships’ (2008-2009) 
61 Rutgers Law Review 529 at 547.  
  
33 Schalk and Kopf v Austria 53 EHRR 20 at paragraph 45.   
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Rights for LGBTQ persons: MB v Secretary of 
State for Work and Pensions 
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Family Law 
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Annulment; Direct discrimination; EU law; Gender recognition certificates; Marriage; Sex 
discrimination; State retirement pension; Transsexuals 
 
Abstract  
Discusses MB v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (C-451/16) (ECJ) on whether the 
denial of a state pension to a transgender person living as a woman when she reached the age 
of 60 in 2008, on the ground that she had not obtained a gender recognition certificate due to 
her wish not to annul her marriage, a condition at the time, had infringed the non-
discrimination provisions of Directive 79/7 art.4. 
Cases cited  
MB v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (C-451/16) EU:C:2018:492; [2019] 1 
C.M.L.R. 4; [2018] 6 WLUK 500 (ECJ (Grand Chamber))  
Coman v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrari (C-673/16) EU:C:2018:385; [2019] 1 W.L.R. 
425; [2018] 6 WLUK 15 (ECJ (Grand Chamber))  
Legislation cited  
Directive 79/7 on equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security art.4  
Gender Recognition Act 2004 (c.7)s.4  
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 European Court of Justice of rights for LGBTQ persons.  
In the case of MB v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions[Case C-451/16] [2018] Pens. L.R. 17, the European 
Court of Justice (‘CJEU’) determined that the requirement of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 (‘GRA 2004’), 
which required trans persons to annul their marriage before they would be granted a full Gender Recognition 
Certificate in their new sex (prior to same-sex marriage being legalised in 2013), which was also necessary to 
claim state pension benefits for women from the age of 60, contravened Article 4 Council Directive 79//7/EEC 
non-discrimination provisions. The consequence of the GRA 2004 provisions meant that many individuals never 
obtained gender recognition certificates as they did not want to annul their marriages. This subsequently meant 
that they could not exercise the right to claim the state pension at the lower age of 60 previously given to women 
(where men had to wait until 65). The far reaching judgment from the CJEU demonstrates again that the 
expanding nature of EU family law. The concept of EU citizenship is leading to an ever greater array of rights 
being given to EU citizens. Following Brexit UK citizens will no longer be able to benefit from such interventions 
from the CJEU.  
Introduction 
The case of MB v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [Case C-451/16] [2018] Pens. L.R. 17 (‘the MB 
case’) concerned a trans person who was born a male in 1948 and married in 1974. She subsequently underwent 
gender reassignment surgery in 1995. When she sought to claim her state pension at the age of 60 in 2008 she was 
rejected. At the time (prior to state pension reform) whilst women were entitled to access their pensions from the 
age of 60, men had to wait until 65 (s44 Social Security Contributions Act 1992 read in conjunction with s122 of 
that Act and with Schedule 4 paragraph1 of the Pensions Act 1995). MB was rejected on the basis that the UK 
state still officially classified her as a male. This was because MB had never obtained a full Gender Recognition 
Certificate. MB had not completed this legal process because the Gender Recognition Act (‘GRA 2004’) in force 
at the time, prior to the legalisation of same-sex marriage in 2013, required a married applicant to annul their 
marriage. MB did not wish to annul her marriage.  
At the time the GRA was enacted in 2004 the UK had only legalised civil partnership, by way of the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004, and not same-sex marriage. In 2004 it was considered by some that although civil 
partnerships had given nearly the same legal rights to same-sex couples, that UK society was not ready for same-
sex marriage. Jacqui Smith (then Deputy Minister for Women and Equality) stated in the House of Commons that 
‘I recognise that Hon. Members on both sides of the House understand and feel very strongly about specific 
religious connotations of marriage’ (See Hansard, HC, 12 October 2004, Col 177). The GRA 2004 therefore 
provided that in order to obtain a full gender recognition certificate not only did strict medical conditions have to 
be met but that also that a married applicant had to have their marriage annulled by the court (section 4(3) and 
section 5 GRA 2004). This provision was only reformed following the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, 
Schedule 5 of which amended s4 GRA 2004 to provide that a full gender recognition certificate could be issued 
to a married applicant if their spouse consents.  
The original requirements of the GRA 2004 requiring a marriage to be annulled before a full gender recognition 
certificate could be issued required a very ‘painful and sensitive decision’ for many trans persons in stable 
marriages who had no desire to divorce (see for comment http://www.journalonline.co.uk/Magazine/54-
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10/1007115.aspx). Whilst a consequence of the Same Sex Marriage 2013 provisions is that ‘trans persons are no 
longer forced to choose between the legal recognition of their relationship or of their gender identity’ (See 
Charlotte Bendall, ‘Publication Review. From Civil Partnership to Same Sex Marriage: Interdisciplinary 
Reflections’ Eds, by Nicola Barker and Daniel Monk , Int. J.L.C. 2017, 13(3), 429-432 at page 430) the MB case 
demonstrates the continued impact of the previous legislation. MB’s case will be one of many where trans persons 
continue to be affected. Further in Northern Ireland whilst civil partnership legislation has been in force since 
2004, there continues to be no recognition of same-sex marriage.  
Role of the European Court of Justice (‘CJEU’) 
In the MB case before the CJEU the question raised was whether the UK legislation was discriminatory on the 
grounds of sex, contrary to Article 4 of Council Directive 79/7/EEC. This directive provides that there should be 
a principle of equal treatment and ‘no discrimination whatsoever on ground of sex either directly or indirectly…’  
On behalf of the UK Secretary of State for Work and Pensions the argument was made that it should be for 
Member States ‘to determine the conditions under which a person’s change of gender may be legally recognised’ 
(paragraph 23 MB judgment). It was argued that this should not only relate to physical and psychological criteria, 
but also criteria relating to marital status (paragraph 23 MB judgment). The UK government relied upon previous 
case law from the CJEU which  the UK government argued had accorded an area of discretion to Member State’s 
in this area (Judgement 7 January 2004, KB v NHS Pensions Agency (C-117-01) EU: C: 2004: 7 [2004] 1 CMLR 
28 at paragraph 35 and of 27 April 2006, Richards v Secretary of State of Work and Pensions (C243-04) EU:C; 
2006: 256 [2006] 2 CMLR 49 at paragraph 21).  
According an area of discretion to Member States in sensitive areas of family law also reflects the position of the 
European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’). Although the ECtHR has made important judgements in favour of 
recognising trans persons rights (for example see Christine Goodwin v UK Application 28957/95, Judgment of 
11th July 2002) the ECtHR continues to allows Member States to make recognition of a change of gender 
conditional on annulment of that person’s marriage (16 July 2014, Hamalainen v Finland (37359/09) [2015] 1 
FCR 379 / 37 BHRC 55). In the related area of same-sex marriage, ultimately the ECtHR has left this to the 
discretion of the Member State (Schalk and Kopf v Austria (App. No. 30141/04)). Although the ECtHR has 
recognised that a ‘co-habiting same-sex couple living in a stable relationship’ fall under the notion of ‘family life’ 
(Schalk and Kopf v Austria at paragraph 94), and the ECtHR has accorded same-sex couples some right of legal 
protection, dependent upon the factual circumstances existing upon the ground of that member state (Oliari v Italy 
App Nos 18766/11 and 36030/11 (ECtHR, 31 July 2015), ultimately the ECtHR has stopped short of recognising 
same-sex marriage due to concerns about imposing upon Member States’ ‘deep rooted social and cultural’ 
concerns (Schalk and Kopf v Austria para 62). This in turn leads to a wide margin of appreciation, or area of 
discretion being granted to Member States (see Schalk and Kopf v Austria para 105) when it comes to recognising 
same-sex marriage.  
However, although traditionally the EU has similarly always determined that subsidiarity should take precedence 
(see for instance commentary on art 9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union which states 
that Member States do not have an ‘explicit requirement to facilitate [same-sex] marriages’) a recent case has 
demonstrated that the CJEU is prepared to make far reaching judgments in this area. In the case of C-673/16 Relu 
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Adrian Coman and Others v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări and Others (‘Coman’) the CJEU determined 
that a non-EU citizen same-sex spouse should be granted the right of permanent residence when their EU citizen 
same-sex spouse relocated to a different state in the EU. This is the case even where the couple relocate to another 
jurisdiction (in the Coman case Romania) which does not allow any recognition of same-sex partnerships. 
Although the CJEU judgement in no way required EU states to recognise same-sex marriage, it has greatly 
enhanced EU free movement rights for same sex couples. It has also set a precedent for the CJEU in extending 
rights for same-sex couples and GLBTQ individuals more broadly.   
In MB the CJEU ultimately determined that although Member States continue to have authority and competence 
when determining matters of civil status and legal recognition of gender, Member States must exercise this 
authority in such a way to comply with provisions relating to the principle of non-discrimination. In MB close 
examination was made by the CJEU of Article 4 of Directive 79/7 which prohibits all forms of discrimination on 
grounds of sex as regards social security. Ultimately the GRA section 4 conditions which required an annulment 
of marriage as a condition to access a state pension for persons who had changed sex, was considered to be direct 
discrimination on the grounds of sex (see MB paragraph 29). 
Conclusion 
The MB case is noteworthy on a number of different levels. The judgment itself extends the rights of trans persons 
who under the GRA 2004 were required to annul their marriages in order to access state retirement benefits from 
the age of 60 for women. As many trans persons, including the applicant in the MB case, did not wish to annul 
their marriages they were not able to obtain a Gender Recognition certificate or subsequently the state pension 
entitlements which all other women could access. This has been found by the CJEU to be direct discrimination 
contrary to Article 4 of Directive 79/7 which prohibits all forms of discrimination on grounds of sex as regards 
social security (see MB paragraph 29). On another level the MB case alongside the recent Coman judgment 
represents a further intervention by the CJEU in the development of rights for LGBTQ individuals. This again 
demonstrates the ever expanding nature of EU family law. The concept of EU citizenship is leading to an ever 
greater array of rights being given to EU citizens. Following Brexit UK citizens will no longer be able to benefit 
from such interventions from the CJEU.  
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